Gibb, S. C. (2015) 'Physical determinability.', Humana.mente : journal of philosophical studies., 29 . pp. 69-90.
I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure for — physical events to be caused. More specifically, I defend the claim that mental events are ‘double preventers’ within the physical domain, where double preventers are a type of enabling event. The distinction that I make between causes and enabling events and the dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance that I defend has emerged from my acceptance of the powers theory of causation. In this paper, I explore how this dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance offers a response to Papineau’s defence of the causal completeness principle via the conservation laws.
|Additional Information:||Special edition on Causation and Mental Causation.|
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Full text:||(VoR) Version of Record|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/55|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||05 June 2015|
|Date of first online publication:||December 2015|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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