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THE CONSEQUENCES OF DUAL AND UNILATERAL COMMITMENT TO THE ORGANISATION AND UNION.

Abstract

This paper examines the pattern and consequences of commitment to organisation and union amongst union members in a UK National Health Service (NHS) Trust. Those who perceived the industrial relations climate as positive were more likely to be dually committed to both organisation and union. As anticipated, union commitment predicted union citizenship behaviours and intent to quit the union. However, organisational commitment predicted intent to quit the organisation but not organisational citizenship behaviour, which was predicted by union commitment. Findings suggest that those with a unilateral commitment to the union are more likely than the dually committed to engage in citizenship behaviours aimed at helping fellow members and colleagues, perhaps because they feel unconstrained by any strong loyalty to the organisation.

Keywords:
Dual commitment
Union commitment
Organisational commitment
Union citizenship behaviour
Organisational citizenship behaviour
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DUAL AND UNILATERAL COMMITMENT TO THE ORGANISATION AND UNION.

INTRODUCTION

There is now a sizeable literature on employees’ commitment to their employer and to their union, with studies on the antecedents of organisational (Klein et al, 2014; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch and Topolnytsky, 2002) and union commitment (Fiorito et al, 2015; Deery et al, 2014; Monot, Wagner and Beehr, 2011; Bamberger, Kluger and Suchard, 1999;), and on the possibility of employees being dually committed to both (Akoto, 2013; Robinson et al 2012; Kim and Rowley, 2006; Cohen, 2005; Reed, Young and Mchugh, 1994). The findings suggest that, in spite of the possibility that commitment to employer and union might be considered as conflicting, dual loyalty is very common, particularly where the climate of employee relations is relatively harmonious. However, very little research has been conducted on the consequences of dual commitment. Gordon and Ladd (1990) argue that the significance of dual commitment must ultimately be assessed by its impact on employee attitudes and behaviours. Furthermore, much of the dual commitment literature has been North American and very few studies have been conducted in the UK, with the rare exception of Guest and Dewe (1991).

In this paper, our aims are twofold. First, we explore the pattern of commitment to organisation and union amongst union members in a UK National Health Service (NHS) Trust. Our concern is with the extent to which the two commitments can be seen as competing or complementary. The evidence base is rather mixed on the complementary-competing nature of union and organisational commitment (Angle and Perry, 1986; Fuller and Hester, 1998; Kim, and Rowley,
and we seek to clarify the nature of the relationship by examining the role of a contextual moderator, industrial relations climate. Second, we examine the consequences of commitment for employee attitudes and behaviour, including intentions to quit the organisation and the union, and the performance of organisational and union citizenship behaviours. A key question is whether or not dual commitment adds anything to our understanding of attitudes and behaviour, independently of commitment to company and union (Gordon and Ladd 1990; Bemmels 1995).

Developing further understanding of the role of dual commitment is important, as the fostering of dual commitment is closely linked to more co-operative management-union relationships in the workplace. The achievement of more co-operative union-management relationships can be seen as a key objective of recent industrial relations developments in the UK, such as the introduction of formal partnership agreements in the workplace Partnership working has been especially prominent in the NHS (Heaton et al. 2000; 2002; Kinge, 2014).

Dual commitment has important implications for HRM. One suggestion in the HRM literature is that the development of HRM practices in order to win the organisational commitment of employees may have also had the effect of undermining employees’ commitment to their unions. A related argument here is that HRM practices are a substitute for unions (Machin and Wood, 2005). Thus a deeper understanding of the consequences of union and organisational commitment should provide insights into such debates. Further, the consequences of commitment to the organisation and the union have considerable implications for outcomes of importance in HRM, such as employees’ willingness to go the extra mile at work and their quit rates. For example, a recent study of unionized banking employees in Australia found
that union commitment predicted union citizenship behaviours which in turn reduced employee absence levels (Deery, Iverson, Buttigieg and Zatzick, 2014.

The paper begins with a brief survey of the literature on dual commitment. We then present our empirical work, before drawing some conclusions and discussing the implications of our findings.

LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES

Commitment to organisation and to union.

Organisational commitment has been defined as the ‘binding of an individual to an organisation’ (Gordon et al. 1980: 480), and is usually measured as an attitude involving a sense of identification and loyalty. This ‘attitudinal’ approach to commitment may be distinguished from ‘behavioural’ commitment, the latter involving the individual becoming bound to the organisation due to sunk investments and ‘side bets’ in the employment relationship. The attitudinal approach has received the greater attention in the commitment literature overall. The union commitment literature has essentially transferred the notion of organisational commitment into a union context (Gordon et al. 1980).

It might be expected that commitment to organisation and to union would be a source of role conflict, involving cognitive dissonance, particularly if union and employer are seen to be in conflict (Festinger 1957). The behaviours expected of the committed union member, including actively supporting the union and perhaps participating in industrial action from time to time, may bring the individual into conflict with the employer. At the very least, the individual may face a choice in
allocating time and energy to behaviours that express support for the union or the organisation.

Indeed classic unitarist theory in industrial relations conceptualizes the employing organisation has having a single set of goals and shared values (Fox, 1971; Cullinane and Dundon, 2014). This thus suggests that a committed employee is one who is attached to the organization as a whole. Unitarist theory has long been challenged as an adequate explanation for workplace behaviour but organisational behavior research has often treated organisational commitment in a global and monolithic way (Chan, Tong-qing, Redman and Snape, 2006). However, the longstanding and continuing evidence on organizational and union commitment supports a more pluralistic (Ackers, 2014) interpretation of employee commitment. The pattern of findings in the literature suggests that many individuals are highly committed both to their union and their employer, a phenomenon known as ‘dual allegiance’, ‘dual loyalty’ or ‘dual commitment’ (e.g. Stagner 1954; Purcell, 1960; Angle and Perry 1986; Magenau et al. 1988; Fullagar and Barling 1991; Lee, 2004).

Two main approaches have been adopted in the measurement of dual commitment (Sverke and Sjoberg 1994; Gordon and Ladd 1990). The ‘dimensional approach’ is based on the assessment of the correlation between organisational and union commitment, with dual commitment being evidenced by a positive correlation (Angle and Perry 1986; Conlon and Gallagher 1987, Johnson and Johnson 1992). Most studies have found a positive correlation between the two variables, although a few have found a small negative correlation.

Reed et al’s (1994) meta-analysis of 76 samples found correlations ranging from –0.25 to +0.77, with a mean corrected correlation of +0.42. Similarly, Fuller and Hester’s (1998) meta-analysis of 22 samples found correlations ranging from –0.26 to
+0.72. Such a wide range of correlations, ranging from negative to positive, is unusual in commitment studies. For example, meta-analytic studies of affective professional/occupational and organisational commitment show a strong positive correlation (Wallace, 1995; Lee, Carswell, and Allen, 2000). Further analysis by Lee et al (2000:806) suggests that a negative relation “does not exist between the two constructs” and the much discussed possible conflicts between profession and organisation may not be as prevalent as some have suggested. Clearly, from the range of correlations reported by the dual commitment meta-analytic studies, this is not the case for union and organisational commitment.

The ‘taxonomic approach’ -see figure 1 - to dual commitment categorises individuals into four groups: dual allegiance (with high levels of commitment to both organisation and union), unilateral allegiance to either organisation or union, and dual disallegiance (low commitment to both). The criteria for splitting the sample vary across studies. Splitting at the median is common, and we adopt this approach in this study, although this results in sample-specific quadrants, which prevents meaningful comparisons across samples. An alternative is to split the sample at the ‘neutral’ scale mid-points. A less common approach is to perform a cluster analysis. The choice of approach is essentially an arbitrary one and some studies apply alternative bifurcation methods and then assess the impact on the results (e.g., Sverke and Sjoberg 1994; Robinson et al, 2012).

The general findings here are that the mean and median splits generate very similar results across samples. For example, over 99 percent of individuals are assigned to the same taxons across four samples in the Sverke and Sjoberg (1994) Swedish union data. The distribution of individuals produced by the mid-point split differs markedly from the median and mean splits in assigning fewer individuals to a
dual commitment taxon in the Sverke and Sjoberg study (1994) but more in a Korean study of union members by Robinson et al (2012). Lastly, the Swedish study found cluster analysis assigned 88 and 87.3 percent of individuals to the same taxons as are allocated by median and mean splits respectively.

We focus more on the taxonomic approach in this study but also report the results of a dimensional approach. Our first preliminary research objective is to report the pattern of findings on dual commitment. We expect to find evidence of dual commitment in our study.

*Figure 1 somewhere near here.*

**Industrial relations climate and commitment.**

Studies of organisational (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch and Topolnytsky, 2002), union commitment (Bamberger et al, 1990) and dual commitment (Deery and Iverson 1998; Sverke and Sjoberg 1994; Sherer and Morishima 1989) have generally found union and organisational commitment to have different antecedents. Individuals may perceive separate exchanges with employer and union, so that organisational and union commitment are the outcome of parallel rather than competing processes (Johnson and Johnson 1992). Thus, findings suggest that organisational commitment is influenced by perceptions of the job, and union commitment by perceptions of the union’s performance (Ng 1989; Magenau et al. 1988).

Some studies find a positive relationship between perceived industrial relations climate and commitment to both employer and union (Angle and Perry 1986; Deery and Iverson, 2005), suggesting that dual commitment may be a feature of harmonious industrial relations. Thus, when management-union relations are seen to be positive, employees may find it easier to commit to both organisation and union,
although these commitments may be seen as being inconsistent where relations between the two are antagonistic (Fuller and Hester, 1998). This is in line with Festinger’s (1957) notion of cognitive dissonance, with the two commitments constituting dissonant cognitive elements. Cognitive dissonance is seen as a state of negative arousal, the reduction of which is likely to be gratifying. Thus, where union and organisation are seen to be in conflict, dual commitment is likely to give rise to attempts to reduce the degree of dissonance, perhaps by abandoning commitment to one or other.

Frustration-aggression theory (Klandermans, 1986; Buttigieg, Deery, Iverson, 2014) has also been used to explain patterns of commitments to organisation and union when employees have negative experiences at work (Redman and Snape, 2004). An adversarial IR climate is a source of negative experience in the workplace for employees (Dastmalchian, 2008). When employees perceive the IR climate as conflictual, they are likely to interpret the two commitments as potentially competing and feel “threatened” by committing to both union and organisation resulting in low levels of dual commitment. Employees are thus likely to choose the union over the organisation in negative IR climates.

This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Dual commitment to organisation and union will be more prevalent amongst those individuals who perceive the industrial relations climate to be positive.

**The consequences of organisational and union commitment.**

There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that organisational commitment is associated with lower levels of intent to quit and with higher levels of discretionary or
citizenship behaviour (Meyer, et al. 2002; Mathieu and Zajac 1990). Similarly, union
commitment has been shown to predict active participation in the union (Bamberger
et al. 1999), and intent to quit the union (Snape and Chan 2000; Sverke and Sjoberg
1995; Goslinga and Sverke 2003).

One possible rationale for such relationships is that the individual
employee/member enjoys a social exchange relationship with both employer and
union, which is reflected in commitment and reciprocated in the form of discretionary
citizenship behaviour and intent to continue the relationship (Organ 1990).

Social exchange is a subjective, relationship-oriented interaction between
organisations, such as employers and unions, and employees characterized by an
exchange of benefits, trust and commitment, with a long-term focus, and unspecified,
open-ended commitments (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano, and Mitchell, 2005). Social
exchange involves a norm of reciprocity such that discretionary benefits provided to
the exchange partner are returned in a discretionary way over the longer term. Thus,
high quality social exchange relationships are likely to motivate employees to engage
in citizenship behaviours that have favourable consequences for the organization or
union over time because employees tend to identify such organizations’ wellbeing
with their own and because they may feel an obligation to support the organizations
that support them (Lavelle et al, 2007).

However, work on multiple commitments suggests that reciprocation is likely
to be aimed at the specific exchange partner (McNeely and Meglino 1994; Settoon et
foci research, drawing especially on the social exchange and citizenship behaviour
literatures, suggests that employees conceptualize their experience of the workplace in
a multifaceted way. Employees, according to target similarity theory, differentiate
between social exchange relationship partners, such as the organization and union, and the beneficiaries of specific citizenship behaviors. Target similarity theory suggests that employees selectively direct different citizenship behaviors toward the organization or toward other targets such as individuals (Williams & Anderson, 1991) unions (Bamberger et al, 1999) or professions (Wallace, 1988). The argument here is that commitment to the employer results in discretionary behaviours likely to benefit the employer, whilst union commitment results in discretionary behaviours likely to benefit the union. We make one exception to this general theoretical position in hypothesising a “cross-over” effect from union commitment to OCB-I. Here we suggest that the pro-social motivational basis of union commitment will result in union members providing helping behaviours targeted at helping other individuals in both union-related and general work areas. Thus, we formulate the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: Organisational commitment is a). negatively associated with intention to quit the organisation and b). positively associated with OCB-O and OCB-I.

Hypothesis 3: Union commitment is a). negatively associated with intention to quit the union and b). positively associated with union helping, union rank and file and union activism and c). OCB-I.

The consequences of dual commitment.

Much of the research has examined the extent of dual commitment and has explored the factors which might predict its existence. However, a key question which has been relatively neglected in the literature is the extent to which dual commitment predicts attitudes and behaviours (Gordon and Ladd 1990). The suggestion is that if dual
commitment is a unique construct, independent of organisational and union commitment, then ‘…it would have additive effects beyond commitment to an employer or a union on desirable behaviors and organisational outcomes’ (Bemmels 1995: 401). The suggestion is that employees who express dual commitment may be expected to show attitudes and behaviours which are favourable to both employer and union.

Bemmels (1995) provides a test of this. Modelling dual commitment as an interaction term between the union and organisational commitment variables, the findings suggest that dual commitment predicts shop steward behaviour (the frequency with which the steward resolves grievances through informal discussion with the supervisor), and grievance procedure outcomes (the percentage of grievances filed which were resolved during the year), after controlling for the possible main effects of the two commitments. In each case, the interaction suggests that dual commitment is associated with a higher level of the steward behaviour/outcome in question. Thus, according to Bemmels (1995), dual commitment emerges as a distinct construct, with independent predictive power, explaining variance over and above that explained by union and organisational commitment.

In contrast, Deery and Iverson (1998), in their study of an Australian financial services company, find that dual commitment, measured by a development of Angle and Perry’s (1986) direct measure of dual commitment, is a significant predictor of none of their organisational outcomes. This is in spite of the fact that such outcomes were predicted by organisational and union commitment, suggesting that the dual commitment construct has no independent explanatory power. The divergent findings between the Bemmels (1995) and Deery and Iverson (1998) studies may be due to their having measured dual commitment differently or to their being based on very
different samples. Clearly, the relationship between dual commitment and outcomes is in need of further examination.

The Angle and Perry (1986) direct measure of dual commitment is a five-item scale, which attempts to tap into potential employee-union member role conflict and the extent to which management and union are perceived as being non-conflictual, with high dual commitment being represented by a perception of low conflict – see appendix. However, attempting to measure dual commitment separately, as essentially perceived conflict, rather than as a function of the two unilateral commitment scales is perhaps inappropriate (Bemmels, 1995). There may also be reliability problems in the Angle and Perry (1986) scale. Whilst the original study reported an alpha of 0.71, Deery and Iverson’s (1998) adaptation of the scale had a reliability coefficient of only 0.63, and that used by Beauvais et al. (1991) had alphas of only 0.51 and 0.44 in their two samples. Furthermore, Beauvais et al. (1991) questioned the validity of the scale as a measure of dual commitment, suggesting that it reflects union rather than dual commitment.

Given the above concerns, in this study we follow the suggestions of both Gordon and Ladd (1990) and Bemmels (1995) in measuring dual commitment as an interaction between the organisational and union commitment scales. We also suggest that dual commitment will emerge as a unique construct, explaining variance in outcomes over and above that explained by organisational and union commitment (Gordon and Ladd 1990; Bemmels 1995).

The question then arises as to what will be the expected sign of such effects. Following Bemmels (1995), we might expect that commitment to one focus (e.g., the organisation) would reinforce the effect of commitment to the other focus (e.g., the union) on relevant outcomes (e.g., intent to quit the union and union citizenship.
behaviours). A possible rationale for such moderation effects is that dual commitment is associated with cognitive consistency between the roles of employee and union member (Magenau et al. 1988), such that outcome behaviours are engaged in relatively free from fears of compromising either role. However, it is also plausible to suggest the reverse effect, with dual commitment making individuals more cautious about being identified too strongly with either organisation or union. For example, the impact of union commitment on union citizenship behaviour may be weaker for those who also have high levels of organisational commitment, if such individuals fear that being seen as a union activist offends the employer.

Given the general findings of the none-US literature (e.g. Deery et al, 1994; Guest and Dewe, 1991) which suggests that there is an inherent conflict in dual commitment we hypothesis as follows

Hypothesis 4: Dual commitment will moderate the relationships between a). union commitment and union helping, union rank and file and union activism b). union commitment and intention to quit the union and c). organizational commitment and OCB-O and OCB-I and d). organisational commitment and intent to quit the Trust , such that these relationships will be weaker when dual commitment is high.

We summarise the relationships for hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 in the model -see Figure 2.

Figure 2 somewhere near here.

METHOD

Sample and procedure.
A self-completion questionnaire was distributed to all 1,560 employees of an Acute Hospital NHS Trust serving a diverse rural population in North East England. We selected an NHS trust because of our focus on dual commitment and the need to secure research access to a good sized workforce with a high percentage of union members. We chose this Trust because it had a local reputation (e.g. in local media and from Chartered Institute of Personnel & Development branch presentations) for neither strongly adversarial nor highly cooperative union-management labour relations. To ensure confidentiality the questionnaire was returned direct to the researchers in a reply-paid envelope. By the cut-off date, late 2011, 707 useable responses were received, providing a response rate of 45 percent. The sample, like all NHS Trusts, was occupationally diverse. The three largest groups of respondents were nurses 38 percent of the respondents, professions allied to medicine 16 percent, doctors seven percent doctors. In total, 66 percent were members of a union. In this paper, we restrict our analysis to union members. In the union member sub-sample, mean health service and union tenure were 16.29 and 14.47 years respectively. The modal age range was 40 to 49, accounting for 33.6 percent of the sub-sample, 84.8 percent were female, 81.3 percent were married/living as married and 27.6 percent had degree-level education. The sample was broadly representative of the Trust’s overall workforce, for example, with 84 percent of all employees being women.

The sample is generally representative of the wider NHS population with slightly more female respondents than the overall population of 77 % but closer to figure of 79% for the Northern Region (NHS Employers, 2015). Establishing the representativeness with the more directly comparable population of Acute Trust Hospitals is more difficult to assess but it appears to be largely line with data from the National Staff Surveys (NSS,
findings of a female population of 82%. Union representatives estimated trade union density for the Trust at approximately two-thirds of the work force, which is higher than that for the average union density figure for the UK public sector as a whole of 57% (Department for Business Innovation & Skills 2012). Establishing union density percentages of the population of Acute Hospital Trusts is again difficult to achieve. The TUC reports of union density by sector consistently places the Health sector in the top 5 for levels of union density (TUC, 2015).

Measures.

The study variables were measured as follows (see appendix for all items). Unless mentioned otherwise, responses were on a seven-point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (7). Union commitment was measured with six items, reflecting a single affective dimension, based on shared values, and a sense of identity, belonging, and pride. The Cronbach alpha reliability statistic for the scale was at an acceptable level (.84). Organisational commitment (i.e. to the employer, the NHS Trust) was measured using Meyer and Allen’s (1997) six-item affective commitment scale (Cronbach alpha =.83). We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the organisational and union commitment items. This suggested that the two scales had discriminant validity, with a two-factor model consisting of separate organisational and union commitment factors producing a good fit ($\chi^2 = 147.674; $ df = 53; CFI = 0.948; RMSEA = 0.066), which was superior to a one-factor model ($\chi^2 = 1035.365; $ df = 54; CFI = 0.465; RMSEA = 0.210. Change in $\chi^2 = 887.691; $ change in df = 1; p < 0.01). In the two-factor solution, all indicators loaded significantly (p < 0.001) on their latent variables.
Perceived IR climate reflects the extent to which relations between management and rank and file workers are seen as mutually trusting, respectful and co-operative, and was measured with six items from Hammer et al. (1991) with a Cronbach alpha of .84.

Potential organisational outcomes were measured as follows. Intention to quit the Trust was measured with four items. Organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB), including ‘OCB-Individual (OCB-I) and ‘OCB-Organization (OCB-O)’ dimensions, was measured with 10 items based on those of Smith et al. (1983) and Williams and Anderson (1991). Responses were made on a five-point scale, ‘never’ (1) to ‘always’ (5). An exploratory factor analysis of these items, with varimax rotation, revealed two factors with eigenvalues greater than one, accounting for 62 percent of total variance. One item was dropped because it had a secondary loading within 0.2 of the primary leading. A re-analysis with the remaining 9 items produced a similar two-factor structure, accounting for 64 percent of total variance. The items designed to measure OCB-O loaded on the first factor (five items). The remaining items loaded on the second factor, and were those designed to measure OCB-I (four items). OCB-O (Cronbach alpha =.83) and OCB-I (Cronbach alpha =.82) variables were formed by averaging across the five and four items respectively.

Potential union outcomes were measured as follows. Intent to quit the union was measured with two items (Cronbach alpha =.63). Union citizenship behaviour is concerned with members’ extra-role behaviours, and was measured as a response to the question: ‘Think about how you behave in relation to the union and your work colleagues. When the opportunity arises, how often do you do each of the following?’ Respondents were then presented with 13 items, responding on a five-point scale: ‘never’ (1) to ‘always’ (5). The items were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis,
with oblique rotation. Three factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than one, accounting for 72 percent of variance. Three items were removed because of significant cross loadings, leaving ten items to be re-analysed. Three factors again emerged, identical to the initial analysis except for the deleted items, and accounting for 75 percent of total variance. Four items loaded heavily on the first factor, relating to activist forms of union citizenship behaviour: speaking at and attending union meetings, volunteering to be a union official, committee member or delegate, and reading a union journal or magazine. Three items loaded on the second factor, including providing advice to work colleagues on union-related matters, problems and grievances, and helping them put their case to management. We refer to these as union helping behaviours. Finally, three items loaded on a third factor: helping with union campaigns or elections, voting in union elections and speaking well of the union to colleagues. Whilst the first of these might well be time-consuming for the member, we nevertheless interpret these as actions which might be expected of a rank-and-file union member, given that there is no leadership role implied. Union citizenship behaviour variables for ‘union activism’ (Cronbach alpha = .89), ‘union helping’ (Cronbach alpha = .85), and ‘union rank & file’ (Cronbach alpha = .73) were formed by averaging across the four, three and three items respectively.

We used exploratory factor analysis for OCB and UCB because researchers have noted that it is important that the dimensionality of a citizenship behaviour measure used in different contexts “should not be taken for granted” (Lievens and Anseel, 2004: 300). Equally, with UCB the nature of the organisational context influences dimensionality, for example, by determining the extent to which particular types of union participation involve initiative and effort (Redman and Snape, 2004). In some
unions, meetings are workplace based and are easily and routinely attended by rank-and-file members, whereas in others they are held off-site and are poorly attended, mainly by a self-selected group of activists.

**Analysis**

We first estimated an overall measurement model for the constructs included in our hypothesis testing, including both commitments, OCB-O and OCB-I, the union citizenship behaviours, and intent to quit the organisation and the union using AMOS version 22 (Arbuckle, 2006). This nine-factor model provided a reasonable fit ($\chi^2 = 1313.96; \text{df} = 593; \text{CFI} = .91; \text{RMSEA} = .05$), much superior to a single-factor model with the same items ($\chi^2 = 5786.07; \text{df} = 629; \text{CFI} = .32; \text{RMSEA} = .14$), providing support for our hypothesized measurement model. In addition, to assess the significance of common method variable, we ran an exploratory factor analysis of all these items. A single factor accounted for only 20.40 percent of total variance, and the rotated factors (oblimin) showed no evidence of a common method factor. These findings are not suggestive of significant problems with common method variance.

We tested hypothesis 1 by first using the median value to split the full union sample on union and organisational commitment and IR climate, before calculating the chi-square difference for dual loyalists in negative and positive IR climates. Given the paper’s main contribution is to test for moderation effects of dual commitment, we tested hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 by using hierarchical regression in SPSS (version 22, IBM, 2013). We used hierarchical regression analysis rather than structural equation modelling because it readily accommodates the analysis of interactions and the inclusion of dichotomous control variables. For each of the dependent variables, we began by analysing control variables (gender, organisation tenure, part-time,
temporary and shift working) at step 1, then adding organisational and union commitment at step 2, and the interaction term to test for dual commitment effects at step 3.

We selected our controls based on the union and organizational commitment literature. For example, on gender some studies on organizational commitment typically find that women are slightly more committed than men, such as the meta-analysis of Mathieu and Zajac, (1990). However, this is not a consistent finding and it maybe that such apparent gender effects reflect different work characteristics and experience (Meyer and Allen, 1997). The position on union commitment is more mixed. Some studies on union commitment find no significant gender effects (e.g. Barling et al, 1990); others find women are more committed to their union than men (e.g. Bemmels, 1995).

In general, our hypotheses are concerned with the association between commitment to a particular referent (organisation or union) and behaviours that may be seen as benefitting that reference (e.g., OCB-O or Union activism), the only exception being that we anticipate UCB-I being associated with both commitments. However, in testing our hypotheses, we include both organisational and union commitment in all our regressions, in effect testing hypotheses whilst controlling for the “other” commitment, thus providing a more rigorous test. This is similar to the approach adopted in the multiple commitments research (Meyer and Allen, 1997).

Results
Means, standard deviations, correlations and alphas for the study variables are shown in table 1. Alphas are generally at acceptable levels, with only that for intent to quit the union marginally below 0.7.

Organisational commitment and union commitment are not significantly correlated (correlation coefficient = +0.080; p = 0.104 on a 2-tailed test), suggesting that commitment to the union does not necessarily imply a lack of commitment to the Trust. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no evidence of dual commitment (Gordon and Ladd 1990). A taxonomic analysis split the samples into four categories, taking the median value of organisational and union commitment as the split points (table 2). Those with above average commitment to both are categorised as dual loyalists, those with below average commitment on both are dual disaffecteds, and those with above average on one or other commitment are classified as Trust or Union loyalists accordingly.

Table 1 –somewhere near here.

The analysis for all union members shows a fairly equal distribution across the four taxons, with slightly more classified into the dual disaffected category. Almost a quarter (23 percent) fall into the dual commitment category, defined as those with above average commitment to both Trust and to their union. In order to test hypothesis 1, we conducted an analysis according to individuals’ perceptions of the IR climate, again splitting the sample at the median. Those who perceive a relatively negative IR climate are grouped mainly into either the dual disaffected or union loyalist categories (70 percent). Those with more positive perceptions of the IR climate are grouped mainly into the dual loyalty and trust loyalist categories (68 percent). Most significantly, hypothesis 1, which anticipates that dual commitment will be more prevalent amongst those individuals who perceive the industrial relations
climate to be positive, is supported (34 percent versus 12 percent). We calculated the chi-square difference for dual loyalists in negative and positive IR climates and found this to be significant at the .05 level.

The results of the hierarchical regression analysis for all union members are shown in table 3. Of the demographic control variables shift working positively predicted intent to quit the Trust and OCB-I, and negatively predicted OCB-O and union-activism. Temporary working negatively predicted union activism as did female gender. Part-time working negatively predicted OCB-O, OCB-I union helping, union rank and file. Organisation tenure positively predicted OCB-O, OCB-I, and union helping. Organisational commitment is negatively associated with intent to quit the trust, as predicted by hypothesis 2a. However, contrary to hypothesis 2b, there is no association between organisational commitment and the two dimensions of OCB, OCB-O and OCB-I. Rather, OCB-I and OCB-O are positively associated with union commitment. Union commitment is negatively associated with intent to quit the union, as expected in hypothesis 3a, and positively associated with all three dimensions of UCB (helping, rank & file, and activism), as expected in hypothesis 3b.

Looking now at hypothesis 4, concerning the incremental contribution of dual commitment, the only significant interaction term in table 3 is for union helping, and in this case there is a negative moderating effect. This is plotted in figure 1. This suggests that higher levels of organisational commitment are associated with a less strongly positive relationship between union commitment and union helping behavior and hypothesis 4 is supported.

Tables 2 and 3 somewhere near here.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Theoretical implications
Whilst organisational and union commitments were not significantly correlated, we did find evidence of dual commitment in our taxonomic analysis. Furthermore, consistent with hypothesis 1, dual commitment was more in evidence amongst those who perceived the IR climate as being positive. A positive IR climate was also associated with a higher proportion of Trust loyalists and lower proportions of union loyalists and dual dissaffecteds. This pattern suggests that whilst a positive IR climate favours the development of dual commitment, any perceived deterioration in IR climate is likely to result primarily in a decline in organisational rather than in union commitment.

These findings help in interpreting the mixed literature on the relationship between union commitment and organisational commitment. As we noted in the literature review meta-analytical studies (e.g. Reed et al, 1994) report a wide range of correlations between organizational and union commitment. On the basis of our findings we suggest that IR climate variation is likely to explain this range of findings. For example, as in our case, where industrial relations climate is positive, dual commitment is more prevalent because the two commitments are less likely to be seen as conflictual. Social exchange theory offers an explanation here, in that where IR climate is positive employees “credit” both the union and the employer for achieving this outcome.

We also drew on Frustration-Aggression theory (Klandermans, 1986) to hypothesise the relationship between dual commitment and IR climate. As we find in this study, it seems employees blame the employer for their frustration with the negative experience of working in a poor IR climate and choose the union over the organisation. Wider support for this view can be found in the union commitment literature which reports union commitment as increasing when members feel under
threat in such contexts as strikes (Stagner and Effal, 1982) and where the union is under general threat from membership loss (Mellor, 1990).

Turning to the consequences of commitment, our findings suggest that union citizenship behaviours and intent to quit the union are largely a reflection of union commitment. However, whilst organisational commitment predicts intent to quit, organisational citizenship behaviours seem not to reflect organisational commitment, and it is commitment to the union rather than to the organisation which predicts the OCB dimensions of OCB-O and OCB-I. We hypothesised that union commitment would predict UCB-I and UCB-O following social exchange theory and target similarity theory and also the “cross-over path” to OCB-I because of the pro-social nature of union member helping behaviour. However, the finding that union commitment also predicts OCB-O requires an explanation. Here such a relationship may actually reflect an expression of dual commitment in that employees do not see the union and organization as representing competing loyalties.

Overall, there is no suggestion in our findings that the union and employer necessarily compete for the commitment and extra-role participation of individuals, in that commitment to the one does not necessarily involve reduced levels of citizenship behaviour for the other.

We formulated a hypothesis on the effects of dual commitment. The literature reviewed suggested two possible effects. First, one possibility was a positive interaction effect between organisational and union commitment in the case of organisational and union citizenship behaviours, based on a cognitive consistency interpretation of dual commitment (Magenau et al. 1988). Second, and what we hypothesised and found, was that a negative effect was also likely. Here the argument
is that dual commitment makes employees cautious of being too closely identified with the organization or union. A particular concern for employees in union contexts is that negative outcomes may ensue if they are seen as being too closely identified with their union. For example, there is a longstanding research track that reports how union members are discouraged from becoming too attached to the union by being labelled as ‘disloyal’, ‘un-trustworthy’, ‘troublesome’, ‘unconstructive’, ‘stubborn’, ‘dangerous’, ‘unreasonable’ by managers if they show too much commitment to the union (Redman, Snape and Bamber, 1990).

In this study, the only significant interaction was negative for union helping behaviours targeted at assisting fellow members. This interaction suggests that higher levels of organisational commitment are associated with a less strongly positive relationship between union commitment and UCB aimed at helping fellow members and colleagues, for example advising colleagues on their problems and helping them put their case to management. One way to interpret these findings is to suggest that those with a unilateral commitment to the union are particularly likely to participate in such behaviours, because they feel unconstrained by any strong loyalty to the organisation. In contrast, some of the dually committed may wish to avoid such potentially partisan union behaviours for fear that they signal disloyalty to the organisation. Not surprisingly, the dual disaffecteds, with low levels of commitment to both union and organisation, show the lowest levels of helping.

Our findings are consistent with those of Bemmels (1995) in so far as they suggest that dual commitment has independent predictive power, and is thus a unique construct rather than an epiphenomenon. However, unlike Bemmels (1995) our findings suggest that this unique predictive power is negative rather than positive. This difference may be resolved by looking at the specific steward behaviours and
outcomes for which a positive interaction effect was found in the Bemmels (1995) study. The two outcomes, ‘How often do you settle a potential grievance before it is filed by discussing the problem with the employee’s supervisor?’ (informal), and the percentage of filed grievances resolved by the year end (resolved), reflect a particularly cooperative approach to industrial relations. In contrast, the outcome in our study, union helping, involve providing help to fellow employees, and do not necessarily imply the adoption of a cooperative approach. Indeed, such behaviours may even be indicative of a relatively militant attitude and approach on the part of the individual respondent in raising grievances and issues with management and helping other members to put their case to management.

Our findings provide no support for the suggestion that dually committed individuals will be better organisational or union citizens than their unilaterally committed colleagues. Indeed, there is counter evidence, with dual commitment being associated with lower levels of union helping than for those with strong unilateral commitment to the union. Our findings suggest that initiatives designed to build cooperative industrial relations and dual commitment to organisation and union will not necessarily lead to more active member participation in unions. On the contrary, the co-worker-focussed union helping behaviours appear likely to be most developed under conditions of unilateral union commitment, which may be more prevalent where industrial relations are perceived by members to be less harmonious. This suggests that union militancy, rather than moderation, may be the most effective way for unions to win the active participation of their members.

Practical Implications.
Our findings have practical implications for both HR managers and unions. For HR, managers have often behaved in classical unitarist fashion (Cullinane and Dundon, 2014) and acted as if they believed that employee commitment is a zero-sum game. Here managers seeking to win the commitment of their employees to the organisation, felt they had first to reduce employees’ commitment to their unions. Managers acted positively to increase organisational commitment by implementing supportive HRM practices. However, managers also acted to reduce employees’ commitment to unions by undermining the union role in the workplace, in effect trying to substitute HRM for unions, in the belief that this would increase organizational commitment. The findings of this study, demonstrate clearly that union-and organisation commitment are not a zero-sum game, employees can have high commitment to both their organisation and their union. The implication is that managers do not need to spend effort on reducing union commitment in order to win organisational commitment.

For unions, our findings suggest that there are advantages and disadvantages of developing co-operative industrial relations with employers. First, it is clear that adversarial workplace climates are stressing for employees with the proportions of employees in the dually disaffected and trust loyalist categories being roughly half that of a positive IR climate. At the core of trade union objectives, is the wellbeing of members (Haile, Bryson and White, 2015). Employee commitment and engagement at work are now seen as positive wellbeing related constructs (Bakker, and Demerouti, 2008). Union effort in developing positive, trusting, and supportive workplace climates thus clearly benefits the wellbeing of their members. Set against this position, is our finding that co-operative industrial relations practices that build more harmonious industrial relations climates and dual commitment, may undermine union helping and so may be inconsistent with attempts to build a more activist,
solidaristic form of workplace unionism. The “two faces” of cooperative industrial relations for unions is that it on the one side it improves employee wellbeing but on the other it has the potential to undermine union loyalty and union helping behaviours.

**Strengths and weaknesses.**

A key strength of our study is the theorising and empirically testing of the consequences of dual commitment. Despite longstanding research interest on the existence and importance of dual commitment, the literature had rather neglected examining its outcomes. Our findings should be interpreted in light of several limitations of the study. First, our findings, like all other dual commitment studies known to us, are based on cross-sectional data. We thus cannot be definitive about causation in our model. Second, our findings may be susceptible to common method bias (CMB) given all our measures are taken from an employee survey. However, it appears that it is not a significant problem in our study. Our measurement model provides evidence of discriminant validity. We also used Harmon’s one-factor test for CMB (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). If the first unrotated factor accounts for a relatively small share of the total variance (not more than 50 present), the implication is usually that CMB is not likely to be a significant problem. The Harmon’s one-factor test suggests in our case that one single factor explains only about 20 percent of total variation of the variables in our model.

Lastly, our data are based on evidence from one particular NHS trust. The extent, to which these findings can be generalised to other trusts, or more broadly to other sectors, requires further research. Furthermore, given that the central concern of this paper is with dual commitment, we have naturally focused on just two commitment foci - the union and the organisation. However, our failure to find a significant
relationship between organisational commitment and OCB may be attributable to our having missed a commitment focus, since OCB may be engaged in by employees in reciprocation for favourable consideration and treatment by their supervisor, co-workers, or clients/patients rather than for support or favourable treatment by the organisation.

**Directions for future research**

Future studies could address some of the limitations in study design noted above. For example, CMB is avoided by collecting independent reports of OCB from supervisors/managers and independent reports of UCB from stewards. Equally, longitudinal data on dual commitment would be especially valuable in determining causation in commitment-citizenship studies. Our data was gathered in the North of England, an area traditionally characterised by a pro-union culture. Additional studies of dual commitment outcomes would be valuable in other regions and countries with different union cultures to test the generalizability of the findings. Future studies might also adopt a multi-commitment foci approach and include a wider range of potential commitment foci, including not only the supervisor, co-workers, and clients, but also those in the union domain, such as the local union representative/shop steward and the full-time officer. The conceptualisation of dual commitment and the examination of the competing and complementary nature of the commitments found in the union-organisation literature could be valuably extended to other domains. For example, it would be very informative to examine the outcomes of dual-commitment, for example, in organisation-profession and union-profession dual commitment contexts.
Appendix: Measurement of variables

**Affective Commitment to the Organisation (Trust)**
I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career in this Trust.
I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to this Trust. [R]
This Trust has a great deal of personal meaning for me.
I really feel as if this Trust’s problems are my own.
I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to this Trust. [R]
I do not feel like ‘part of the family’ at this Trust. [R]

**Quit intent - organization**
I am always on the lookout for a better job.
It is likely that I will look for another job during the next year.
There isn’t much to be gained by staying in this job.
I often think of quitting this job.

**Organizational Citizenship Behavior**
*OCB-I*
Help new people to settle into the job.
Help others who have heavy workloads.
Help others who have been absent.
Take time to listen to work colleagues’ problems or worries.

*OCB-O*
Assist your manager with his or her work.
Suggest ways to reduce waste.
Suggest ways to improve service quality.
Make innovative suggestions to improve work procedures.
Volunteer for things that are not absolutely required.

**Affective union commitment.**
My values and the union’s values are very similar.
I really feel as if this union’s problems are my own.
I do not identify with the union. [R]
I feel proud of the union.
I feel a strong sense of belonging to the union.
I don’t care if the union survives. [R]

**Quit intent – union.**
I often think about leaving my union and joining another union.
I often think about not being a union member at all.

**Union citizenship behaviour**
*Activist activity*
Attend union meetings.
Speak at union meetings.
Volunteer to be a union official, committee member or delegate.
Help with union campaigns or elections.

*Rank and file activity*
Read a union journal or magazine.
Vote in union elections.
Speak well of the union to work colleagues.

*Helping fellow members*
Advise work colleagues on union-related matters.
Help colleagues to put their case to management.
Advise colleagues on their problems or grievances.

**Perceived industrial relations (IR) climate.**
Staff and management try to cooperate as much as possible.
Staff and management distrust one another. [R]
The relationship between staff and management is hostile. [R]
Staff and management respect each other.
I think management makes decisions in the best interests of all employees.
Day-to-day relations between staff and management are poor. [R]

**Angle and Perry (1986) Dual Commitment (not used in study)**

It is easy to be loyal to both the union and management.
The management makes it easy to conduct union business.
The management makes it difficult for me to talk to my group representative or job steward. [R]
You can't be a union member and support management at the same time. [R]
The union helps me deal effectively with management

[R] – Item was reverse scored.
References


McNeely, B.L., and Meglino, B.M. (1994). ‘The role of dispositional and situational antecedents in prosocial organizational behavior: an examination of the


### TABLE 1
Means, standard deviations, correlations and reliabilities for the study variables.

<table>
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<th>Mean</th>
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<th>5</th>
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<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
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<td>-.05</td>
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<td>.04</td>
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<td>-.51**</td>
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<td>-.14**</td>
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<td>.13**</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<td>.18**</td>
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<td>.12*</td>
<td>.11*</td>
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<td>.18*</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
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<td>.08</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.22**</td>
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<td>.07</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
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<td>-.13**</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<td>.09</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<td>.07</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<td>.52**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.46**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.01</td>
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* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed tests).
Figures on diagonal are scale reliabilities.
Continued…

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<th>12</th>
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<td>12 Union OCB – Rank &amp; File</td>
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* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed tests), N=414. Numbers on diagonal are scale reliabilities.
TABLE 2
Taxonomic analysis of commitment.

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<th>Commitment to:</th>
<th>All union members.</th>
<th>By perceived IR climate:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The union</td>
<td>The Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dual disaffected</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust loyalists</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union loyalists</td>
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<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dual loyalists</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>--</td>
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Note: The four taxons were derived by splitting the samples at the median on the two commitments. The analysis by perceived IR climate was also split at the median.
<table>
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<td><strong>Step 1 Control variables:</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Change in R²</strong></td>
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<td>0.05**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
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<td><strong>Change in R²</strong></td>
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*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01, N = 414.
FIGURE 1: TAXONS OF ORGANISATIONAL AND UNION COMMITMENT
FIGURE 2: THEORETICAL MODEL
FIGURE 3
Plot of interaction between union commitment and organisational commitment on union helping.