Damjanovic, V. (2017) 'Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret.', Economics letters., 150 . pp. 99-103.
Abstract
For Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimal Effort Coordination games, the unconditional regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones. This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Full text: | (AM) Accepted Manuscript Available under License - Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives. Download PDF (325Kb) |
| Status: | Peer-reviewed |
| Publisher Web site: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.003 |
| Publisher statement: | © 2016 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| Date accepted: | 04 November 2016 |
| Date deposited: | 14 November 2016 |
| Date of first online publication: | 16 November 2016 |
| Date first made open access: | 16 May 2018 |
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