Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Causal nominalism and the one over many problem.', Analysis., 73 (3). pp. 455-462.
The causal nominalist theory of properties appears at first glance to offer a novel nominalist approach and one that can provide an illuminating response to the one over many problem. I argue, however, that on closer inspection causal ‘nominalism’ collapses into either a version of realism or a mere variant of one of the traditional nominalist approaches. In the case of Whittle’s specific brand of causal nominalism, I suggest it is best thought of as a version of what Armstrong calls ‘ostrich’ nominalism, a view which ultimately refuses to acknowledge the one over many problem rather than provide a solution to it.
|Keywords:||Dispositions, Nominalism, One over many.|
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant038|
|Publisher statement:||This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Causal nominalism and the one over many problem.', Analysis., 73 (3). pp. 455-462 is available online at: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/73/3/455.|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||01 September 2015|
|Date of first online publication:||July 2013|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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