Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Rescuing Dispositionalism from the Ultimate Problem: Reply to Barker and Smart

Tugby, Matthew

Rescuing Dispositionalism from the Ultimate Problem: Reply to Barker and Smart Thumbnail


Authors



Abstract

Barker and Smart have argued that dispositional monism is just as susceptible to the ultimate regress problem as Armstrong’s contingent necessitation view of laws. In this response, I consider what implications this conclusion has for the dispositional essentialist project more generally. I argue that it is the monistic aspect of dispositional monism, rather than the dispositional essentialist aspect, which is the source of the problem raised by Barker and Smart. I then outline a version of dispositional essentialism which avoids the ultimate problem by avoiding the commitment to monism. Despite the article by Barker and Smart, it is not time to give up on the dispositionalist project yet.

Citation

Tugby, M. (2012). Rescuing Dispositionalism from the Ultimate Problem: Reply to Barker and Smart. Analysis, 72(4), 723-731. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans112

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Oct 1, 2012
Deposit Date Oct 7, 2013
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Analysis
Print ISSN 0003-2638
Electronic ISSN 1467-8284
Publisher Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 72
Issue 4
Pages 723-731
DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans112
Keywords Properties, Laws, Dispositions, Qualities, Essentialism, Monism.

Files

Accepted Journal Article (72 Kb)
PDF

Copyright Statement
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The version of record Tugby, Matthew (2012) 'Rescuing dispositionalism from the ultimate problem : reply to Barker and Smart.', Analysis., 72 (4). pp. 723-731 is available online at: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/72/4/723




You might also like



Downloadable Citations