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VIII—Defending dualism.

Gibb, S. C. (2015) 'VIII—Defending dualism.', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society., 115 (2pt2). pp. 131-146.

Abstract

In the contemporary mental causation debate, two dualist models of psychophysical causal relevance have been proposed which entail that although mental events are causally relevant in the physical domain, this is not in virtue of them causing any physical event. It is widely assumed that the principle of the causal completeness of the physical domain provides a general argument against interactive dualism. But, whether the completeness principle presents a problem for these alternative forms of interactive dualism is questionable. In this paper, focusing on the popular no-gap argument for the completeness principle, I explore one reason why.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 9 February 2015 at 5:30 p.m.
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00388.x
Publisher statement:This is the accepted version of the following article: Gibb, S. (2015), VIII—Defending Dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 115(2): 131-146, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00388.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:03 June 2015
Date of first online publication:19 November 2015
Date first made open access:01 July 2017

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