Tugby, Matthew (2012) 'Rescuing dispositionalism from the ultimate problem : reply to Barker and Smart.', Analysis., 72 (4). pp. 723-731.
Barker and Smart have argued that dispositional monism is just as susceptible to the ultimate regress problem as Armstrong’s contingent necessitation view of laws. In this response, I consider what implications this conclusion has for the dispositional essentialist project more generally. I argue that it is the monistic aspect of dispositional monism, rather than the dispositional essentialist aspect, which is the source of the problem raised by Barker and Smart. I then outline a version of dispositional essentialism which avoids the ultimate problem by avoiding the commitment to monism. Despite the article by Barker and Smart, it is not time to give up on the dispositionalist project yet.
|Keywords:||Properties, Laws, Dispositions, Qualities, Essentialism, Monism.|
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans112|
|Publisher statement:||This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis following peer review. The version of record Tugby, Matthew (2012) 'Rescuing dispositionalism from the ultimate problem : reply to Barker and Smart.', Analysis., 72 (4). pp. 723-731 is available online at: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/72/4/723|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||08 September 2015|
|Date of first online publication:||October 2012|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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