We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. By continuing to browse this repository, you give consent for essential cookies to be used. You can read more about our Privacy and Cookie Policy.

Durham Research Online
You are in:

Power worlds and the problem of individuation.

Tugby, Matthew (2017) 'Power worlds and the problem of individuation.', American philosophical quarterly., 54 (3). pp. 269-281.


Is it metaphysically possible for a world to contain power properties but no nonpower properties? Recently, much progress has been made by powers theorists to defend the coherence of such a possibility. But unfortunately, it remains unclear how the powers in a power world are individuated. The problem is that the most obvious principle of individuation for properties in a power world is one that is circular. In this paper, it is argued that this circularity is generated by a modal assumption, which is that different families of powers exist in different possible worlds. By rejecting this assumption, a noncircular principle of individuation for power properties can be formulated. Moreover, this solution is not ad hoc because there are independent reasons for rejecting the aforementioned modal assumption.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
Download PDF
Publisher Web site:
Publisher statement:From American Philosophical Quarterly. Copyright 2017 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.
Date accepted:10 May 2016
Date deposited:07 July 2016
Date of first online publication:July 2017
Date first made open access:01 July 2018

Save or Share this output

Look up in GoogleScholar