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The financial crisis : a reason to improve shareholder protection in the EU?

Mukwiri, Jonathan and Siems, Mathias (2014) 'The financial crisis : a reason to improve shareholder protection in the EU?', Journal of law and society., 41 (1). pp. 51-72.

Abstract

The global financial crisis of 2008 has stimulated the debate on corporate governance and shareholder protection. The intuitive reason for the topicality of shareholder protection is that insolvencies mainly harm shareholders as the companies' residual claimants. In addition, ideally, shareholder empowerment may ensure better monitoring of management and therefore better-run companies preventing corporate failures and benefiting the economy as a whole. Yet, it is not self-evident that shareholder participation has such a positive effect. This article critically examines the discussion about the relationship between the financial crisis, shareholder protection, and law reform. We also develop a central position: while there may be a need to improve shareholder protection, we do not take the view that any increase in shareholder rights is the right way forward; rather, such reforms should aim to encourage shareholder engagement by responsible long-term investors.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:Workshop date: 21 September 2012.
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2014.00656.x
Publisher statement:This is the accepted version of the following article: Mukwiri, Jonathan and Siems, Mathias (2014) 'The financial crisis : a reason to improve shareholder protection in the EU?', Journal of law and society., 41 (1). pp. 51-72, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2014.00656.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Date accepted:05 November 2013
Date deposited:20 January 2015
Date of first online publication:18 February 2014
Date first made open access:No date available

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