The virtues of unknowing

Smith, R.D.

doi:10.1111/1467-9752.12206

The virtues of unknowing

Smith, R.D.

Authors

Professor Richard Smith r.d.smith@durham.ac.uk
Emeritus Professor

Abstract

Traditional epistemology is often said to have reached an impasse, and recent interest in virtue epistemology supposedly marks a turn away from philosophers’ traditional focus on problems of knowledge and truth. Yet that focus re-emerges, especially among ‘reliabilist’ virtue epistemologists. I argue for a more ‘responsibilist’ approach and for the importance of some of the quieter and gentler epistemic virtues, by contrast with the tough-minded ones that are currently popular in education. In particular I make a case for what I here call ‘unknowing’: a positive state that is not the same as ignorance. I acknowledge the mystical connotations of the term, and suggest that there is a strong interest in unknowing in writers such as Plato, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. In their style of philosophising they also address the paradox of being knowing about unknowingness itself.

Citation

Smith, R. (2016). The virtues of unknowing. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 50(2), 272-284. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12206

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Aug 7, 2015
Online Publication Date	Jun 16, 2016
Publication Date	May 1, 2016
Deposit Date	Dec 11, 2015
Publicly Available Date	May 1, 2018
Journal	Journal of Philosophy of Education
Print ISSN	0309-8249
Electronic ISSN	1467-9752
Publisher	Wiley
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	50
Issue	2
Pages	272-284
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12206

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Copyright Statement
This is the accepted version of the following article: Smith, R.D. (2016). The virtues of unknowing. Journal of Philosophy of Education 50(2): 272-284, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12206. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.