Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties

Tugby, Matthew

doi:10.1007/s11229-013-0316-y

Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties

Tugby, Matthew

Authors

Professor Matthew Tugby matthew.tugby@durham.ac.uk
Professor

Abstract

Notoriously, the dispositional view of natural properties is thought to face a number of regress problems, one of which points to an epistemological worry. In this paper, I argue that the rival categorical view is also susceptible to the same kind of regress problem. This problem can be overcome, most plausibly, with the development of a structuralist epistemology. After identifying problems faced by alternative solutions, I sketch the main features of this structuralist epistemological approach, referring to graph-theoretic modelling in the process. Given that both the categoricalists and dispositionalists are under pressure to adopt this same epistemological approach in light of the regress problem, this suggests that the categoricalist versus dispositionalist debate is best fought on metaphysical rather than epistemological grounds.

Citation

Tugby, M. (2014). Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties. Synthese, 191(6), 1147-1162. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0316-y

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Jul 12, 2013
Online Publication Date	Jul 26, 2013
Publication Date	Apr 1, 2014
Deposit Date	Oct 7, 2013
Publicly Available Date	Sep 1, 2015
Journal	Synthese
Print ISSN	0039-7857
Electronic ISSN	1573-0964
Publisher	Springer
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	191
Issue	6
Pages	1147-1162
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0316-y