Li, Daniel Z. (2016) 'Disclosure or not, when there are three bidders?', Economics bulletin., 36 (1). pp. 349-354.
This paper provides a more general sufficient condition than Hummel and McAfee (2015) for optimal information disclosure in auctions when there are three bidders. We show that the optimal disclosure policy is related to the skewness of the distribution of bidders' valuations. Specifically, if the distribution is skewed to the left (right), it is optimal for the seller to reveal full (no) information to the bidders. And if it is symmetric, then there's no difference between revealing information or not.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
Download PDF (94Kb)
|Publisher Web site:||http://www.economicsbulletin.com/|
|Date accepted:||17 March 2016|
|Date deposited:||04 May 2016|
|Date of first online publication:||17 March 2016|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
Save or Share this output
|Look up in GoogleScholar|