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Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality

Kamei, K.

Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality Thumbnail


Authors

K. Kamei



Abstract

Unequally distributed resources are ubiquitous. The decision of whether to promote competition or equality is often debated in societies and organizations. With heterogeneous endowments, we let subjects collectively choose between a public good that most benefits the less endowed and a lottery contest in which only one individual in a group receives a prize. Unlike standard theoretical predictions, the majority of subjects, including a substantial number of subjects who believe that their expected payoffs are better in the contest, vote for the public good. Our data suggest that people’s collective institutional choices may be driven by inequality-averse concerns. It also suggests that the collective decision to select the option for the public good depends on voting rules.

Citation

Kamei, K. (2018). Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(3), 626-655. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716656446

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jun 2, 2016
Online Publication Date Jul 4, 2016
Publication Date Mar 1, 2018
Deposit Date Jun 6, 2016
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Journal of Conflict Resolution
Print ISSN 0022-0027
Electronic ISSN 1552-8766
Publisher SAGE Publications
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 62
Issue 3
Pages 626-655
DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716656446
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1402671

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