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Modal Platonism and the problem of negativity.

Tugby, Matthew (2018) 'Modal Platonism and the problem of negativity.', Erkenntnis., 83 (3). pp. 465-476.

Abstract

The Platonic account of modality says, roughly, that truths about alien possibilities are grounded in uninstantiated universals. Recently, Ingram has raised a problem for this kind of view, which is that it apparently requires negative facts to play a truthmaking role. Ingram offers an alternative Platonic account which makes use of modal instantiation relations. In this paper, I highlight some of the costs of Ingram’s new account and argue that a more appealing version of Platonism—and modal theory in general—is one that is supplemented with an ontology of totality facts.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(VoR) Version of Record
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Full text:(VoR) Version of Record
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9898-y
Publisher statement:© The Author(s) 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Date accepted:03 April 2017
Date deposited:12 May 2017
Date of first online publication:22 April 2017
Date first made open access:No date available

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