K. Kamei
Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality
Kamei, K.
Authors
Abstract
Unequally distributed resources are ubiquitous. The decision of whether to promote competition or equality is often debated in societies and organizations. With heterogeneous endowments, we let subjects collectively choose between a public good that most benefits the less endowed and a lottery contest in which only one individual in a group receives a prize. Unlike standard theoretical predictions, the majority of subjects, including a substantial number of subjects who believe that their expected payoffs are better in the contest, vote for the public good. Our data suggest that people’s collective institutional choices may be driven by inequality-averse concerns. It also suggests that the collective decision to select the option for the public good depends on voting rules.
Citation
Kamei, K. (2018). Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(3), 626-655. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716656446
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Jun 2, 2016 |
Online Publication Date | Jul 4, 2016 |
Publication Date | Mar 1, 2018 |
Deposit Date | Jun 6, 2016 |
Publicly Available Date | Mar 29, 2024 |
Journal | Journal of Conflict Resolution |
Print ISSN | 0022-0027 |
Electronic ISSN | 1552-8766 |
Publisher | SAGE Publications |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 62 |
Issue | 3 |
Pages | 626-655 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716656446 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1402671 |
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This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access page (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Copyright Statement
Advance online version
Published Journal Article
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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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