Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation

Tugby, Matthew

Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation

Tugby, Matthew

Authors

Professor Matthew Tugby matthew.tugby@durham.ac.uk
Professor

Abstract

Is it metaphysically possible for a world to contain power properties but no nonpower properties? Recently, much progress has been made by powers theorists to defend the coherence of such a possibility. But unfortunately, it remains unclear how the powers in a power world are individuated. The problem is that the most obvious principle of individuation for properties in a power world is one that is circular. In this paper, it is argued that this circularity is generated by a modal assumption, which is that different families of powers exist in different possible worlds. By rejecting this assumption, a noncircular principle of individuation for power properties can be formulated. Moreover, this solution is not ad hoc because there are independent reasons for rejecting the aforementioned modal assumption.

Citation

Tugby, M. (2017). Power Worlds and the Problem of Individuation. American Philosophical Quarterly, 54(3), 269-281

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	May 10, 2016
Publication Date	Jul 1, 2017
Deposit Date	Jul 6, 2016
Publicly Available Date	Jul 1, 2018
Journal	American Philosophical Quarterly
Print ISSN	0003-0481
Electronic ISSN	2152-1123
Publisher	University of Illinois Press
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	54
Issue	3
Pages	269-281
Publisher URL	http://apq.press.illinois.edu/54/3/tugby.html