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Causal nominalism and the one over many problem.

Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Causal nominalism and the one over many problem.', Analysis., 73 (3). pp. 455-462.

Abstract

The causal nominalist theory of properties appears at first glance to offer a novel nominalist approach and one that can provide an illuminating response to the one over many problem. I argue, however, that on closer inspection causal ‘nominalism’ collapses into either a version of realism or a mere variant of one of the traditional nominalist approaches. In the case of Whittle’s specific brand of causal nominalism, I suggest it is best thought of as a version of what Armstrong calls ‘ostrich’ nominalism, a view which ultimately refuses to acknowledge the one over many problem rather than provide a solution to it.

Item Type:Article
Keywords:Dispositions, Nominalism, One over many.
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant038
Publisher statement:This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Causal nominalism and the one over many problem.', Analysis., 73 (3). pp. 455-462 is available online at: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/73/3/455.
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:01 September 2015
Date of first online publication:July 2013
Date first made open access:No date available

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