Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Platonic dispositionalism.', Mind., 122 (486). pp. 451-480.
In this paper I argue that if one subscribes to dispositionalism — the view that natural properties are irreducibly dispositional in character — then one ought to favour a Platonic view of properties. That is, dispositionalists ought to view properties as transcendent universals. I argue for this on the grounds that only with transcendent universals in play can two central dispositionalist platitudes be accounted for in a satisfactory way. Given that dispositionalism is becoming an increasingly influential view in the metaphysics of science, my argument, if successful, suggests that Platonism will see something of a revival in contemporary metaphysics. This new kind of Platonism is shown to have some striking metaphysical and epistemological consequences.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071|
|Publisher statement:||This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Platonic dispositionalism.', Mind., 122 (486). pp. 451-480 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071.|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||01 September 2015|
|Date of first online publication:||April 2013|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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