Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games

Kamei, K.; Putterman, L.

doi:10.1111/ecoj.12320

Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games

Kamei, K.; Putterman, L.

Authors

K. Kamei

L. Putterman

Abstract

Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to “wipe clean” one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their “reforming” themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous, symmetric partner choice. We find that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts, although earlier end-game behaviours are observed.

Citation

Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2016). Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games. The Economic Journal, 127(602), 1069-1095. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12320

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	May 29, 2015
Online Publication Date	Jul 25, 2016
Publication Date	Jul 25, 2016
Deposit Date	Jul 7, 2015
Publicly Available Date	Jul 25, 2018
Journal	The Economic Journal
Print ISSN	0013-0133
Electronic ISSN	1468-0297
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	127
Issue	602
Pages	1069-1095
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12320
Keywords	Cooperation, Reputation, Voluntary contribution, Public goods, Sorting, Endogenous grouping, Group formation, Experiment.
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1402769

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Copyright Statement
This is the accepted version of the following article: Kamei, K. and Putterman, L. (2016). Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games. The Economic Journal, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12320. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.