Tugby, Matthew (2010) 'Simultaneity in dispositional interaction?', Ratio., 23 (3). pp. 322-338.
My aim is to question an assumption that is often made in the philosophical literature on dispositions. This is the assumption that, generally, the stimulation (or ‘triggering’) of a disposition temporally precedes the manifesting of that disposition. I will begin by examining precisely what the trigging of a disposition may be thought to consist in, and will identify two plausible views. I will then argue that on either of these views about triggering, a case can be made against the view that the triggering of a disposition always occurs before the manifesting of that disposition. More precisely, if the first view about triggering is accepted, and certain plausible assumptions about dispositions are put into place, a metaphysical argument can be formulated for the claim that the stimulation of a disposition never occurs before that disposition manifests. If the second view about triggering is accepted, the question concerning simultaneity becomes an empirical one. There are, however, examples of dispositional interaction which, on the second view about triggering, clearly seem to involve simultaneity.
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00470.x|
|Publisher statement:||This is the accepted version of the following article: Tugby, M. (2010), Simultaneity in dispositional interaction? Ratio, 23(3): 322-338, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00470.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||08 September 2015|
|Date of first online publication:||September 2010|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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