Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Punishment Can Support Cooperation Even When Punishable

Fu, T.; Ji, Y.; Kamei, K.; Putterman, L.

Punishment Can Support Cooperation Even When Punishable Thumbnail


Authors

T. Fu

Y. Ji

K. Kamei

L. Putterman



Abstract

Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punish punishers harm cooperation and its benefits by deterring first order punishment and wasting resources? We compare treatments of a decision experiment without peer punishment and with one order of punishment to ones in which subjects can be punished for punishing or for failing to punish. Our treatments with higher-order punishment achieve as much improvement in cooperation as those with only one punishment stage. We see evidence of social norms in action, but no evidence of punishing failure to punish. These results suggest that higher-order punishment is neither critical to nor a major deterrent to cooperation.

Citation

Fu, T., Ji, Y., Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2017). Punishment Can Support Cooperation Even When Punishable. Economics Letters, 154, 84-87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jan 14, 2017
Online Publication Date Feb 20, 2017
Publication Date May 1, 2017
Deposit Date Jan 20, 2017
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Economics Letters
Print ISSN 0165-1765
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 154
Pages 84-87
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1366707

Files




You might also like



Downloadable Citations