Gibb, S. C. (2015) 'The causal closure principle.', Philosophical quarterly., 65 (261). pp. 626-647.
In the mental causation debate, there is a common assumption that interactive dualism is false because of the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. However, this paper argues that recent advances in metaphysics—more specifically, in the philosophy of causation—reveal a serious, general flaw in contemporary formulations of this principle.
|Keywords:||Causal closure principle, Interactive dualism, Powers theory of causation, Causal sufficiency, Double prevention, Enabling events.|
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv030|
|Publisher statement:||This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The Philosophical Quarterly following peer review. The version of record Gibb, S. C. (2015) 'The causal closure principle.', Philosophical quarterly, 65(261): 626-647 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv030.|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||03 June 2015|
|Date of first online publication:||26 April 2015|
|Date first made open access:||26 April 2017|
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