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What is it like to have type-2 blindsight? Drawing inferences from residual function in type-1 blindsight

Kentridge, R.W.

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Abstract

Controversy surrounds the question of whether the experience sometimes elicited by visual stimuli in blindsight (type-2 blindsight) is visual in nature or whether it is some sort of non-visual experience. The suggestion that the experience is visual seems, at face value, to make sense. I argue here, however, that the residual abilities found in type-1 blindsight (blindsight in which stimuli elicit no conscious experience) are not aspects of normal vision with consciousness deleted, but are based fragments of visual processes that, in themselves, would not be intelligible as visual experiences. If type-2 blindsight is a conscious manifestation of this residual function then it is not obvious that type-2 blindsight would be phenomenally like vision.

Citation

Kentridge, R. (2015). What is it like to have type-2 blindsight? Drawing inferences from residual function in type-1 blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition, 32, 41-44. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.005

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Aug 4, 2014
Online Publication Date Oct 7, 2014
Publication Date Mar 1, 2015
Deposit Date Sep 2, 2014
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Consciousness and Cognition
Print ISSN 1053-8100
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 32
Pages 41-44
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.005
Keywords Vision, Neuropsychology, Consciousness, Blindsight, Phenomenology.

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Copyright Statement
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Consciousness and Cognition. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Consciousness and Cognition, 32, March 2015, 10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.005.





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