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Durham Research Online
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How independent are independent committees and advisers in mergers and acquisitions transactions?

Mukwiri, Jonathan (2016) 'How independent are independent committees and advisers in mergers and acquisitions transactions?', Butterworth's journal of international banking and financial law., 31 (2). pp. 99-102.

Abstract

Independent Committees in the US are more likely to be scrutinised by the courts than their counterpart Independent Advisers in the UK after or during mergers and acquisitions. Stockholders are more likely to bring actions against Committees in the US for unfairness in the transaction than shareholders may bring against Advisers. Whilst the use of Independent Committees may clear boards of charges of unfairness in handling transactions, it cannot cure fraud. This article considers the role of independent committees and advisers in Mergers and Acquisitions in light of the Delaware Court of Chancery case (Dole Foods Co Inc).

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://store.lexisnexis.co.uk/products/butterworths-journal-of-international-banking-and-financial-law-skuuksku02692694JIBL72080/details
Publisher statement:First published in Journal of International Banking & Financial Law - (2016) 31 JIBFL 99-102. LexisNexis.
Date accepted:07 January 2016
Date deposited:09 February 2017
Date of first online publication:16 February 2016
Date first made open access:No date available

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