Damjanovic, V. (2017) 'Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret.', Economics letters., 150 . pp. 99-103.
For Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimal Effort Coordination games, the unconditional regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones. This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
Available under License - Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.003|
|Publisher statement:||© 2016 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/|
|Date accepted:||04 November 2016|
|Date deposited:||14 November 2016|
|Date of first online publication:||16 November 2016|
|Date first made open access:||16 May 2018|
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