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Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus

Kamei, K.; Putterman, L.

Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus Thumbnail


Authors

K. Kamei

L. Putterman



Abstract

Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an agent to report another's behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many cooperators pay to report a defecting partner without the possibility of pecuniary benefit when this has the potential to deprive the latter of future gains and to help his next partner. We illustrate how a social preference can explain such costly reporting, and also discuss evidence for a role of emotions. (JEL C91, D03, D63)

Citation

Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2018). Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus. Economic Inquiry, 56(1), 158-172. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12477

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date May 9, 2017
Online Publication Date Aug 10, 2017
Publication Date Jan 1, 2018
Deposit Date May 10, 2017
Publicly Available Date Aug 10, 2018
Journal Economic Inquiry
Print ISSN 0095-2583
Electronic ISSN 1465-7295
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 56
Issue 1
Pages 158-172
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12477
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1387720

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Copyright Statement
This is the accepted version of the following article: Kamei, K. & Putterman, L. (2018). Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus. Economic Inquiry, 56(1): 158-172, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12477. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.




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