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Physical determinability.

Gibb, S. C. (2015) 'Physical determinability.', Humana.mente : journal of philosophical studies., 29 . pp. 69-90.


I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure for — physical events to be caused. More specifically, I defend the claim that mental events are ‘double preventers’ within the physical domain, where double preventers are a type of enabling event. The distinction that I make between causes and enabling events and the dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance that I defend has emerged from my acceptance of the powers theory of causation. In this paper, I explore how this dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance offers a response to Papineau’s defence of the causal completeness principle via the conservation laws.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:Special edition on Causation and Mental Causation.
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:05 June 2015
Date of first online publication:December 2015
Date first made open access:No date available

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