Conditional Punishment in England

Kamei, K.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2925307

Conditional Punishment in England

Kamei, K.

Authors

K. Kamei

Abstract

A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperation norms in dilemmas. Kamei [2014, Economics Letters 124, pp.199-202] provides experimental evidence on the prevalence of heterogeneous conditional punishment types by conducting an experiment with a strategy method in the United States. This note reports a replication experiment using subjects in England. As consistent with Kamei (2014), the experiment indicates that people's punishment decisions are on average positively proportional to the others' punishment toward the target. However, it also indicates interesting cross-country differences in the distribution of human conditional punishment types.

Citation

Kamei, K. (2017). Conditional Punishment in England. Economics Bulletin, 37(2), 837-845. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2925307

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Apr 18, 2017
Online Publication Date	Apr 22, 2017
Publication Date	Apr 22, 2017
Deposit Date	Apr 18, 2017
Publicly Available Date	Apr 18, 2017
Journal	Economics Bulletin
Print ISSN	1545-2921
Publisher	Economics Bulletin
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	37
Issue	2
Pages	837-845
DOI	https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2925307
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1381068