Tugby, M. (2013) 'Nomic necessity for Platonists.', Thought : a journal of philosophy., 2 (4). pp. 324-331.
After identifying some existing explanations offered by nomic necessitarians for the alleged necessary connections between natural properties and their dispositional or nomic features, I discuss a less explored necessitarian strategy. This strategy is available to Platonists who hold that properties exist necessarily, as most do.
|Additional Information:||Article first published online: 6 January 2014|
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.99|
|Publisher statement:||This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Tugby, M. (2013), Nomic Necessity for Platonists. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(4): 324-331, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.99. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||01 September 2015|
|Date of first online publication:||December 2013|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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