Ranking Equilibrium Competition in Auctions with Participation Costs

Li, D.Z.

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.003

Ranking Equilibrium Competition in Auctions with Participation Costs

Li, D.Z.

Authors

Daniel Li daniel.li@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor

Abstract

This paper studies the degrees of equilibrium competition in three common forms of auctions with costly participation, and shows that, when bidders’ valuation distribution is concave, there is a simple condition to rank the equilibrium competition of those auctions. It also investigates how the results are related to stochastic ordering of bidders’ valuation distributions, and provides some illustrative examples.

Citation

Li, D. (2017). Ranking Equilibrium Competition in Auctions with Participation Costs. Economics Letters, 153, 47-50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.003

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Feb 3, 2017
Online Publication Date	Feb 4, 2017
Publication Date	Feb 4, 2017
Deposit Date	Feb 6, 2017
Publicly Available Date	Aug 4, 2018
Journal	Economics Letters
Print ISSN	0165-1765
Publisher	Elsevier
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	153
Pages	47-50
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.003
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1365859

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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Copyright Statement
© 2017 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/