Tugby, M. (2013) 'Nomic necessity for Platonists.', Thought : a journal of philosophy., 2 (4). pp. 324-331.
Abstract
After identifying some existing explanations offered by nomic necessitarians for the alleged necessary connections between natural properties and their dispositional or nomic features, I discuss a less explored necessitarian strategy. This strategy is available to Platonists who hold that properties exist necessarily, as most do.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Article first published online: 6 January 2014 |
| Full text: | (AM) Accepted Manuscript Download PDF (79Kb) |
| Status: | Peer-reviewed |
| Publisher Web site: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.99 |
| Publisher statement: | This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Tugby, M. (2013), Nomic Necessity for Platonists. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(4): 324-331, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.99. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving. |
| Date accepted: | No date available |
| Date deposited: | 01 September 2015 |
| Date of first online publication: | December 2013 |
| Date first made open access: | No date available |
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