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Nomic necessity for Platonists.

Tugby, M. (2013) 'Nomic necessity for Platonists.', Thought : a journal of philosophy., 2 (4). pp. 324-331.


After identifying some existing explanations offered by nomic necessitarians for the alleged necessary connections between natural properties and their dispositional or nomic features, I discuss a less explored necessitarian strategy. This strategy is available to Platonists who hold that properties exist necessarily, as most do.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:Article first published online: 6 January 2014
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Publisher statement:This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Tugby, M. (2013), Nomic Necessity for Platonists. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(4): 324-331, which has been published in final form at This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:01 September 2015
Date of first online publication:December 2013
Date first made open access:No date available

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