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Durham Research Online
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Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret.

Damjanovic, V. (2017) 'Two “little treasure games” driven by unconditional regret.', Economics letters., 150 . pp. 99-103.

Abstract

For Traveler’s Dilemma and Minimal Effort Coordination games, the unconditional regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones. This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
Available under License - Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.003
Publisher statement:© 2016 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Date accepted:04 November 2016
Date deposited:14 November 2016
Date of first online publication:16 November 2016
Date first made open access:16 May 2018

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