

Durham Research Online

Deposited in DRO:

25 March 2015

Version of attached file:

Accepted Version

Peer-review status of attached file:

Peer-reviewed

Citation for published item:

Steinberg, P.E. and Bruun, J.M. and Medby, I.A. (2014) 'Covering Kiruna : a natural experiment in Arctic awareness.', *Polar geography.*, 37 (4). pp. 273-297.

Further information on publisher's website:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2014.978409>

Publisher's copyright statement:

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor Francis Group in *Polar Geography* on 26/11/2014, available online at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/1088937X.2014.978409>.

Additional information:


Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a [link](#) is made to the metadata record in DRO
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the [full DRO policy](#) for further details.



Covering Kiruna: A natural experiment in Arctic awareness

Journal:	<i>Polar Geography</i>
Manuscript ID:	TPOG-2014-0022
Manuscript Type:	Original Article
Keywords:	Arctic Council, Kiruna, Media, Permanent observers

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

Covering Kiruna: A natural experiment in Arctic awareness

Abstract

At a time when the Arctic is attracting increasing international attention and a variety of actors are positioning themselves in anticipation of future developments, news reporters across the world face the challenge of explaining why the Arctic is relevant to the lives and realities of audiences, some of whom are far from the region itself. This challenge was felt particularly profoundly in May 2013, when events and controversies surrounding the Kiruna Arctic Council meeting tasked journalists around the world with explaining to their audiences what it means to have a legitimate interest in the Arctic and why the Arctic *matters* at a global scale. Media coverage from the eight Arctic Council member states, six candidate states, and six existing permanent observer states thus presented a natural experiment in Arctic awareness. In this article, an analysis of 280 news stories reporting on the Kiruna meeting is used to reveal how the media frame the Arctic as a region of increasing global significance – a region in which present-day participation is a strategic positioning for the future, and in which political presence holds symbolic significance for geopolitical relations far beyond the region's latitudinal borders.

Keywords: Arctic Council, Kiruna, Media, Permanent observers

The age of the Arctic media event

When the 'age of the Arctic' was heralded a decade ago, few could have foreseen the role that the Arctic and, in particular, Arctic politics, would come to have in the eyes of the world. This phrase was coined by Oshorenko and Young (2005) with reference to policy-makers concerned with military, industrial, environmental, and indigenous interests. However, these policy-makers are also news-makers. Indeed, individuals involved in Arctic policy debates often engage the media to translate their interests beyond the conference center, the boardroom, or the military command post, and enlist public support for what their investors and voters perceive as high-risk ventures in distant regions. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the 'age of the Arctic' has also become the 'age of the Arctic news-making event.'

In this article, we focus on one such Arctic news-making event, the eighth Arctic Council ministerial meeting, which took place on May 15, 2013 in Kiruna, Sweden. In particular, we analyze media stories surrounding the event. In Kiruna, as perhaps never before, news organizations from around the world were prompted to report on Arctic politics. While this was partly due to the scale of the event, it was also because of the meeting's most prominent controversy: the question of granting permanent observer status to fourteen inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and non-Arctic states. Consequently, news media from around the world and, in particular, those based in Arctic Council member states, existing permanent observer states, and states that were seeking permanent observer status were led to opine on why the Arctic *mattered*.

Of course, the dynamics of this coverage played out differently, depending on each country's relationship with the Arctic Council and, more broadly, the Arctic region. The media in member countries with strong Arctic identities (e.g. Canada, Norway, Russia) had to explain to their audiences why the Arctic was not simply a national or regional concern. By contrast, in member countries with less central Arctic identities (e.g. Denmark, the USA), the media were less obliged to defend the sanctity of the

1
2
3 nation's Arctic patrimony. In the (mostly Asian) non-Arctic countries seeking
4 permanent observer status, the media were faced with informing citizens that,
5 according to their governments, their countries had important interests in the distant
6 North. Finally, in the (European) non-Arctic countries already holding permanent
7 observer status, citizens likely were unaware of their government's Arctic interests and
8 reporters therefore had the delicate task of reporting on the controversy over *other*
9 non-Arctic countries' involvement while either educating about or ignoring their own
10 country's role. Thus, in all of these countries, albeit in different ways, the media had to
11 explain to a (usually) distant public why they should care about the Arctic, whether as
12 an Arctic Council member, permanent observer candidate, or existing permanent
13 observer.

14
15
16 As we discuss below, the media frequently carried out these tasks by narrating
17 selective interpretations of Arctic pasts and futures to explain current political conflict
18 that was being waged through the debate over Arctic Council expansion. The portrayal
19 of the Arctic as a space of anticipatory futures, requiring proactive policy responses, is
20 characteristic of Arctic media stories in general (Dodds 2013). However, even as
21 journalists covering the Kiruna meeting spun these 'anticipatory' narratives, they were
22 bound by the need to reaffirm (or construct) among their audiences a sense of why
23 specific state and non-state actors should or should not be understood as having a
24 legitimate interest in the Arctic region. In this article, we analyze 280 Arctic Council-
25 focused stories from the eight Arctic Council member states, six permanent observer
26 candidate states, and six existing permanent observer states, from the weeks
27 immediately before and after the Kiruna meeting, when the news world was abuzz with
28 the Arctic Council expansion debate.

29
30 As has been reported elsewhere (Graczyk 2012), positions on Arctic Council
31 expansion range from the argument that it will bring the organization increased
32 influence (Young, 2009) to concern that expansion will dilute the voices of Arctic states
33 and indigenous peoples (Gregoire 2013). Others note that expanding the permanent
34 observer category is of little consequence, since the status grants neither true
35 permanency nor notable powers (Koivurova 2009), and that the trend toward accepting
36 applications by states, but not by non-governmental organizations, is indicative of a
37 more thoroughgoing 'normalization' of the region (Steinberg and Dodds 2013). In this
38 article, however, the expansion debate is less the *object* of analysis than a *vehicle* for
39 understanding how the media, in countries with varying degrees of cultural, economic,
40 and geographic proximity to the Arctic, make sense of this region of increasing global
41 significance, as they explain its current political controversies and anticipate its future.
42 We therefore turn away from the specific debate about the Arctic Council and individual
43 countries' (or quoted politicians') views on expansion. Rather, we are interested in
44 coverage of the Kiruna meeting because it presents a *natural experiment in Arctic*
45 *awareness*.

46 47 48 49 ***Covering the Arctic as political space***

50 As sources of representation, interpretation, and dissemination of knowledge,
51 news media play a significant role in making sense of and communicating distant acts of
52 diplomacy to locally engaged citizens (Sharp 1993, 2000; Ó Tuathail 2002). While the
53 causal power of media representations has at times been exaggerated (Robinson 2011;
54 Pinkerton 2013), news coverage is nonetheless an important source of both spatial and
55 political discourse. Newsfeed thus contributes to the normalization of certain
56 geographical understandings and helps construct (in)visibilities on the global political
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 stage, thus guiding public opinion and concern (Boykoff 2011; Campbell 2007; Dittmer
4 and Dodds 2008; Sharp 2000).

5 While the power to frame political space is unevenly distributed between the
6 popular sphere and geopolitical elites, policy-makers are themselves affected by beliefs
7 and ideas circulating in the realm of popular culture (Sharp 2000). Geopolitical
8 categories normalized by news media may be mobilized by elites to render certain
9 policies natural, necessary, or unthinkable. Conversely, news media reproduce and
10 (re)interpret elite discourse. Hence, elite politics and popular newsfeed are
11 complementary and entangled (Adams 2013; Bennett 1990; Kuus 2008; Sharp 2000).

12 The media's function in interpolating between popular culture and elite politics
13 is particularly evident when a news organization covers a diplomatic event, such as an
14 Arctic Council ministerial meeting. Such events are distant from the everyday
15 experiences and concerns of most citizens, and are therefore understood primarily
16 through media reportage (Christensen 2013). When interpreting an event like the
17 Kiruna meeting, journalists often depend on elite sources, and the resulting media
18 storylines form largely in accordance with parameters established by national and
19 international political elites (see Pinkerton 2013). Additionally, communication flows
20 are channeled by the attitudes and expectations of would-be audiences who both affect
21 the content of news coverage and reinterpret it upon consumption in accordance with
22 their positionalities (Adams 2013; Dittmer and Dodds 2008; Dodds 2006). Media
23 interpretations are, among other things, affected by the 'geopolitical culture' of a state –
24 the way in which citizens see their home country, its identity, and its position in the
25 political world (Ó Tuathail 2006). Hence, media representations not only *shape* public
26 opinions, but may also *reflect* them, and in the process reaffirm national identities.

27 In the case of an Arctic Council meeting, the social distance between audiences
28 and the politicians making the news is, in most cases, matched by a geographic distance.
29 Few people residing outside the region have first-hand experience of the Arctic, even
30 within the so-called Arctic states. For this reason, media representations play an
31 important role as sources of Arctic identities and geopolitical imaginaries of the
32 national Self, the foreign Other, and the region itself. One-dimensional representations
33 of the Arctic as a frontier of endless dangers and possibilities, with the retracting sea-ice
34 signaling open-ended futures, therefore, have exceptional impact on public perceptions
35 and attitudes (Christensen 2013; Dodds 2013; Woon 2014). As a result, some actors are
36 scripted as 'natural stakeholders', while others are scripted as 'outsiders'. In this
37 fashion, media framings significantly affect processes of legitimizing Arctic policies
38 (Wilson Rowe 2013) and construct the Self and Other as (il)legitimate Arctic players.
39 Coverage of an event like the Kiruna meeting therefore not only imparts information
40 about the event itself; it also (re)produces conceptions of Arctic pasts and uses the
41 anticipation of projected futures to explain uncertain, unstable presents. In short, the
42 media professionals who covered the 2013 Arctic Council ministerial meeting were not
43 just reporting on a high-level diplomatic meeting. Through their framing of the debate,
44 they were also translating and reproducing the meaning of a region.

45 Journalists covering the Kiruna meeting were riding a wave of Arctic Council-
46 oriented news coverage that had grown steadily over the previous decade. Long a
47 relatively obscure and insignificant organization in a low-profile world region, coverage
48 of the Arctic Council had seen two notable spikes prior to 2013 (Figure 1), each of which
49 was broadly indicative of increased awareness of the Arctic as a space where
50 anticipated futures required present-day political solutions.¹ The first spike in coverage
51 occurred in November 2004, when the Arctic Council's Arctic Monitoring and
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Assessment Programme released its Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. An
4 unprecedented number of news stories appeared in the weeks that followed, rising
5 from 38 in the Nexis database for all of 2003 to 190 in just November and December of
6 2004.
7

8
9 **INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE**

10
11 Although coverage dropped slightly after 2004, it leveled off at considerably above the
12 pre-2004 rate, presumably due to increased general awareness of the region amidst
13 climate change. Coverage then increased steadily between 2007 and 2011 as a series of
14 events drew attention to the Arctic and, consequently, the Arctic Council. These events
15 included the planting of a Russian flag on the seabed beneath the North Pole (August
16 2007), the first recorded summer when the Northwest Passage was briefly suitable for
17 navigation without icebreaker escort (August-September 2007), the five-government
18 Ilulissat Declaration that sought to assure the world of the Arctic's political stability
19 (May 2008), the first non-Russian commercial transit of the Northern Sea Route
20 (August-September 2009), and the signing of the Arctic Council-facilitated search and
21 rescue agreement (May 2011).
22

23
24 Notwithstanding this pattern of continually increasing coverage, there was no
25 precedent for the exceptional spike that occurred in 2013, and particularly in May of
26 that year, in the weeks surrounding the Kiruna meeting (Figure 2). The foreign
27 ministers gathered at Kiruna used the meeting as a backdrop for signing the Arctic
28 Council's second binding agreement – on marine oil pollution preparedness and
29 response. Although the agreement likely would have attracted some attention on its
30 own, Greenpeace heightened its visibility by arguing that, in its view, it fell short of what
31 was needed to protect the region's environment. The meeting also saw a boycott by the
32 Greenlandic delegation, which protested its position as a subset of the Danish
33 delegation. However, the primary reason for the spike in 'Arctic Council' news coverage
34 was the controversy over expanding the Council's roster of permanent observers to
35 include an additional six states (China, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore),
36 four inter-governmental organizations (the European Union, the International
37 Hydrographic Organization, the OSPAR Commission, and the World Meteorological
38 Organization), and four non-governmental organizations (the Association of Oil and Gas
39 Producers, the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists, Greenpeace, and Oceana).
40 Among these, the greatest controversies surrounded the candidacies of China (because
41 of general wariness of its global influence), the European Union (because of its ban on
42 seal product imports), and Greenpeace (because of its strident environmentalist
43 opposition to a range of Arctic activities). The age of the Arctic media event had arrived,
44 and news organizations from around the world were poised to cover it.
45
46
47

48
49 **INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE**

50
51 ***Methodology***

52
53 In order to assess how the media explained the Arctic's importance in the weeks
54 surrounding the Kiruna meeting, we worked with thirteen research assistants to
55 identify and (when necessary) translate Arctic Council-related articles from the eight
56 Arctic Council member states, six permanent observer candidate states, and six pre-
57 existing permanent observer states. We set a target of twenty relevant news stories
58
59
60

1
2
3 from each of the member and candidate states, and five from each of the pre-existing
4 observer states, for a potential total of 310 news stories.

5 Conducting media analysis on an international dataset presents several
6 challenges. There are notable differences between national media cultures in terms of,
7 for example, levels of government control, story length, balance of national and regional
8 news outlets, cross-ownership between print and electronic media, political
9 partisanship, and rates of both interest and literacy in the audience population. For all
10 these reasons, even if one could obtain a representative sample of news stories within
11 one country, using a single sampling protocol to obtain a representative sample across
12 twenty countries would be inconceivable.

13
14 In lieu of seeking a representative sample, we sought a degree of stratification by
15 instructing research assistants to gather stories from sources that covered a range of
16 formats (print, broadcast, etc.), geographic scope (national, regional, local), political
17 orientation, and audience profiles. However, the only fixed quota for stratification was
18 by language in the five countries where there are significant linguistic minorities or
19 prominent newspapers in a second language (Canada (English/French), Denmark
20 (Danish/Faroese), Finland (Finnish/Swedish), India (English/Hindi), and Singapore
21 (Chinese/English)).²

22
23 Several of the research assistants failed to meet their quotas, especially in the
24 candidate states, resulting in 280 stories rather than the target number of 310 (table 1).
25 It is difficult to determine the cause of this shortfall. In the candidate states, one factor
26 could have been news organizations' reliance on wire service stories due to the expense
27 of covering a meeting in distant Sweden; certainly several assistants reported that they
28 found the same story reproduced in different news sources. Another reason may have
29 been the nature of the story itself: Whereas news organizations in the member states
30 may have felt that the event was already signified as being of interest due to their
31 country's Arctic Council membership, journalists in the candidate and observer
32 countries may have been unsure that stories about the meeting would attract an
33 audience. Of the 280 articles, 84 were published before the May 15 meeting, 75 on the
34 day itself, and 121 afterwards.

35 36 37 38 **INSERT TABLE 1 HERE**

39
40 Because the articles were not gathered in a representative fashion, evaluation of
41 the data using analytic statistics was not undertaken. Rather, following their translation,
42 we coded each article based on broad themes identified from an initial reading.
43 Although the codes emerged in a grounded fashion, the guiding focus remained the way
44 in which the Arctic's significance was explained in light of the ministerial meeting.
45 However, the specific meaning of 'significance' necessarily varied depending on the
46 national origin of the article: In some cases it was why the Arctic was significant to 'us',
47 in others why it was significant to 'them' (usually a candidate state), and in still other
48 articles the significance to both was noted. Throughout the research, the aim was to
49 investigate how the chosen articles – in their breadth if not necessarily in their
50 representativeness – presented various framings of the Arctic's importance, and
51 thereby broadly illustrate the ways in which the region's relevance was portrayed at
52 this particular 'news-making event'.
53
54

55 56 ***Member states*** 57 58 59 60

1
2
3 As journalists explained the significance of the Arctic to domestic audiences in the eight
4 Arctic Council member states, two principal sets of narratives emerged: one
5 characterized by northern protectionism, the other emphasizing global
6 interconnectedness. Both shared the common themes of natural resources, shipping
7 routes, climate change, and international political status, but framed them along
8 different lines depending on whether international interest was seen as legitimate or
9 threatening.

10
11 Canadian and Russian news coverage strongly emphasized the national
12 character and identity of the Arctic region. In accordance with Canadian traditions of
13 referencing its indigenous population to affirm sovereign rights in the High Arctic (see
14 Grant 2010), Canadian coverage constructed a hierarchy of 'Arcticness' by, for example,
15 quoting incoming Arctic Council Chair Leona Aglukkaq's statement that 'the Arctic
16 Council was formed by Northerners, for Northerners, long before the region was of
17 interest to the rest of the world' (Canada 7, 16), and that she, as an Inuit, would bring
18 the perspective of 'a *real* northerner' (Canada 7, emphasis added). Russian coverage
19 emphasized Russia's longstanding history of polar science and exploration (Russia 3), in
20 stark opposition to the non-Arctic applicants, who were framed as incapable of Arctic
21 endeavors and described as 'hidden snakes' lying in waiting (Russia 1), following
22 'devious paths' and 'camouflaging [their] true interests' (Russia 8).

23
24 Several stories from both Canada and Russia noted that the Arctic contains vast
25 quantities of untapped resources that could satisfy rising global demand, and that
26 extraction and export of these resources would benefit from the opening of new
27 'transportation arteries' through the region (Russia 3; see also Canada 3, 15). This
28 emphasis on the region's resource endowment paradoxically constructed the Arctic as
29 both a *national* and an *international* space. On the one hand, as a *future* space of global
30 significance, the Arctic was understood as a gateway to the global political stage. On the
31 other hand, the media maintained that the Arctic presently is a space of *national*
32 development and resource wealth, and that proposals for internationalizing or
33 designating it as the 'common heritage of mankind' are to be dismissed as 'absurd'
34 (Russia 16).

35
36
37 This balance between the Arctic's significance as a space of international
38 prominence and its present-day function as a source of national wealth and identity was
39 achieved in varied ways. Russian newspaper *Trud* took an explicitly nationalist (or
40 protectionist) stance, calling the decision to grant permanent observer status to the six
41 candidate states a 'major geopolitical failure' (Russia 17). However, the expansion was
42 justified elsewhere as a means to control and manage international engagement
43 (Canada 5, 17; Russia 6, 14). Although Russia's Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev
44 dismissed fears of an Asian invasion of the Arctic as mere 'bogeyman stories' (Russia
45 12), the Russian tabloid *Komsomolskaya Pravda* predicted an 'Arctic WWII' (Russia 7),
46 and reports heralding the emergence of 'Chinartica' (Russia 8) were prolific. This
47 reflected the general tenor of much of the Russian as well as Canadian coverage, in
48 which it was argued that it would be necessary to 'protect the Arctic from "peaceful"
49 expansion' (Russia 3) and 'from its many new friends' (Canada 4). Some of these
50 'friends' could at best prove to be valuable business partners, but not legitimate Arctic
51 stakeholders (Canada 7; Russia 14, 15). Non-state applicants were regarded with
52 particular suspicion. Despite their diversity, the applicant non-governmental and
53 intergovernmental organizations were often grouped in the same category as the
54 European Union. The EU was generally construed as 'arrogant southerners' (Canada 6;

1
2
3 see also Russia 9; Norway 21) and 'environmentalists' (Canada 7), whose interference
4 in the development and livelihoods of northern regions was unwelcome.

5 Maps also served to reaffirm the national-territorial status of the Arctic. Russian
6 newspapers consistently used maps displaying Arctic oceanic borders in accordance
7 with the so-called 'sectoral division', which divides the region into wedges joining at 90°
8 north (Russia 7, 9, 15), a depiction of Arctic territory that also frequently appears on
9 Canadian government maps (Gerhardt et al. 2010; Steinberg et al. 2014a). Although the
10 sectoral principle has long been officially abandoned (Byers 2013; Pharand 1988), such
11 imagery effectively maximizes the depiction of Russian territory and implies that there
12 are no unclaimed spaces where others might rightfully enter. In comparison, US
13 coverage used maps highlighting zones of 'international waters' in the Arctic Ocean
14 beyond the 200 nautical mile mark (USA 7, 13). Although the US can most likely claim
15 sovereign rights to seabed minerals beyond this point, the choice of imagery is
16 unsurprising as the US tends to idealize free navigation in the Arctic Ocean and beyond
17 (Steinberg 2014a).
18
19

20 In contrast, journalists from the Nordic states – Denmark (with Greenland and
21 the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden – as well as those from the
22 USA proved much more likely to stress the global interconnectedness of the Arctic
23 region. Norway's *ABC Nyheter* used the flight patterns of migratory birds to convey a
24 connection between East Asian coastlines and the Arctic region, thus naturalizing Asian
25 interests in the region – or, conversely, Arctic interests in Asia (Norway 6). Climate
26 change was widely used to frame the Arctic as a space of extra-Arctic connections,
27 which justified global interest in the circumpolar north. Melting Arctic ice was linked to
28 the regulation of global temperatures (Norway 2), food production (Finland 9), extreme
29 weather (Denmark 6; Greenland 5), and rising sea levels.

30 While it was noted that melting sea ice could leave northern borders
31 dangerously exposed (Norway 4; Iceland 7; Finland 1, 2, 11, 15; USA 13), climate change
32 was also touted as a cause for scientific and political collaboration, as scientists from
33 both Arctic and non-Arctic states could use the Arctic as a global climate laboratory.
34 Although it was acknowledged that geographic proximity confers privileges and rights
35 (Denmark 5), the recognition that climate change and the consequences of Arctic
36 politics would not stop at the 66th parallel meant that the region was no longer 'the
37 backyard of the Arctic states but a new ocean where all the world's states have rights,
38 responsibilities, and interests' (Finland 6; see also USA 10). Thus, the future role of the
39 Arctic would be as a space of connection and commerce – a 'polar Mediterranean' –
40 rather than a frozen desert separating five coastal states (see Dodds 2010; Steinberg
41 2014b). As noted by the Danish newspaper *Berlingske*, this transition could 'shake the
42 traditional role of nation-states – and borders' (Denmark 2).
43
44
45

46 According to this narrative, which appeared in several media stories from the
47 Nordic member states, the Arctic region would gain global significance by creating
48 precedence for peaceful collaboration among states, like the USA, Russia, and China, that
49 historically have had tense relationships with each other (Denmark 2, 5; Iceland 5;
50 Sweden 3, 15). This theme also appeared in Canadian and Russian coverage, albeit with
51 less frequency (Canada 15, 17; Russia 11). The Arctic Council would serve as a forum
52 where other disagreements, like the Norwegian-Chinese dispute regarding 2010 Nobel
53 Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo (Norway 21) and Danish-Indian tensions concerning
54 suspected arms smuggler Niels Holck (Denmark 5), could be momentarily suspended
55 for the sake of addressing pressing common concerns such as climate change.³ Although
56 coverage was rife with war-jargon and references to an 'Arctic battle' (Norway 4;
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Denmark 1), the Arctic was framed as a generally peaceful region that could serve as a
4 model for troubled regions elsewhere (Norway 2). As such, the Arctic was construed as
5 a space that would bring states and nations together, not only to address regional
6 concerns, but also to facilitate productive dialogue on other matters of world politics,
7 such as the conflict in Syria (Denmark 5; Sweden 10, 15). For the small Nordic countries,
8 their status as Arctic states would thus allow them to engage in high politics (Denmark
9 5; Greenland 2; Iceland 5; Sweden 8).

10
11 Regardless of whether the Arctic was viewed primarily as a space requiring
12 nationalist protection or one of international opportunity, a common theme through
13 many of the member states' news stories was that the region needs to be protected
14 from an anticipated threat which, especially in the Russian press, was frequently
15 identified as emanating from China (Russia 1, 8).⁴ Despite their generally
16 internationalist stance, some Nordic news stories also displayed skepticism regarding
17 Chinese motives, citing China's history of dealing directly with indigenous peoples and
18 its courting of Arctic nations through 'panda-diplomacy' (Denmark 8; see also Norway
19 20).⁵

20
21 Threats were identified as military, in addition to economic and political,
22 especially in US and Finnish coverage. Reflecting a *realpolitik* orientation, several media
23 stories assumed that resource riches and territorial uncertainty would almost
24 inevitably lead to conflict. An illustrative example was an editorial in the Finnish
25 newspaper *Pohjolan Sanomat*, which stressed the importance of Finland being 'active
26 now and in the future, so that the situation would never come to a point where missiles
27 would be flying over Lapland' (Finland 15).

28
29 Throughout all eight member states' media coverage, the Arctic was framed as a
30 space of latent danger, a 'vulnerable and demanding environment' (Finland 7). Since it
31 was also agreed that activity was bound to increase in the near future, the region was
32 understood as a space of emergent challenges. As noted by Dodds (2013), such
33 seemingly innocent statements serve as potent arguments for more governance and
34 stewardship. While such a need was agreed upon across the vast majority of the news
35 stories, the question of scale – national, regional or global – was disputed. Arctic
36 geographies are often framed through anticipation of the future, and several articles
37 explicitly noted how both the opportunities and challenges that make the Arctic globally
38 significant are not happening in the *present*, but are expected to occur in the *future*
39 (Finland 3; Denmark 7). Indeed, none of the news stories from the member states
40 questioned the potential for intensive resource extraction and ice-free shipping lanes,
41 even though these are not present material realities, but rather features of anticipation
42 and uncertain forecasts (see Arctic Council 2009; Humpert 2013; Powell 2008). In the
43 Arctic Council member states – the states that one would expect to have the most
44 engaged concern with current Arctic realities – the Arctic was shaped as much by
45 anticipated geographies of the future as by experienced politics of the present.

49 **Candidate states**

50 In countries with no territory above the Arctic Circle, journalists also had to explain the
51 relevance of the Arctic, but with the added challenge of communicating it to audiences
52 geographically far from the region. Journalists in the six candidate states – China, India,
53 Italy, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea – met this challenge by presenting their
54 distance from the Arctic as gradually 'shrinking' in tandem with the Arctic ice cap,
55 thereby prompting increased involvement.
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Notwithstanding questions regarding the viability of transarctic sea routes,
4 several news stories from the candidate states highlighted the potential for a more
5 accessible Arctic Ocean providing new links between the Pacific and Atlantic (China 1,
6 16; India 1, 3, 16; Italy 1, 2; Japan 1, 2; Singapore 11, 12; South Korea 1, 2). In addition to
7 shortening transport routes, which would reduce shipping time and costs, transarctic
8 passage was also projected as having the potential to lessen reliance on the Strait of
9 Malacca and Suez Canal (India 16; Singapore 11; South Korea 11). Although this
10 diversification could pose a threat to port tax income, especially for Singapore
11 (Singapore 9, 12), news media in the candidate states – four of which are major
12 shipping nations – evidenced a keen interest in assessing what might be gained from
13 northern transport routes. This potential was understood in terms of both increasing
14 current market share and enabling entrance into new markets in years to come.
15

16 The expected ‘opening up’ of the Arctic associated with climate change,
17 technological innovation, reduced shipping costs, and increased commodity prices may,
18 furthermore, increase the market for new technology, equipment, and ships. As was
19 noted by the media, this also gives the candidate states an interest in the region. One
20 news story referred to the Arctic as the ‘land of promise’ for South Korean shipbuilders
21 (South Korea 2), and similar sentiments were expressed in the Singaporean media
22 (Singapore 11). Media also noted that, in addition to ships, there will be increased
23 demand for other specialized equipment, much of which is manufactured in the
24 candidate states.
25

26 Although the Arctic’s predicted resource wealth featured in most of the news
27 stories, both with reference to commodities of national interest and by way of noting
28 the potential for resource extraction to lead to conflict and pollution, articles from the
29 candidate states rarely focused on the particular economic stakes for the source
30 countries’ private companies. For example, the Italian petroleum company ENI’s Arctic
31 activities remained notably absent in the Italian media. Instead, the focus of several
32 stories from Italy was on how *other* states (particularly China) ‘courted’ the Arctic states
33 for admission to the ‘most exclusive club on the planet’ (Italy 2). Indeed, journalists
34 wrote about *other* states’ ‘cold fever’ (Italy 2), ‘cold rush’ (India 3; South Korea 13), or
35 ‘race’ (Italy 4; Singapore 3) to the ‘Earth’s last treasure trove’ (China 5). The Arctic was
36 host to a ‘wild rush to the new black gold’ (Italy 7; see also South Korea 10, 15) that, in
37 turn, was creating a need to ‘keep an eye on those countries not to prioritize
38 development [over environmental protection]’ (Japan 3; see also India 6; Singapore 9).
39 In particular, China’s application received much concern from the other states. Often
40 China’s Arctic interests received more ink than that of the source country itself, and
41 Chinese involvement was in itself stated as a reason why others ‘cannot be out of the
42 picture’ (Japan 12; see also India 1; Italy 11; Singapore 14). This was also noted in the
43 Chinese media, which criticized outsiders’ ‘misconception about Chinese intentions’
44 (China 9; see also China 1, 3, 5).
45

46 Although the positive economic prospects linked to a more accessible Arctic
47 were frequently reported as motivating non-Arctic states’ involvement, the candidate
48 states’ media also presented the negative effects of climate change as an important
49 driving force. Many news stories noted that climate change happens twice as rapidly in
50 the Arctic as elsewhere on the planet (Italy 8; Japan 5; Singapore 16). Thus,
51 environmental processes in the Arctic hold significance at a global scale, necessitating
52 research and intervention by non-Arctic states and the world at large. Candidate states
53 further reported that sea-level rise threatens low-lying areas regardless of distance
54 from the melting ice cap (Singapore 2; see also Japan 5). Recognition of the planetary
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 effects of Arctic melting has prompted all six candidate states to be actively involved in
4 Arctic research, particularly in monitoring environmental and climatic changes. Indeed,
5 in order to be admitted as a permanent observer, a candidate must demonstrate its
6 'Arctic interests and expertise' (Graczyk and Koivurova 2014). As such, journalists
7 acknowledged that conducting Arctic research is both important for the findings it may
8 yield and for enabling and legitimizing a state's desired level of Arctic status (India 12;
9 Italy 12; Japan 3; South Korea 15).

10
11 Various potential economic pull-factors and environmental push-factors have
12 together made the Arctic a region of current – and even more so, expected future –
13 geopolitical importance, something that has not escaped media attention. Although
14 impending conflict in the Arctic has been dismissed time and time again by academics
15 and politicians (Arbo et al. 2013; Wilson Rowe 2013; Ruel 2011), the media still chose
16 to catch readers' attention with references to an impending 'ice war' (China 16; see also
17 Singapore 3). This added urgency to national interest in a distant and seemingly
18 foreboding corner of the world. Indeed, in a reworking of Mackinder's famous
19 aphorism, readers of *China Daily* were dramatically informed that 'he who controls the
20 Arctic, conquers the world' (China 11).

21
22 Media sources in all six candidate states highlighted the presence of the global
23 'great powers' in the Arctic, most notably the USA and Russia. The region's association
24 with high-level diplomacy was developed further by one Italian news source that
25 referred to the Arctic Council as 'the North Pole's G8' (Italy 11). Thus, the Arctic was
26 scripted not only as a zone of potential resources, environmental threats, and
27 geopolitical conflict, but also as one of potential neighborly or bilateral relations. In all
28 of these scenarios, the Arctic was understood as an area of global significance within
29 which any state that aspires to be a global actor must have a seat at the table (even if, in
30 the case of Arctic Council permanent observers, that seat comes without a voice). News
31 organizations in the candidate states thus ascribed the Arctic a symbolic significance as
32 a region where presence-for-the-sake-of-presence matters – a region playing host to a
33 great geopolitical and geoeconomic game that has its roots far from the Pole itself. For
34 the candidate states' media, the Arctic was significant not for what it in and of itself is,
35 but for what it may *become*, and for what it *symbolizes*.

36 37 38 39 **Observer states**

40 In the six European states that already had permanent observer status in the Arctic
41 Council prior to the Kiruna meeting – France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain,
42 and the United Kingdom – media were faced with a question that, if confronted directly,
43 would demand some rather uncomfortable soul-searching: If one were questioning non-
44 Arctic Asian states' bids for permanent observer status, then why were no similar
45 questions being asked of European observer states? Rather than addressing this
46 directly, however, most media stories from the observer states avoided the question by
47 framing the expansion debate so that the European states' observer status went
48 unrecognized and, therefore, unquestioned.

49
50 Permanent observer states' news stories on the Arctic Council meeting were
51 typically placed in the 'International Politics' section, and reported in much the same
52 manner as an international story from elsewhere in the world. The dominant narrative
53 in these stories was that the rising powers of Asia were seeking a foothold in the region
54 for both economic and strategic reasons. Arctic states were reported as responding to
55 this new challenge through the political arena, as they each adopted particular
56 perspectives on whether or not it would be in their interest to admit new permanent
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 observers, as well as on the related question of expanding the Arctic Council's policy-
4 making capacity.

5 The question of who should and should not be granted Arctic Council permanent
6 observer status was thus framed as a reflection of the fundamental geopolitical and
7 geoeconomic rivalry that characterizes 'high politics'. News stories emphasized how
8 this contest was being waged by global superpowers and the other Arctic Council
9 member states, most often focusing on the diplomatic initiatives and underlying
10 interests of an emergent China (Netherlands 5; UK 8, 9). However, the 'high politics'
11 framing was also expressed in more nuanced ways, for instance by focusing on the
12 meeting's significance as a crucial moment for President Barack Obama and newly
13 confirmed US Secretary of State John Kerry (UK 1, 7) or by analyzing the meeting within
14 the context of the ongoing rivalry between India and China for influence in Africa, the
15 Arctic, and other 'resource frontiers' (Poland 5). Furthermore, reporters chronicled the
16 Arctic Council's growing powers as an international organization (Germany 1, 2; Poland
17 3; UK 5) and highlighted the Council's role as a forum where the world's political and
18 economic elites were charting a course for an emergent region – 'a sort of Davos for the
19 North Pole' (Netherlands 5).

20
21
22 This 'international relations' framing accommodated a range of political
23 positions: Some news stories voiced suspicion of 'Chinese-style politics' in which China
24 was using the Arctic Council to quietly 'move its pawns forward' on the Arctic
25 chessboard (France 2; see also Spain 4; UK 9), while others countered that China's
26 interest in the region was entirely reasonable, and that the country was generally acting
27 according to established norms (Spain 1; UK 6). Still others framed China as a
28 dangerous rival to the West in an ongoing global geopolitical contest, but noted that, as
29 a tactical move, including China in discussions would be the best way of moderating its
30 behavior (Netherlands 3; UK 8). As divergent as these perspectives were, however, they
31 all reflected a general understanding of the Arctic as a space where global powers
32 engage in international diplomacy.

33
34
35 Perhaps the most striking aspect of this framing is that it conveniently did away
36 with any need to comment on the privileged status of the current observer states. After
37 all, if the Arctic is just one of many regions where international politics is contested, and
38 if this simply reflects a broader dynamic of global political and economic competition in
39 which all states partake (with varying degrees of effectiveness), then a state's privileged
40 position as permanent observer is entirely unremarkable. It is merely evidence of the
41 state having achieved a minor level of success in the global political arena. Thus there is
42 no need to reflect on this privilege in the context of the debate over *new* states seeking
43 permanent observer status. Indeed, of the 32 news stories analyzed from the six
44 observer states, only sixteen even noted that the news organization's state was already
45 a permanent observer. Furthermore, of these sixteen, only three – all from The
46 Netherlands – went beyond noting observer status, to give a reason for *why* it had been
47 granted to this non-Arctic state.⁶ None reflected on why some (European) countries'
48 permanent observer status applications had been approved without question while
49 other (Asian) countries' applications were mired in controversy.

50
51
52 A secondary, though less common framing was one in which the Arctic (and
53 hence, the Arctic Council) was depicted not as a site of 'high politics' but rather as a
54 region beleaguered by environment-development conflict. This alternate framing was
55 most evident in the German media and to a lesser extent in the Dutch. While these
56 stories mentioned the debate concerning the admission of China and the five other state
57 candidates, they frequently gave as much attention to the controversy surrounding EU
58
59
60

1
2
3 membership (Germany 1, 3, 5; Netherlands 1). Discussion of EU membership led to
4 extensive coverage of indigenous peoples' concerns, and the Greenlandic boycott, topics
5 that received little coverage in articles centered on great-power politics. Likewise,
6 stories from Germany and The Netherlands often adopted an environmental angle,
7 focusing on the oil spill agreement and Greenpeace's opposition to it. More generally,
8 these environment-focused articles identified the key tension in Arctic politics not as
9 between West and East, or between Arctic and non-Arctic states, but rather as between
10 those wishing to exploit the region and those wishing to protect it (Germany 2, 4;
11 Netherlands 4). By challenging received notions of the environment as a series of
12 'resources', two of the German stories (Germany 2, 4) went so far as to question popular
13 understandings of the region's potential as an oil-rich transit corridor. This skepticism
14 was the exception, however, as most news stories from the permanent observer states
15 (and from other states as well) used the region's resource potential as a self-evident
16 background for explaining the Arctic Council's emergence as a locus of global power
17 politics.
18
19

20 21 **Conclusion**

22 In the 'age of the Arctic', when high-level policy-makers from both near and far are
23 directing their attention northwards, news organizations from around the world are
24 challenged with explaining the region's relevance to often distant audiences. When the
25 Arctic Council met in Kiruna, the question of inclusion and exclusion in what was
26 framed as a great geopolitical game for future influence was thrust to the fore. In
27 particular, the admission of six new permanent observer states, geographically distant
28 from the region but with great geopolitical and economic power, prompted global
29 media to articulate why the Arctic *mattered* – to their state, to other states, and to the
30 world writ large.
31

32 Across 280 news stories collected from 20 states, hyperbolic headlines sought to
33 catch audiences' attention with references to populist notions of geopolitical rivalry,
34 often focusing on China's growing presence in the Arctic. Journalists from around the
35 world tended to focus on common 'hot topics' – namely, future opportunities, such as
36 natural resources and new shipping routes, and future challenges, in particular relating
37 to climate change.
38

39 For journalists from the Arctic Council member states, international focus on the
40 Arctic raised the question of whether to adopt an inclusive or exclusive approach to
41 non-members' interest in the region. On the one hand, global attention could present
42 future possibilities for international interaction and cooperation – in particular with so-
43 called 'great powers'. On the other hand, it could necessitate protection from the very
44 same powers and the threat of their insatiable demands.
45

46 Media from the six candidate states presented the same anticipated
47 opportunities and challenges, but the region's significance was connected to wider
48 global interests. While some media in the member states suggested that the threat of
49 unsustainable exploitation was a reason for exclusionary protectionism, media in the
50 candidate states tended to present this threat as a reason why extra-regional
51 involvement was needed. In these non-Arctic states, the region was framed as
52 important due to the political presence of *other* states – both Arctic and non-Arctic –
53 positioning themselves for future developments.
54

55 Finally, in the six states already holding permanent observer status, news
56 reports skirted the question of Arctic legitimacy in relation to geographic proximity.
57 Instead, the Arctic was framed as a region that reflected a wider-reaching geopolitical
58
59
60

1
2
3 game in which all of the world's states participated. As such, their focus was on how the
4 Arctic – as a region seemingly distant from the world's centers of power – was now
5 playing host to high-level politics far beyond latitudinal borders, and which, as an ever-
6 imminent space of potential future diplomacy, required the unwavering presence of
7 states from around the world.
8

9 Emerging from these news stories was thus a range of seemingly divergent
10 framings of the Arctic's growing relevance. However, despite their differences, media
11 reports from across the world were based on a common understanding that the Arctic is
12 increasingly important not so much for what it *is* as for what it *may become*. Whether
13 for the opportunities it may offer or the challenges it may present, the Arctic was
14 consistently scripted as a region in which states and stakeholders are positioning
15 themselves in anticipation of the future. As such, the significance of the Arctic was
16 understood as transcending its potential for generating material gains or losses; the
17 Arctic also was understood as mattering for the symbolic significance of political
18 presence. As their stories celebrated (or dreaded) anticipated Arctic 'openings', news
19 reporters actively partook in the discursive construction of the region as a space of
20 global significance.
21

22 The brief meeting in a small Swedish town was thus an Arctic news event of
23 unprecedented scale, not because of the ministerial decisions *per se* but because of the
24 level of global attention it received. As news stories covering Kiruna traveled across the
25 world, it became clear that the 'age of the Arctic' now extends far beyond the regional
26 policy arena. By painting a picture of a proverbial table at which a seat grants not just
27 observance but *status*, news organizations directed audience's attention northwards,
28 positioning and preparing them to encounter the Arctic as a space where future
29 developments would have *global* implications.
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Notes

- ¹ These figures show mentions of 'Arctic Council', from 552 news sources indexed by Nexis, 471 of which are published primarily in English. Because of the database's English-language bias, inclusion of the equivalent in other languages would have a negligible impact on results. For instance, compared to 'Arctic Council', which appears 5,529 times between 2000 and 2013, 'Arktiska rådet' (Swedish) appears only twice, 'Arktisk Råd' (Danish and Norwegian) appears 81 times, and 'арктический совет' (Russian) appears 141 times. 2014 figures are projections, based on doubling figures from the first half of 2014.
- ² Greenland would have qualified for bilingual stratification, but the main Greenlandic newspaper, *Sermitsiaq*, publishes most stories in both Danish and Greenlandic, so no translation from Greenlandic was necessary. However, the Faroe Islands' newspapers publish only in Faroese, so Faroese-language articles were translated as part of the Denmark/Greenland/Faroes quota. Most stories in *Nunatsiaq News*, the major newspaper in Canada's northern territory of Nunavut, appear in Inuktitut and English so no Inuktitut translation was undertaken. The original intention was to stratify Singapore across three languages (English/Chinese/Malay), but no relevant Malay stories were found. Although the South Korean press is largely monolingual, the research assistant included an extra two stories from the English-language Korean press, so these were included.
- ³ Anecdotal evidence suggests that this tendency toward celebrating the Arctic as the leading edge of cooperation has waned due to heightened East-West tensions following Russia's March 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and subsequent conflict with Ukraine. Since then, several news stories have noted how the 'Ukraine crisis' is negatively affecting Arctic political relations (e.g. Breum 2014; Rosen 2014; Stenbæk 2014; Sveen 2014; Weber 2014).
- ⁴ In some cases, this sinophobia was extended to a general wariness about Asia's interest in the Arctic (Canada 4; Russia 3, 7), a framing of the permanent observer expansion issue that left journalists in a quandary when reporting on the one European candidate state: Italy (Steinberg et al. 2014b).
- ⁵ These stories from the Danish and Norwegian media, however, were the exception, as Nordic media (like their governments) were generally supportive of Chinese investment. Faroese and Greenlandic media similarly emphasized the potential benefits of Chinese investment, although also stressing the nationalist need to protect natural resources and control revenues obtained from their extraction (Faroe Islands 4; Greenland 6; see also Norway 21).
- ⁶ Netherlands 2 and 4 noted Dutch involvement in Arctic science, while Netherlands 5 noted the country's potential involvement in Arctic shipping.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to the following the following research assistants for their work locating and translating news stories: Dania Achermann (German), Sasha Bozheva (Russian), Rikke Jensen (Faroese and Icelandic), Jiyouon Kim (Korean), Guanlie Lim (Chinese), Sonali Narang (Hindi), Taina Renkonen (Finnish and Swedish), Merete Ryneld Sun (French), Andrea Scassola (Italian), Mila Szolkowska (Polish), Jenine de Vries (Dutch), Atsuko Watanabe (Japanese), and Jessica Whitfield (Spanish). We are also grateful to Audrey Nichols for her assistance with grant administration. Funding was provided by a

grant from the U.S. National Science Foundation (BCS-0921436) and a European Commission FP7 Marie Curie Action (IIF-GA-2010-275846).

References

- Adams, P.D., 2013, Media. In *The Ashgate Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, K. Dodds, M. Kuus and J. Sharp (eds.), pp. 263-280 (Farnham: Ashgate).
- Arbo, P., Iversen, A., Knol, M., Ringholm, T. and Sander, G., 2013, Arctic futures: conceptualizations and images of a changing Arctic. *Polar Geography*, 36, pp. 163–182.
- Arctic Council, 2009, *Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment*. Available from: http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf [accessed September 13 2014]
- Bennett, W.L., 1990, Toward a theory of press-state relations in the United States. *Journal of Communication*, 40, pp. 103-127.
- Boykoff, M., 2011, *Who speaks for the climate? Making sense of media reporting on climate change* (Cambridge University Press).
- Breum, M., 2014, Krim-krisen giver os arktiske kvaler [The Crimea crisis causes Arctic problems]. *Politiken* (March 18). Available from: <http://politiken.dk/debat/ECE2237970/krim-krisen-giver-os-arktiske-kvaler/> [accessed August 22 2014].
- Byers, M., 2013, *International Law and the Arctic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Campbell, D., 2007, Geopolitics and visibility: Sighting the Darfur conflict. *Political Geography*, 26, pp. 357-382.
- Christensen, M., 2013, Arctic climate change and the media: The news story that was. In *Media and the Politics of Arctic Climate Change: When the Ice Breaks*, M. Christensen, A.E. Nilsson, and N. Wormbs (eds.), pp. 26-51 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Dittmer, J. and Dodds, K., 2008, Popular geopolitics past and future: Fandom, identities and audiences. *Geopolitics*, 13(3), pp. 437-457.
- Dodds, K., 2006, Popular geopolitics and audience dispositions: James Bond and the internet movie database (IMDb). *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 31 (2), pp. 116-130.
- Dodds, K., 2010, A polar Mediterranean? Accessibility, resources and sovereignty in the Arctic Ocean. *Global Policy*, 1(3), pp. 303-311.
- Dodds, K., 2013, Anticipating the Arctic and the Arctic Council: Pre-emption, precaution and preparedness. *Polar Record*, 49(2), pp. 193-203.
- Gerhardt, H., Steinberg, P.E., Tasch, J., Fabiano, S.J. and Shields, R., 2010, Contested sovereignty in a changing Arctic. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 100(4), pp. 992-1002.
- Graczyk, P., 2012, The Arctic Council inclusive of non-Arctic perspectives: Seeking a new balance. In *The Arctic Council: Its Place in the Future of Arctic Governance*, T. Axworthy, T. Koivurova, and W. Hasanat (eds.), pp. 261-305 (Toronto: Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation).
- Graczyk, P. and Koivurova, T., 2014, A new era in the Arctic Council's external relations? Broader consequences of the Nuuk observer rules for Arctic governance. *Polar Record*, 50(3), pp. 225-236.

- 1
2
3
4 Grant, S.D., 2010, *Polar imperative: A history of Arctic sovereignty in North America*
5 (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre).
- 6 Gregoire, L., 2013, Arctic Council should be cautious about new observer hopefuls: Inuit
7 org president. *Nunatsiaq News* (February 1). Available from:
8 [http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674arctic_council_should_be_c](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674arctic_council_should_be_cautious_about_new_observer_hopefuls_inuit_or)
9 [autious_about_new_observer_hopefuls_inuit_or](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674arctic_council_should_be_cautious_about_new_observer_hopefuls_inuit_or).
- 10 Humpert, M., 2013, The Future of Arctic Shipping: A New Silk Road for China?. *The*
11 *Arctic Institute*. Available from:
12 http://issuu.com/thearcticinstitute/docs/the_future_of_arctic_shipping_-_a_n.
13 [Accessed August 25 2014].
- 14 Koivurova, T., 2009, Limits and possibilities of the Arctic Council in a rapidly changing
15 scene of Arctic governance. *Polar Record*, 46(2) pp. 1-11.
- 16 Kuus, M., 2008, Professionals of geopolitics: Agency in international politics. *Geography*
17 *Compass*, 2/6, pp. 2062-2079.
- 18 Ó Tuathail, G., 2002, Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: The case of the United
19 States' response to the war in Bosnia. *Political Geography*, 21, pp. 601-628.
- 20 Ó Tuathail, G., 2006, Thinking critically about geopolitics. In *The Geopolitics Reader*, G. Ó
21 Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge (eds.), pp. 1-14 (London: Routledge).
- 22 Oshorenko, G. and Young, O., 2005, *The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities*
23 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- 24 Pharand, D., 1988, *Canada's Arctic waters in international law* (Vol. 256) (Cambridge:
25 Cambridge University Press).
- 26 Pinkerton, A.D., 2013, Journalists. In *The Ashgate Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, K.
27 Dodds, M. Kuus and J. Sharp (eds.), pp. 439-460 (Farnham: Ashgate).
- 28 Powell, R.C., 2008, Configuring an 'Arctic commons'?. *Political Geography*, 27, pp. 827-
29 832.
- 30 Robinson, P., 2011, The CNN effect reconsidered: Mapping a research agenda for the
31 future, *Media, War & Conflict*, 4(1), pp. 3-11.
- 32 Rosen, Y., 2014, U.S.-Russia tensions create worries for Arctic scientists. *Alaska Dispatch*
33 *News* (May 9). Available from: [http://www.adn.com/article/20140509/us-russia-](http://www.adn.com/article/20140509/us-russia-tensions-create-worries-arctic-scientists-0)
34 [tensions-create-worries-arctic-scientists-0](http://www.adn.com/article/20140509/us-russia-tensions-create-worries-arctic-scientists-0) [accessed August 22 2014].
- 35 Ruel, G.K., 2011, The (Arctic) Show Must Go On: Natural Resource Craze and National
36 Identity in Arctic Politics. *International Journal*, 66(4), pp. 809-824.
- 37 Sharp, J.P., 1993, Publishing American identity: Popular geopolitics, myth and The
38 Reader's Digest. *Political Geography*, 12(6), pp. 491-503.
- 39 Sharp, J.P., 2000, *Condensing the Cold War: Reader's Digest and American identity*
40 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
- 41 Steinberg, P.E., 2014a, Maintaining hegemony at a distance: ambivalence in US Arctic
42 policy. In *Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, resources and legal regimes*, R. Powell and
43 K. Dodds (eds.), pp. 113-130 (Edward Elgar Publishing).
- 44 Steinberg, P.E., 2014b, Mediterranean metaphors: Travel, translation and oceanic
45 imaginaries in the 'new mediterraneans' of the Arctic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico
46 and the Caribbean. In *Water worlds: Human geographies of the ocean*, J. Anderson
47 and K. Peters (eds.), pp. 23-38 (Farnham: Ashgate).
- 48 Steinberg, P.E., and Dodds, K., 2013, The Arctic Council after Kiruna. *Polar Record*, pp. 1-
49 3.
- 50 Steinberg, P.E., Tasch, J. and Gerhardt, H., 2014a, *Contesting the Arctic: Politics and*
51 *imaginaries in the Circumpolar North* (London: I. B. Tauris).
- 52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4 Steinberg, P.E., Medby, I.A. and Bruun, J.M., 2014b, *The Race for the Arctic (Council) or*
5 *Italy's other North-South Divide*. Prince George, B.C.: ICASS VIII (May 24)
6 [Conference paper].
7
8 Stenbæk, M., 2014, Ukraine spøger i Arktis [Ukraine is haunting the Arctic]. *KNR* (May
9 20). Available from: [http://www.knr.gl/da/nyheder/ukraine-sp%C3%B8ger-i-](http://www.knr.gl/da/nyheder/ukraine-sp%C3%B8ger-i-arktis)
10 [arktis](http://www.knr.gl/da/nyheder/ukraine-sp%C3%B8ger-i-arktis) [accessed August 22 2014]
11
12 Sveen, E.H., 2014, Arktisk nøkkel i Russisk isfront [Arctic Key in Russian ice front].
13 *Dagsavisen* (August 2), available at [http://www.dagsavisen.no/verden/arktisk-](http://www.dagsavisen.no/verden/arktisk-nokkel-i-russisk-isfront/)
14 [nokkel-i-russisk-isfront/](http://www.dagsavisen.no/verden/arktisk-nokkel-i-russisk-isfront/) [accessed August 22 2014]
15
16 Weber, B., 2014, Russian actions in Ukraine could cause problems for Arctic Council:
17 Iceland PM. *CTV News* (March 9). Available from:
18 [http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/russian-actions-in-ukraine-could-cause-](http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/russian-actions-in-ukraine-could-cause-problems-for-arctic-council-iceland-pm-1.1721076)
19 [problems-for-arctic-council-iceland-pm-1.1721076](http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/russian-actions-in-ukraine-could-cause-problems-for-arctic-council-iceland-pm-1.1721076) [accessed August 22 2014].
20
21 Wilson Rowe, E., 2011, A dangerous space? Unpacking state and media discourses on
22 the Arctic, *Polar Geography*, 36(3), pp. 232-244.
23
24 Woon, C.Y., 2014, China, Canada and framings of Arctic geopolitics. In *Polar Geopolitics?*
25 *Knowledges, resources and legal regimes*, R. Powell and K. Dodds (eds.), pp. 166-
26 182 (Edward Elgar Publishing).
27
28 Young, O.R., 2009, Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North.
29 *Polar Record*, 45(232), pp 73-82.

30 Captions

31 Figure 1: Mention of the phrase 'Arctic Council' in 552 news sources indexed by Nexis,
32 2000-2014 (searched August 7, 2014).
33

34 Figure 2: Mention of the phrase 'Arctic Council' in 552 news sources indexed by Nexis,
35 2013 (searched August 7, 2014).
36

37
38 Table 1: Media stories analyzed.
39
40
41

42 Appendix

43
44 News stories in this analysis were gathered between July and September 2013, at the
45 URLs noted. Due to the nature of online news sources, not all news stories remain
46 available online. Screenshots, printouts, transcriptions, or translations are available
47 from the authors on request.
48

49 Member states

50
51 Canada 3: Normand, F., *Les Affaires*. (May 04 2013). "Le Canada veut renforcer
52 l'encadrement des activités dans l'Arctique" – Richard L. Desgagnés, avocat
53 ["Canada wants to strengthen the framework for activities in the Arctic" – Richard
54 L. Desgagnés, lawyer]. Available from:
55 [http://www.lesaffaires.com/archives/generale/le-canada-veut-renforcer-l-](http://www.lesaffaires.com/archives/generale/le-canada-veut-renforcer-l-encadrement-des-activites-dans-l-arctique---richard-l-desgagnes-avocat/557052)
56 [encadrement-des-activites-dans-l-arctique---richard-l-desgagnes-avocat/557052](http://www.lesaffaires.com/archives/generale/le-canada-veut-renforcer-l-encadrement-des-activites-dans-l-arctique---richard-l-desgagnes-avocat/557052).
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4 Canada 4: Giroux, R., *Le Soleil*. (May 19 2013). L'Arctique compte un peu trop d'amis
5 [The Arctic has a few too many friends]. Available from:
6 [http://www.lapresse.ca/le-soleil/opinions/chroniqueurs/201305/18/01-](http://www.lapresse.ca/le-soleil/opinions/chroniqueurs/201305/18/01-4652294-larctique-compte-un-peu-trop-damis.php)
7 [4652294-larctique-compte-un-peu-trop-damis.php](http://www.lapresse.ca/le-soleil/opinions/chroniqueurs/201305/18/01-4652294-larctique-compte-un-peu-trop-damis.php)
8
9 Canada 5: Leblanc, E., *Radio-Canada* (May 15 2013). Conseil de l'Arctique : une
10 présidence canadienne axée sur l'économie [Arctic Council: A Canadian
11 chairmanship centred around economy]. Available from: [http://ici.radio-](http://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/International/2013/05/15/008-arctique-conseil-presidence.shtml)
12 [canada.ca/nouvelles/International/2013/05/15/008-arctique-conseil-](http://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/International/2013/05/15/008-arctique-conseil-presidence.shtml)
13 [presidence.shtml](http://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/International/2013/05/15/008-arctique-conseil-presidence.shtml).
14
15 Canada 6: Koring, P., *Toronto Globe*. (May 15 2013). Canada signals new era for Arctic
16 Council. Available from:
17 [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-signals-new-era-](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-signals-new-era-forarctic-council/article11951388/)
18 [forarctic-council/article11951388/](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-signals-new-era-forarctic-council/article11951388/)
19
20 Canada 7: Koring, P., *Toronto Globe*. (May 15 2013). Canada's Aglukkaq takes hot seat at
21 Arctic Council. Available from:
22 [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadas-aglukkaq-takes-](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadas-aglukkaq-takes-hotseat-at-arctic-council/article11923462/)
23 [hotseat-at-arctic-council/article11923462/](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadas-aglukkaq-takes-hotseat-at-arctic-council/article11923462/).
24
25 Canada 9: Gregoire, L., *Nunatsiaq News*. (February 1 2013). Arctic Council should be
26 cautious about new observer hopefuls: Inuit org president. Available from:
27 [http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674arctic_council_should_be_c](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674arctic_council_should_be_cautious_about_new_observer_hopefuls_inuit_or)
28 [autious_about_new_observer_hopefuls_inuit_or](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674arctic_council_should_be_cautious_about_new_observer_hopefuls_inuit_or).
29
30 Canada 15: *Nunatsiaq News*. (May 08 2013). Editorial: Most Arctic Council applicants
31 pose little risk. Available from:
32 [http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674most_arctic_council_applic](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674most_arctic_council_applicant)
33 [an](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674most_arctic_council_applicant).
34
35 Canada 16: Boyd, A., *Nunatsiaq News*. (May 15 2013). Nunavut's Aglukkaq becomes first
36 indigenous minister to head Arctic Council. Available from:
37 [http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674nunavuts_aglukkaq_becom](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674nunavuts_aglukkaq_becomes)
38 [es](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674nunavuts_aglukkaq_becomes).
39
40 Canada 17: Bell, J., *Nunatsiaq News*. (May 16 2013). Canada wants permanent fix for EU
41 seal hunt dispute: Aglukkaq. Available from:
42 http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674canada_wants_perma
43 [nent_f](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674canada_wants_perma)
44 [ix](http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674canada_wants_perma).
45
46 Denmark 1: Hannestad, A., *Politiken*. (May 14 2013). Arktisk møde er blevet en
47 kampplads [Arctic meeting had become a battlefield].
48
49 Denmark 2: Gården, H., *Berlingske*. (May 14 2013). Et arktisk dilemma – en ny
50 verdensorden [An Arctic dilemma – a new world order]. Available from:
51 <http://www.b.dk/kronikker/et-arktisk-dilemma-en-ny-verdensorden>.
52
53 Denmark 5: Nørgaard, N. and Hannestad, A., *Politiken*. (May 16 2013). Kina lukket ind i
54 den arktiske 'varme' [China let into the 'warmth' of the Arctic].
55
56 Denmark 6: Bundgaard, V., *Kristeligt Dagblad*. (May 15 2013). Kina vil med i spillet om
57 Arktis [China wants to join the game for the Arctic]. Available from:
58 <http://www.kristeligt-dagblad.dk/udland/kina-vil-med-i-spillet-om-arktis>.
59
60 Denmark 7: Maressa, J.E., *Jyllands-Posten*. (May 15 2013). Dansk fremtidsdrøm om
Nordpolen [Danish future-dream about the North Pole]. Available from:
<http://www.jyllands->

- 1
2
3
4 posten.dk/protected/premium/international/ECE5472452/dansk-
5 fremtidsdroem-om-nordpolen/.
- 6 Denmark 8: Maressa, J. E., *Jyllands-Posten*. (May 13 2013). EU mødes med kulde ved
7 isporten [EU received a cold welcome at the ice-gate]. Available from:
8 [http://www.jyllands-
11 posten.dk/protected/premium/international/ECE5462663/eu-moedes-med-
12 kulde-ved-isporten/](http://www.jyllands-
9 posten.dk/protected/premium/international/ECE5462663/eu-moedes-med-
10 kulde-ved-isporten/).
- 13 Faroe Islands 4: Joensen, E., *Norðlýsið*. (May 22 2013). Inuittar seta ES skák og mát -
14 Føroyar gera onki [The Inuit put the EU into checkmate – the Faroe Islands do
15 nothing]. Available from:
16 <http://nordlysid.fo/inuittar+seta+es+skak+og+mat+foroyar+gera+onki.html>.
- 17
18
19 Finland 1: *Aamulehti*. (May 16 2013). Arktista päätösvaltaa lisää [More Arctic decision
20 power]. Available from:
21 [http://www.aamulehti.fi/Paakirjoitukset/1194813636985/artikkeli/arktista+pa
23 atosvaltaa+lisaa.html](http://www.aamulehti.fi/Paakirjoitukset/1194813636985/artikkeli/arktista+pa
22 atosvaltaa+lisaa.html).
- 24 Finland 2: Tiri, A., *Aamulehti*. (May 11 2013). Arktisen alueen sulava jää paljastaa
25 rikkaudet – Mitä Suomi tekee? [The Arctic's Melting Ice Exposes Riches – What
26 Will Finland Do?]. Available from:
27 [http://www.aamulehti.fi/cs/Satellite?c=AMArticle_C&childpagename=KAL_newss
31 ite%2FAMLayout&cid=1194812783630&p=1194596113763&packedargs=packe
32 dargs%3DAMArticleCommentThreadDetails%25253AcurrentPage%253D2&page
33 name=KALWrapper](http://www.aamulehti.fi/cs/Satellite?c=AMArticle_C&childpagename=KAL_newss
28 ite%2FAMLayout&cid=1194812783630&p=1194596113763&packedargs=packe
29 dargs%3DAMArticleCommentThreadDetails%25253AcurrentPage%253D2&page
30 name=KALWrapper).
- 34 Finland 3: Kauhanen, A., *Helsingin Sanomat*. (May 15 2013). Kiirunassa Jaetaan arktista
35 uusiksi [In Kiruna, the Arctic Is Being Redivided].
- 36 Finland 6: Koivurova, T., *Helsingin Sanomat*. (May 18 2013). Kiina ja Intia ovat saamassa
37 jalansijaa arktisella alueella [China and India Are Gaining Foothold in the Arctic].
- 38 Finland 7: *Helsingin Sanomat*. (May 19 2013). Arktinen neuvosto ei käske [The Arctic
39 Council Does Not Command].
- 40 Finland 9: *Inarilainen*. (May 22 2013). Inarinmaan lapinkylä haluaa Arktiseen
41 neuvostoon [Inarinmaa Lapp Village Aspires to the Arctic Council]. Available from:
42 <http://www.inarilainen.fi/inarinmaan-lapinkyla-haluaa-arktiseen-neuvostoon>
- 43 Finland 11: Luotola, T., *Keskisuomalainen*. (May 15 2013). Pohjoisen lumo kasvaa [Lure
44 of the North Is Growing].
- 45 Finland 15: *Pohjolan Sanomat*. (May 05 2013). Kiirunassa haetaan arktiselle suuntaa [In
46 Kiruna, Direction for the Arctic is Being Sought].
- 47
48 Greenland 2: Mølgaard, N., *Sermitsiaq*. (May 15 2013). D: Det er pinligt [D: It is
49 embarrassing]. Available from: <http://sermitsiaq.ag/d-pinligt>.
- 50 Greenland 5: Stenbæk, M., *Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa*. (May 26 2013). Indien vil forstå
51 forandringer I Arktis [India wants to understand changes in the Arctic]. Available
52 from: [http://www.knr.gl/da/nyheder/indien-vil-forst%C3%A5-forandringer-i-
54 arktis](http://www.knr.gl/da/nyheder/indien-vil-forst%C3%A5-forandringer-i-
53 arktis).
- 54 Greenland 6: Krebs, M.L., *Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa*. (May 13 2013). Oprindelige folk
55 kræver rettigheder forud for Arktisk Råds møde [Indigenous peoples demand
56 rights prior to the Arctic Council's meeting]. Available from:
57
58
59
60

<http://www.knr.gl/da/nyheder/oprindelige-folk-kr%C3%A6ver-rettigheder-forud-arktisk-r%C3%A5ds-m%C3%B8de>.

Iceland 5: Unnarsson, K. M., *Visir.is*. (May 15 2013). Ísland við háborðið með stórveldunum [Iceland takes centre stage together with world Superpowers]. Available from: <http://www.visir.is/island-vid-habordid-med-storveldunum/article/2013130519324>.

Iceland 7: *Ríkisútvarpið*. (May 08 2013). NATO verður ekki við óskum Norðmanna [NATO will not comply with requests made by Norway]. Available from: <http://www.ruv.is/frett/nato-verdur-ekki-vid-oskum-nordmanna>.

Norway 2: Prokosch, P., *Aftenposten*. (May 12 2013). En visjon for Arktis [An Arctic vision]. Available from: <http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/En-visjon-for-Arktis-7198807.html>.

Norway 4: NTB, *E24*. (May 13 2013) – Arktisk råd er ikke helt som Woodstock [- The Arctic Council is not quite like Woodstock]. Available from: <http://e24.no/makro-og-politikk/leder-arktisk-raad-er-ikke-helt-som-woodstock/20345564>.

Norway 6: Vernes, T., *ABC Nyheter*. (May 14 2013). Kongerekene du spiser, kan true fuglelivet I Arktis [The scampi you eat may threaten bird life in the Arctic]. Available from: <http://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/2013/05/14/kongerekene-du-spiser-kan-true-fuglelivet-i-arktis>.

Norway 20: Hansen, K., *Aftenposten* (March 03 2013). [Putin gives China a foot in the door to the Arctic]. Available from: <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/Putin-gir-Kina-fot-innenfor-i-Arktis-7158055.html>.

Norway 21: Blindheim, A.M., *Dagbladet*. (May 27 2013). “Vi kommer aldri til å si undskyld” [“We will never apologise”]. Available from: http://www.dagbladet.no/2013/05/27/nyheter/politikk/utenriks/espen_barth_eide/kina/27381132/.

Russia 1: Terentyev, D., *Arguments Nedeli*. (April 04 2013). Присвоение Севера [Acquisition of the North]. Available from: <http://argumenti.ru/society/n383/244097>.

Russia 3: Kolomeytsev, N., *Gazeta Pravda*. (May 17-20 2013). Убережь Арктику от «мирной» экспансии [Protect the Arctic from: "peaceful" expansion].

Russia 6: Chermenko, E., *Kommersant* (May 16 2013). Россия приоткрыла Арктику [Russia has slightly opened the Arctic]. Available from: <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2188538>.

Russia 7: Moiseenko, A., *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. (May 18 2013). Политпрогноз: третья мировая война начнется в Арктике [Political forecast: WWII will start in the Arctic]. Available from: <http://www.kp.ru/daily/26077/2982488/>.

Russia 8: Guschin, A., *Lenta.ru* (June 14 2013). Где-то в Китарктике: Пекин подбирается к полярным богатствам [Somewhere in Chinartica: Beijing stealthily approaches to the arctic treasures]. Available from: <http://lenta.ru/articles/2013/06/14/chinarctic/>.

Russia 9: Usova, A., *Murmanskiy Vestnik*. (May 15 2013). Захватят ли Арктику «нерегиональные игроки»? [Will "non-regional players" take over the Arctic?]. Available from: <http://www.mvestnik.ru/shwpgn.asp?pid=201305156>.

- 1
2
3
4 Russia 11: Semushin, D., *REGNUM*. (May 18 2013). Евросоюз рвется к арктическому
5 сырью: заседание Арктического совета Кируне [The EU eagerly longs for Arctic
6 raw resources: the Arctic Council meeting in Kiruna], Available from:
7 <http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1660146.html>.
8
9 Russia 12: *RIA Novosti*. (June 4 2013). Медведев назвал страшилками разговоры об
10 экспансии стран АТР [Medvedev calls the talks about expansion of the Asia-
11 Pacific Region countries bogeyman stories].
12 Russia 14: *RIA Novosti*. (June 04 2013). Медведев: Страны Арктики доверяют КНР,
13 но будут устанавливать правила [Medvedev: the Arctic countries trust the PRC,
14 but will set the rules]. Available from:
15 <http://ria.ru/world/20130604/941379869.html>.
16
17 Russia 15: *Rossiya-24*. (May 16 2013). Битва за сокровища Арктики [Battle for the
18 treasures of the Arctic]. Available from:
19 <http://rutv.ru/brand/show/episode/410681> [video].
20
21 Russia 16: Stogov, N., *Soyuznoe Veche*. (May 23-29 2013). АЗИЯ РВЕДЖТСЯ В АРКТИКУ
22 [Asia rushes into the Arctic].
23 Russia 17: Fomenko, V., *Trud* (May 16 2013). Индия и Китай потеснили Россию в
24 Арктике [Indian and China crowded out Russia in the Arctic]. Available from:
25 [http://www.trud.ru/article/16-05-](http://www.trud.ru/article/16-05-2013/1293667_indija_i_kitaj_potesnili_rossiju_v_arktike.html)
26 [2013/1293667_indija_i_kitaj_potesnili_rossiju_v_arktike.html](http://www.trud.ru/article/16-05-2013/1293667_indija_i_kitaj_potesnili_rossiju_v_arktike.html).
27
28 Sweden 3: Tunström, M., *Barometern Oskarshamn Tidningen*. (May 15 2013). Polariserat
29 Arktis [Polarised Arctic]. Available from:
30 [http://www.barometern.se/ledare/polariserat-](http://www.barometern.se/ledare/polariserat-arktis%283772623%29.gm?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+bot-ledare+%28BOT+Ledare%29)
31 [arktis%283772623%29.gm?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_ca](http://www.barometern.se/ledare/polariserat-arktis%283772623%29.gm?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+bot-ledare+%28BOT+Ledare%29)
32 [mpaign=Feed%3A+bot-ledare+%28BOT+Ledare%29](http://www.barometern.se/ledare/polariserat-arktis%283772623%29.gm?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+bot-ledare+%28BOT+Ledare%29).
33
34 Sweden 8: Eliasson, S., *Norrländska Socialdemokraten*. (May 15 2013). Världspolitik på
35 agendan [World politics on the agenda]. Available from:
36 <http://www.nsd.se/nyheter/kiruna/artikel.aspx?ArticleId=7658662>.
37
38 Sweden 10: TT-DN, *Dagens Nyheter*. (May 15 2013). Nya länder får insyn i Arktiska rådet
39 [New countries gain entry to the Arctic Council]. Available from:
40 <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/nya-lander-far-insyn-i-arktiska-radet/>.
41
42 Sweden 15: Stigsson Michajlov, H., *Norrköpings Tidningar*. (May 16 2013). Arktisk kyla
43 bakom handslagen i Kiruna [Arctic cold behind the hand-shakes in Kiruna].
44 Available from: [http://www.nt.se/opinion/ledare/arktisk-kyla-bakom-](http://www.nt.se/opinion/ledare/arktisk-kyla-bakom-handslagen-i-kiruna-8558213.aspx)
45 [handslagen-i-kiruna-8558213.aspx](http://www.nt.se/opinion/ledare/arktisk-kyla-bakom-handslagen-i-kiruna-8558213.aspx).
46
47 USA 7: Guilford, G., *The Atlantic*. (May 16 2013). What is China's Arctic game plan?
48 Available from: [http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/what-is-](http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/what-is-chinas-arctic-game-plan/275894/)
49 [chinas-arctic-game-plan/275894/](http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/what-is-chinas-arctic-game-plan/275894/).
50
51 USA 10: Myers, S.L., *New York Times*. (May 15 2013). Arctic Council adds 6 nations as
52 observer states, including China. Available from:
53 [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/world/europe/arctic-council-adds-](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/world/europe/arctic-council-adds-sixmembers-including-china.html?_r=0)
54 [sixmembers-including-china.html?_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/world/europe/arctic-council-adds-sixmembers-including-china.html?_r=0).
55
56 USA 13: Macdonald, A., *Wall Street Journal*. (May 13 2013). Arctic body comes in from
57 the cold. Available from:
58 [http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324216004578481292](http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324216004578481292386132004?mod=wsj_valettop_email)
59 [386132004?mod=wsj_valettop_email](http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324216004578481292386132004?mod=wsj_valettop_email).
60

Candidate states

- China 1: *Huánqiú Shíbào*. (May 16 2013). 中国成为北极理事会正式观察员 为此等了七年 [China becomes permanent observer to Arctic Council after 7 year wait]. Available from: <http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2013-05/3937750.html>.
- China 3: Hua, L. Z., Wei, S. and Mu, M., *Renmin Wang*. (May 16 2013). 中国正式加入北极理事会 外媒叹中国不容忽视 [China Becomes Permanent Observer to Arctic Council; Foreign Media Says China's Entry Not to be Underestimated]. Available from: <http://military.people.com.cn/n/2013/0516/c1011-21499826.html>.
- China 5: *Dayoo.com*. (May 16 2013). 中国成功进入“北极俱乐部” [China Successfully Joins 'Arctic Club'] Available from: http://news.dayoo.com/world/57402/201305/16/57402_110054740.htm.
- China 9: Jakobson, L., *Huánqiú Shíbào*. (May 17 2013). 中国不再被排斥于北极之外 [China No Longer Treated as Outsider in the Arctic]. Available from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqpl/zggc/2013-05-17/content_9057030.html.
- China 11: *China Daily*. (May 17 2013). 俄曾反对中国加入北极理事会 [Russia Once Objected China's Entry into the Arctic Council]. Available from: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqgj/jryw/2013-05-17/content_9056206.html.
- China 16: *Xinjiang Net*. (May 21 2013). 中国成北极理事会观察员国 向海权国家迈出重要一步 [China Becomes Observer on the Arctic Council; A Vital Step in Becoming a Sea Power]. Available from: http://www.xinjiangnet.com.cn/xjwzt/2013May/zgbjls/yy/201305/t20130521_3268981.shtml.
- India 1: Chakraborty, N., *Indian Express*. (June 9 2013). A slice of the Arctic. Available from: <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/a-slice-of-the-arctic/1126778/>.
- India 3: Gupta, A., *Indian Express*. (July 7 2013). India's Gains from Arctic Council. Available from: <http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Indias-gains-from-Arctic-Council/2013/07/31/article1709960.ece>.
- India 6: Saram, S. *The Hindu*. (July 15 2013). India's Date with the Arctic. Available from: <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/indias-date-with-the-arctic/article4915241.ece>.
- India 12: Chengappa, R. *The Tribune*. (June 2 2013). Ground Zero: In the World's 'Coolest' Place, the heat is on. Available from: <http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20130602/ground.htm>.
- India 16: Sharma, A. *Pardaphash* (July 4 2013). □□□□□ □□ □□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□ □□□□□ □□ □□□□□□ □□ □□□□□□ [The government is hopeful of using the Arctic sea routes]. Available from: <http://hindi.pardaphash.com/news/--735669/735669>.
- Italy 1: Mazzantini, U., *Greenreport.it*. (May 16 2013) Scoppia la grana della Groenlandia: Gli interessati osservatori asiatici (e l'Italia) nel Consiglio Artico, a caccia di risorse nel Grande Nord che si scioglie. L'Arctic Council tra la difesa dell'ambiente e dei popoli autoctoni e lo sfruttamento delle possibilità nascoste dal ghiaccio [The Greenlandic Issues Breaks Out: The Interested Asian Observers (and Italy) in the Arctic Council in Search of Resources in the Melting High North. The Arctic Council

- 1
2
3
4 between the environmental and indigenous protection and the exploitation of
5 possibilities hidden by ice]. Available from:
6 http://www.greenreport.it/_archivio2011/?page=default&id=21958#sthash.snty
7 [ma5Q.dpuf](http://www.greenreport.it/_archivio2011/?page=default&id=21958#sthash.snty).
8
9 Italy 2: Rampini, F., *La Repubblica*. (May 16 2013). Artico Corsa agli ultimi giacimenti
10 parte la battaglia del ghiaccio [Arctic: Race to the Last Fields. The Ice Battle Starts].
11 Available from:
12 [http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2013/05/16/artico-](http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2013/05/16/artico-corsa-agli-ultimi-giacimenti-parte-la.html)
13 [corsa-agli-ultimi-giacimenti-parte-la.html](http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2013/05/16/artico-corsa-agli-ultimi-giacimenti-parte-la.html).
14
15 Italy 4: *Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata*. (May 16 2013). Italia osservatore in
16 Consiglio Artico [Italy Observer at the Arctic Council]. Available from:
17 [http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/canali/energiaeambiente/istituzioni/2013/05/](http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/canali/energiaeambiente/istituzioni/2013/05/15/Ue-osservatore-Consiglio-Artico-cresce-impegno-Europa_8711344.html)
18 [15/Ue-osservatore-Consiglio-Artico-cresce-impegno-Europa_8711344.html](http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/canali/energiaeambiente/istituzioni/2013/05/15/Ue-osservatore-Consiglio-Artico-cresce-impegno-Europa_8711344.html).
19 Italy 7: Agnoli, S., *Corriere della Sera*. (May 8 2013). Energia, la corsa sfrenata al
20 nuovo oro nero [Energy, the Wild Rush to the New Black Gold]. Available from:
21 [http://www.corriere.it/economia/corriereconomia/13_maggio_09/agnoli-](http://www.corriere.it/economia/corriereconomia/13_maggio_09/agnoli-energia-corsa-sfrenata-nuovo-oro_c7969bea-b7e8-11e2-b9c5-70879a266c65.shtml)
22 [energia-corsa-sfrenata-nuovo-oro_c7969bea-b7e8-11e2-b9c5-](http://www.corriere.it/economia/corriereconomia/13_maggio_09/agnoli-energia-corsa-sfrenata-nuovo-oro_c7969bea-b7e8-11e2-b9c5-70879a266c65.shtml)
23 [70879a266c65.shtml](http://www.corriere.it/economia/corriereconomia/13_maggio_09/agnoli-energia-corsa-sfrenata-nuovo-oro_c7969bea-b7e8-11e2-b9c5-70879a266c65.shtml).
24
25 Italy 8: Scott, A., *Il Sole 24 Ore*. (May 18 2013). Materie prime e rotte marittime. Cina,
26 India e Giappone si affacciano sul risiko dell'Artico [Raw Materials and Sea Routes.
27 China, India and Japan Look out for the Arctic Risk]. Available from:
28 [http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-05-17/materie-prime-rotte-](http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-05-17/materie-prime-rotte-marittime-114311.shtml)
29 [marittime-114311.shtml](http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-05-17/materie-prime-rotte-marittime-114311.shtml).
30
31 Italy 11: Sansonetti, A., *Blitz Quotidiano*. (May 15 2013). Consiglio Artico: al “G8 del Polo
32 Nord” ammesse anche Cina e Italia [Arctic Council: Also China and Italy are
33 admitted to the North Pole’s G8]. Available from:
34 [http://www.blitzquotidiano.it/politica-mondiale/consiglio-artico-g8-polo-nord-](http://www.blitzquotidiano.it/politica-mondiale/consiglio-artico-g8-polo-nord-cina-vengo-canada-no-1561810)
35 [cina-vengo-canada-no-1561810](http://www.blitzquotidiano.it/politica-mondiale/consiglio-artico-g8-polo-nord-cina-vengo-canada-no-1561810).
36
37 Italy 12: Salpietro, C., *World Web News*. (May 18 2013). L'Italia ammessa allo status di
38 osservatore del Consiglio Artico [Italy Admitted as Observer at the Arctic Council].
39 Available from: [http://www.worldwebnews.it/litalia-ammessa-allo-status-di-](http://www.worldwebnews.it/litalia-ammessa-allo-status-di-osservatore-del-consiglio-artico)
40 [osservatore-del-consiglio-artico](http://www.worldwebnews.it/litalia-ammessa-allo-status-di-osservatore-del-consiglio-artico).
41
42 Japan 1: *Yon-nana News*. (May 16 2013). 日本のオブザーバー参加承認 北極評議会、
43 中韓も [Japan, China, and Korea to become observers: Accepted by the Arctic
44 Council]. Available from:
45 http://www.47news.jp/news/2013/05/post_20130515191526.html.
46
47 Japan 2: Ito, K. and Hayashi, N., *The Asahi Shimbun*. (May 16 2013). 日中、オブザーバー
48 に北極評議会が承認 [Japan and China to be Observers: The Arctic Council
49 Ratified]. Available from:
50 <http://www.asahi.com/shimen/articles/TKY201305150782.html>.
51
52 Japan 3: *The Hokkaido Shimbun*. (May 27 2013). <社説>北極圏開発*環境守る国際ル
53 ールを [Editorial: Development in the Arctic: International rule for environmental
54 protection is needed].
55
56 Japan 5: *The Mainichi Shimbun*. (May 3 2013). [Global Warming: Permafrost Soil is
57 Melting. Growing Fear of acceleration: International Cooperation for Observation
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4 is Starting]. Available from:
5 <http://mainichi.jp/feature/news/20130503ddm013040040000c.html>.
6 Japan 12: *Yomiuri Shimbun*. (May 19 2013). [社説] 北極海の開發 資源や航路で戦略
7 的関与を [Editorial: Development in the Arctic: Strategic Engagement is Needed in
8 the Field of Resource and Sea Route]. Available from:
9 <http://t21.nikkei.co.jp/g3/CMN0F12.do>.
10
11
12 Singapore 2: Meng, Y., *Lianhe Zaobao*. (April 29 2013). 新加坡为何要“永久观察”北极?
13 [Why does Singapore Wants ‘Permanent Observer’ Status?].
14 Singapore 3: *Lianhe Zaobao*. (May 21 2013). 北极融冰 引爆资源争夺战 [A Resource War
15 at the Arctic]. Available from:
16 <http://www.zaobao.com.sg/wencui/technology/story20130521-206947>.
17 Singapore 9: Nirmala, M., *The Straits Times*. (May 16 2013). Singapore is now an ocean
18 state. Available from: [http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asia-](http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asia-report/singapore/story/singapore-now-ocean-state-20130516)
19 [report/singapore/story/singapore-now-ocean-state-20130516](http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asia-report/singapore/story/singapore-now-ocean-state-20130516).
20 Singapore 11: Nirmala, M., *The Straits Times*. (May 21 2013). Fuelled by strategic
21 interest in cold North. Available from: [http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-](http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/opinion/story/fuelled-strategic-interest-cold-north-20130521)
22 [story/asia-report/opinion/story/fuelled-strategic-interest-cold-north-20130521](http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/opinion/story/fuelled-strategic-interest-cold-north-20130521).
23 Singapore 12: Nirmala, M. *The Straits Times*. (May 15 2013). Joining the Arctic queue.
24 Available from: [http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-](http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/opinion/story/joining-the-arctic-queue-20130515)
25 [report/opinion/story/joining-the-arctic-queue-20130515](http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/opinion/story/joining-the-arctic-queue-20130515).
26 Singapore 14: *Channel News Asia*. (April 19 2013). Pleas for US to name first
27 ambassador to Arctic. Available from:
28 [http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/pleas-for-us-to-](http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/pleas-for-us-to-name/643432.html)
29 [name/643432.html](http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/world/pleas-for-us-to-name/643432.html).
30 Singapore 16: *AsiaOne*. (May 16 2013) China to Increase Input on the Arctic. Available
31 from:
32 [http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20130516-](http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20130516-422980.html)
33 [422980.html](http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20130516-422980.html).
34
35
36
37
38 South Korea 1: Se-jeong, K., *The Korea Times*. (February 3 2013). Arctic melting to give
39 Korea more gas. Available from:
40 http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/02/176_129952.html.
41 South Korea 2: Jisan, K., *Money Today*. (February 27 2013). 북극, '약속의 땅'으로...
42 '영구옵서버' 지위 효과 [The North Pole, To 'Land of Promise' ... 'Effects of
43 'Permanent Observer Status']. Available from:
44 [http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2013022616242486124&ou-](http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2013022616242486124&outlink=1)
45 [tlink=1](http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2013022616242486124&outlink=1).
46
47 South Korea 10: Dong-hee, H. *ChosunBiz*. (May 15 2013). 한국, 북극이사회 옵서버 진출
48 성공...북극 진출 발판 [South Korea, Succeeded in Gaining Permanent Observer
49 Status at the Arctic Council...A Foothold in the Arctic Region]. Available from:
50 http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/05/15/2013051502322.html.
51 South Korea 11: Won-yoep, J., *JungAng Ilbo*. (May 15 2013). 마지막 기회의 땅 ... 한·중·일
52 북극 삼국지 [The Last Land of Opportunity... South Korea, China, Japan: Arctic
53 “Samgukji”]. Available from:
54 [http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=11521995&cloc=olink|](http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=11521995&cloc=olink|article|default)
55 [article|default](http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=11521995&cloc=olink|article|default).
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 South Korea 13: Jemin, S., *Kyunghyan Sinmun*. (May 15 2013). 한국, 북극 오염 우려 속
5 새 물류 루트 '동참'[South Korea, 'joining' (development for) new shipping routes
6 with a concern about pollution in the Arctic]. Available from:
7 [http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201305152223395&](http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201305152223395&code=910302)
8 [code=910302](http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201305152223395&code=910302)
9

10 South Korea 15: Won-yoep, J., *JungAng Ilbo*. (May 16 2013). 북극 연구 을이던 한국,
11 리딩그룹 도약 [South Korea, Once in the Second ('B') Group in Arctic Research,
12 Leaped to the Leading Group]. Available from:
13 [http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=11534364&cloc=olink|](http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=11534364&cloc=olink|article|default)
14 [article|default](http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=11534364&cloc=olink|article|default).
15
16

17 Observer states

18
19 France 2: Balenieri, R., *LePoint.fr* (May 15, 2013). La Chine admise au Conseil de
20 l'Arctique [China admitted to the Arctic Council]. Available from:
21 [http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/la-chine-admise-au-conseil-de-l-arctique-15-05-](http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/la-chine-admise-au-conseil-de-l-arctique-15-05-2013-1666929_24.php)
22 [2013-1666929_24.php](http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/la-chine-admise-au-conseil-de-l-arctique-15-05-2013-1666929_24.php).
23
24

25 Germany 1: Braune, G., *Handelsblatt* (May 14, 2013). Die EU strebt Beobachtersitz im
26 Artischen Rat an [EU aspires to observer seat in Arctic Council]. Available from:
27 [https://www.genios.de:443/document/HB_F4318D6E-86E8-402D-B17D-](https://www.genios.de:443/document/HB_F4318D6E-86E8-402D-B17D-C54E137C2CD4%7CHBPM_F4318D6E-86E8-402D)
28 [C54E137C2CD4%7CHBPM_F4318D6E-86E8-402D](https://www.genios.de:443/document/HB_F4318D6E-86E8-402D-B17D-C54E137C2CD4%7CHBPM_F4318D6E-86E8-402D).
29

30 Germany 2: Kirchner, T., *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. (May 14, 2013). Ausbeutung der Arktis -
31 Zeit der Eisbrecher [Exploitation of the Arctic: The age of the icebreakers].
32 Available from: [http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/ausbeutung-der-arktis-zeit-](http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/ausbeutung-der-arktis-zeit-der-eisbrecher-1.1672205)
33 [der-eisbrecher-1.1672205](http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/ausbeutung-der-arktis-zeit-der-eisbrecher-1.1672205).
34

35 Germany 3: Braune, G., *Badische Zeitung* (May 16, 2013). Der Arktische Rat will noch
36 enger zusammenarbeiten [The Arctic Council wants to work even more closely
37 together]. Available from: [http://www.badische-zeitung.de/ausland-1/der-](http://www.badische-zeitung.de/ausland-1/der-arktische-rat-will-noch-enger-zusammenarbeiten--71946285.html)
38 [arktische-rat-will-noch-enger-zusammenarbeiten--71946285.html](http://www.badische-zeitung.de/ausland-1/der-arktische-rat-will-noch-enger-zusammenarbeiten--71946285.html).
39

40 Germany 4: Michel, J., *Rheinische Post* (May 16, 2013). Kampf um die Bodenschätze der
41 Arktis [Fight for the natural resources of the Arctic]. Available from:
42 [http://nachrichten.rp-online.de/politik/kampf-um-die-bodenschaetze-der-arktis-](http://nachrichten.rp-online.de/politik/kampf-um-die-bodenschaetze-der-arktis-1.3400531)
43 [1.3400531](http://nachrichten.rp-online.de/politik/kampf-um-die-bodenschaetze-der-arktis-1.3400531).
44

45 Germany 5: Knudsen, A., *Neues Deutschland* (May 17, 2013). Arktischer Rat zwischen
46 Durchbruch und Konflikten:L Neue Beobachter aufgenommen / Deklaration zur
47 Zusammenarbeit gegen Verschmutzung durch Öl [Arctic Council between
48 breakthrough and conflicts: New observers accepted / declaration for cooperation
49 against oil pollution]. Available from: [http://www.neues-](http://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/821712.arktischer-rat-zwischen-durchbruch-und-konflikten.html)
50 [deutschland.de/artikel/821712.arktischer-rat-zwischen-durchbruch-und-](http://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/821712.arktischer-rat-zwischen-durchbruch-und-konflikten.html)
51 [konflikten.html](http://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/821712.arktischer-rat-zwischen-durchbruch-und-konflikten.html).
52

53 Netherlands 1: *Nederlands Dagblad* (May 15, 2013). Arctische raad zet EU in de
54 wachtkamer [Arctic Council puts EU in waiting room]. Available from:
55 <http://www.nd.nl/artikelen/2013/mei/15/>.
56

57 Netherlands 2: Luttikhuis, P., *NRC Handelsblad* (May 14, 2013). Iedereen wil de
58 Noordpool gebruiken [Everybody wants to use the North Pole].
59
60

- 1
2
3
4 Netherlands 3: *NRC Handelsblad* (May 16, 2013). Van wie is de Noordpool? [To whom
5 does the North Pole belong?].
6
7 Netherlands 4: *Trouw* (May 13, 2013). Dringen voor een plek aan tafel bij overleg over
8 de Noordpool [Pushing for a place at the table at consultation on the North Pole].
9 Available from:
10 [http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4332/Groen/article/detail/3440321/2013/05/13/D](http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4332/Groen/article/detail/3440321/2013/05/13/Dringen-voor-een-plek-aan-tafel-bij-overleg-over-de-Noordpool.dhtml)
11 [ringen-voor-een-plek-aan-tafel-bij-overleg-over-de-Noordpool.dhtml](http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4332/Groen/article/detail/3440321/2013/05/13/Dringen-voor-een-plek-aan-tafel-bij-overleg-over-de-Noordpool.dhtml).
12
13 Netherlands 5: de Pous, I. and Koele, T., *De Volkskrant* (May 8, 2013). Wie kmot er door
14 de ballotage van de Noordpool-clan? [Who will get the vote of North Pole group?].
15 Available from:
16 [http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/3438064/](http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/3438064/2013/05/08/Wie-komt-er-door-de-ballotage-van-de-Noordpool-clan.dhtml)
17 [2013/05/08/Wie-komt-er-door-de-ballotage-van-de-Noordpool-clan.dhtml](http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/3438064/2013/05/08/Wie-komt-er-door-de-ballotage-van-de-Noordpool-clan.dhtml).
18
19 Poland 3: *Onet.pl* (May 15, 2013). Rada Arktyczna ma nowych stałych obserwatorów,
20 decyzję ws. UE odłożono [Arctic Council has new permanent observers, decision
21 on EU is postponed]. Available from: <http://m.onet.pl/wiadomosci/swiat,8p5dj>.
22
23 Poland 5: *TVN24.pl* (May 8, 2013). Od Afryki po Arktykę. Chiny i Indie biją się o miejsce
24 w pierwszym rzędzie [From Africa to the Arctic, China and India fight for a front
25 row seat]. Available from: [http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiate,2/od-](http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiate,2/od-afryki-po-arktyke-chiny-i-indie-bija-sie-o-miejsce-w-pierwszym-rzedzie,324116.html)
26 [afryki-po-arktyke-chiny-i-indie-bija-sie-o-miejsce-w-pierwszym-](http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiate,2/od-afryki-po-arktyke-chiny-i-indie-bija-sie-o-miejsce-w-pierwszym-rzedzie,324116.html)
27 [rzedzie,324116.html](http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiate,2/od-afryki-po-arktyke-chiny-i-indie-bija-sie-o-miejsce-w-pierwszym-rzedzie,324116.html).
28
29 Spain 1: Blasco, E., *ABC* (May 17, 2013). China entra en el Consejo Artico, pero no se
30 alarmen [China joins the Arctic Council, but don't be alarmed]. Available from:
31 [http://abcblogs.abc.es/capital-america/2013/05/17/china-entra-en-el-consejo-](http://abcblogs.abc.es/capital-america/2013/05/17/china-entra-en-el-consejo-artico-pero-no-se-alarmen/)
32 [artico-pero-no-se-alarmen/](http://abcblogs.abc.es/capital-america/2013/05/17/china-entra-en-el-consejo-artico-pero-no-se-alarmen/).
33
34 Spain 4: Cardenal, J.P., *El País* (May 16, 2013). La silenciosa conquista china: La agenda
35 china en el Ártico [The silent Chinese conquest: The Chinese agenda in the Arctic].
36 Available from: [http://blogs.elpais.com/conquista-china/2013/05/la-agenda-](http://blogs.elpais.com/conquista-china/2013/05/la-agenda-china-en-el-%C3%A1rtico.html)
37 [china-en-el-%C3%A1rtico.html](http://blogs.elpais.com/conquista-china/2013/05/la-agenda-china-en-el-%C3%A1rtico.html).
38
39 United Kingdom 1: Ghattas, S. *BBC News* (May 14, 2013). Arctic Council: John Kerry
40 steps into Arctic diplomacy. Available from: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22528594)
41 [us-canada-22528594](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22528594)
42
43 United Kingdom 5: Milne, R. *Financial Times* (May 15, 2013). China wins observer status
44 in Arctic Council. Available from: [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b665723c-bd3e-](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b665723c-bd3e-11e2-890a-00144feab7de.html)
45 [11e2-890a-00144feab7de.html](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b665723c-bd3e-11e2-890a-00144feab7de.html).
46
47 United Kingdom 6: Jakobson, L. *Financial Times* (May 19, 2013). Beijing's Arctic goals
48 are not to be feared. Available from: [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3dfd6f16-bef1-](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3dfd6f16-bef1-11e2-87ff-00144feab7de.html)
49 [11e2-87ff-00144feab7de.html](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3dfd6f16-bef1-11e2-87ff-00144feab7de.html).
50
51 United Kingdom 7: Goldenberg, S. *The Guardian* (May 10, 2013). Obama undecided on
52 Arctic Council expansion days before summit. Available from:
53 [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/10/obama-undecided-arctic-](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/10/obama-undecided-arctic-council-expansion)
54 [council-expansion](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/10/obama-undecided-arctic-council-expansion).
55
56 United Kingdom 8: Struzik, E. *The Guardian* (June 4, 2013). China signals hunger for
57 Arctic's mineral riches. Available from:
58 [http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jun/04/china-arctics-mineral-](http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jun/04/china-arctics-mineral-riches)
59 [riches](http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/jun/04/china-arctics-mineral-riches).
60

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

United Kingdom 9: Kaiman, J. *The Guardian* (May 18, 2013). China pours cash into melting Arctic in bid to win influence. Available from:
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/18/china-arctic-mineral-investment>.

For Peer Review Only



Figure 1

Figure 2



Review Only

Table 1: Media stories analyzed by status, country, number, and language

Status	Country	Number	Language
Member states	Canada	20	15 English / 5 French
	Denmark/Greenland/Faroe Islands	24	20 Danish (8 from Greenland, 12 from Denmark) / 4 Faroese
	Finland	18	13 Finnish / 5 Swedish
	Iceland	20	Icelandic
	Norway	21	Norwegian
	Russia	21	Russian
	Sweden	20	Swedish
	USA	13	English
Candidate states	China	15	Chinese
	India	21	9 Hindi / 12 English
	Italy	13	Italian
	Japan	12	Japanese
	Singapore	15	11 English / 4 Chinese
	South Korea	15	13 Korean / 2 English
Permanent observer states	France	4	French
	Germany	5	German
	The Netherlands	5	Dutch
	Poland	5	Polish
	Spain	4	Spanish
	United Kingdom	9	English