Thomas, Emily (2015) 'In defense of real Cartesian motion.', Journal of the history of philosophy., 53 (4). pp. 747-762.
On Thomas Lennon’s (2007) “Eleatic” reading of Descartes, the Cartesian world is in reality motionless, its motions conceived as mere phenomenal appearances. Lennon is aware that this radical reading appears to be at odds with various Cartesian texts that seemingly describe real motions, and accordingly he reinterprets these texts in such a way as to render them compatible with his reading. This reply to Lennon considers many further Cartesian texts that cannot be “reinterpreted” along the lines Lennon describes, with the ultimate aim of showing that the phenomenalist is committed to dividing Cartesian texts into passages dealing with reality and with appearance. I argue there are good reasons not to read Descartes in this way, and we should take Cartesian motion at face value: to be real.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2015.0067|
|Publisher statement:||Copyright © 2015 The Johns Hopkins University Press. This article first appeared in Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 53, Issue 4, October 2015, pages 747-762.|
|Date accepted:||02 January 2015|
|Date deposited:||05 December 2016|
|Date of first online publication:||October 2015|
|Date first made open access:||No date available|
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