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Durham Research Online
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Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs.

Li, D.Z. (2017) 'Ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs.', Economics letters., 153 . pp. 47-50.

Abstract

This paper studies the degrees of equilibrium competition in three common forms of auctions with costly participation, and shows that, when bidders’ valuation distribution is concave, there is a simple condition to rank the equilibrium competition of those auctions. It also investigates how the results are related to stochastic ordering of bidders’ valuation distributions, and provides some illustrative examples.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
Available under License - Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.003
Publisher statement:© 2017 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Date accepted:03 February 2017
Date deposited:06 February 2017
Date of first online publication:04 February 2017
Date first made open access:04 August 2018

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