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Platonic dispositionalism.

Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Platonic dispositionalism.', Mind., 122 (486). pp. 451-480.

Abstract

In this paper I argue that if one subscribes to dispositionalism — the view that natural properties are irreducibly dispositional in character — then one ought to favour a Platonic view of properties. That is, dispositionalists ought to view properties as transcendent universals. I argue for this on the grounds that only with transcendent universals in play can two central dispositionalist platitudes be accounted for in a satisfactory way. Given that dispositionalism is becoming an increasingly influential view in the metaphysics of science, my argument, if successful, suggests that Platonism will see something of a revival in contemporary metaphysics. This new kind of Platonism is shown to have some striking metaphysical and epistemological consequences.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071
Publisher statement:This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Platonic dispositionalism.', Mind., 122 (486). pp. 451-480 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071.
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:01 September 2015
Date of first online publication:April 2013
Date first made open access:No date available

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