Introduction: Narcissism, Melancholia and the Subject of Community

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Therapy

Trying to see you
my eyes grow
confused
it is not your face
they are seeking
fingering through your spaces
like a hungry child
even now
I do not want
to make a poem
I want to make you
more and less
a part
from my self.

Let us begin by saying that the address of Audre Lorde’s poem ‘Therapy’ is at once narcissistic and melancholic. By confusing the self with the other, as well as admitting confusion about what is lost of the other in the self, it enacts a process of identification which is both appropriative and impoverishing. ‘I want to make you / more and less’, Lorde writes, surprising us with a contradiction which is then amplified by the concluding couplet, ‘a part / from myself’. Where we expect separation (more or less) we find illogical conjunction; where we expect the fusion of
self and other (a part / of my self), we find fragmentation. The title suggests that the predicament of the poem is clinical; however, the ramifications are more broadly cultural. It asks the question, how does an ego get formed through its relation to the other? And, more paradoxically, how is the space between the self and the other maintained by a desire that continually moves to collapse it? By wanting to make you, as Lorde’s speaker claims, I want to create a space to contain my wanting. The spaces, then, which the speaker’s eyes ‘finger through’ in this poem, are neither internal nor external, rather they constitute the moving boundary between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’.

Likewise, Sigmund Freud’s twin papers, ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ (1914) and ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (1917 [1915]), take as their formative concern the difficulty of setting apart the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ worlds, and of preserving a stable image of a boundaried self. As Samuel Weber puts it, paying tribute to the way the unconscious always places us beyond ourselves, ‘the relation of self and other, inner and outer, cannot be grasped as an interval between polar opposites but rather as an irreducible dislocation of the subject in which the other inhabits the self as the condition of possibility’ (2000, 68). Narcissism and melancholia attend to the vicissitudes of this inhabitation. Both terms, metapsychologically understood, address the difficulty of drawing lines between the self and the world: the narcissist who declares ‘I am the world, and the world is me’ obliterates the very distinction; the melancholic, famously in Freud’s formulation, expresses a worldly impoverishment as a self-destitution, object-loss is transformed into ego-loss: ‘In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself’ (M&M, 246). To speak of narcissistic or melancholic identifications, then, is to explore how we are made through our passionate
entanglements with others beyond our selves in ways that eschew a settled reading of
the ‘beyond’ in question. Allowing for great interpretative elasticity, psychoanalytic
theories of narcissism and melancholia call into question the story of the contained,
unit-self whose known contours signal her possession of secure borders. They are also
terms of import for cultural analysis.

Whilst it is true that the term narcissism especially has come to be deployed in
ways that seem foreign to the complexities of Freud’s 1914 paper (by its reduction to
a personality disorder for example), it remains the case that neither narcissism nor
melancholia can be thought about today without expressing some debt to Freudian
metapsychology. However, whereas Freud was most evidently concerned to describe
the structure of ego-formation, many subsequent commentators have preferred to
emphasise the cultural and normative dimensions of the terms. If we consider their
respective discursive histories we can see that narcissism and melancholia have been
put to work in very different ways (see more below), and yet remain grounded by a
shared concern with modes of relation and identification. This shared concern, we
would suggest, is the basis upon which they’ve been most productively reanimated in
recent years: the rise of melancholia as a critical aid to the study of cultural
displacement and dispossession (Khanna 2003; Gilroy 2005; Butler 1997, 2004; Frosh
2013), and the determined redemption of narcissism from its pejorative
characterization as fundamentally anti-social (Bersani 2010; DeArmitt 2014; Lunbeck
2014; Walsh 2015). What is most noteworthy in this post-Freudian literature is the
increasing relevance of metapsychology to social and political theory, especially for
the purpose of theorising a reflexive and embodied subjectivity.

Significantly, Lorde’s ‘Therapy’, which, we suggest, returns us to the
formative dilemmas of Freudian metapsychology (both narcissistic and melancholic),
also carries the resonance of particular socio-political histories. Lorde begins by rejecting the self-evidence of the lyric ‘I’, insisting rather on the confusions which condition her identity as a mid-twentieth century American poet who is not predictably white, or male, or straight: ‘Trying to see you / my eyes grow / confused’. She substitutes the ‘I’ with ‘growing eyes’, effortless expressivity with endeavor, and in each successive line de-stabilizes the ground of the line that went before: ‘my eyes grow / confused / it is not your face / they are seeking’. ‘They’ are mine (my eyes looking at you), yet ‘they’ are also plural and alien looking for someone other than you: ‘they’ are the instruments of both internal and external regard.

Emerging from these estranging, mirroring relations is the contemplation of a disregarded face, suggestive of an unrecognizable poet (a black lesbian poet) whose desire is forced by historical circumstance to exceed the making of what is standardly recognized as ‘a poem’. At the centre of Lorde’s endeavor lies the psychoanalytic image of the feeding infant, uncertain of the difference between self and [m]other: every desiring ‘I’, it is implied, is ‘like a hungry child’. And yet we are trusted to concede, through the terms of our own self-regard, that a particular ‘hungry child’, racialized and sexualized in a particular way, and given particular historical coordinates, is not like every ‘I’. It is this joint articulation of therapeutic universality on the one hand (we are all hungry, desirous children) and historical specificity on the other, which frames the endeavor of this volume. Against the standardising tendency within the grammar of metapsychology, we ask how the concepts of narcissism and melancholia can be used to inform and express historical difference today.

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Freud wrote ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ and ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ in the space of three years, from 1913 to 1915, though the latter paper wasn’t published until 1917. Despite their temporal proximity and shared commitment to untangling the same metapsychological knots, the papers are remarkably different in tone and style. By the writer’s own admission, ‘On Narcissism’, had a difficult birth, proving something of a Frankensteinian monster, bursting at the seams with an overabundance of material. But then came ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, ready to be considered the more beautiful sister. The reception histories of each text tell us something further about the power of this distinction of style, since, whilst the former has been variously challenged, dismissed or declared theoretically impenetrable, the latter has more often been appreciated for a few of its most elegant formulations – formulations derived from the convenient provision of a binary (mourning as opposed to melancholia) which the narcissism paper conspicuously lacks.

This introductory chapter is not the place to visit in great detail the intricacies of each paper, but it is worth setting out in précis, insofar as that’s possible, the formative challenges they present for a reader who is concerned to tie questions of ego-formation to those of social relation.

We can begin with ‘On Narcissism’, the theoretical ramifications of which can be helpfully enumerated:

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1 Freud wrote the following to Karl Abraham: ‘Tomorrow I am sending you the narcissism, which was a difficult birth and bears all the marks of it. Naturally, I do not like it particularly, but I cannot give anything else at the moment. It is still very much in need of retouching’ (ON, 222).

2 To say that ‘On Narcissism’ lacks a principal organising binary, is not to say that there aren’t binary conventions operating throughout the paper (e.g. ego-libido/object libido; and variants of narcissistic/anacritic attachment).
(1) In positioning the different functions of narcissism in the male and female negotiations of the Oedipus complex, the paper adds weight and detail to Freud’s theories of the development of sexuality and in particular to the ongoing problem of feminine psychology. (2) In providing an early exposition of the ego-ideal which foreshadows the development of the superego (1923), it carves out an important space for later theorising on the relationship between narcissism and an account of culture. (3) In exploring the twin characteristics of ‘megalomania’ and ‘a withdrawal of interest from the external world’, it sharpens the distinction between the transference neuroses and the narcissistic neuroses, and establishes narcissism’s proximity to psychosis (and schizophrenia). (4) It reflects an important alteration in Freud’s theory of the instincts, leading some to observe that it represents the first systematic shift from id-psychology to ego-psychology. (5) In outlining the availability of alternative object-choices and describing the vicissitudes of each, it opens up avenues for investigating the development of intersubjectivity under the rubric of (what would become) object relations theory. (6) In making frequent reference to terms such as self-regard, self-esteem and self-contentment, it suggests a particular understanding of the concept of the self which would come to have a bearing both on the development of neo-Freudian strands of psychoanalysis (e.g. the self psychology of Heinz Kohut), and, arguably, on the cultural and discursive reverence for ‘selfhood’ in association with the narcissism of late modernity. (7) Perhaps most problematically, by insisting on the universal state of primary narcissism, as the state to which the libido is driven to recover, Freud’s paper of 1914 makes important connections with
both the incorporative features of mourning and melancholia (1917b [1915]),
and the ‘return to stasis’ of the death drive (1920a). (Walsh, 2015:15)\(^3\)

This brief catalogue gives us some impression of the diversity of the paper’s
speculations, but it’s the last point of connection –the idea of a withdrawal of libido
onto the object of the ego– that provides the most important link between the terms of
this volume.

Melancholia, as already suggested, comes equipped with its own opposite,
healthy mourning; it has also, on occasion, been placed as narcissism’s necessary
other, where narcissism connotes the fantasy of fullness and self-sufficiency, and
melancholia records the constitutive lack at the heart of all subjectivity. But such a
neat separation, we would suggest from the outset, is more rhetorical than factual: in
fact Freud makes very plain that melancholia tends regressively towards narcissism
(MM, 250). As the counterpoint to so-called ‘healthy’ mourning and ‘working
through’, melancholia prefigures the conception of the death-drive with its tendency
to daemonic repetitions – through what Freud calls the ‘dissatisfaction with the ego on
moral grounds’ (MM, 248). Furthermore, it exemplifies the mechanism of
unconscious incorporation; by incorporating the lost object, transferring an
impoverishment in the world to an impoverishment in the ego, the melancholic
unconsciously enacts a version of narcissistic self-attachment. The libido released by
the lost object gets drawn back into the ego and binds the ego in identification with
what is missing.

\(^3\) In addition to Walsh 2015, see also chapter 2 of Reuben Fine’s work \textit{Narcissism, The Self and Society} for a discussion of these themes.
Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it were an object, the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification. (MM, 249)

The shadow of the object falling upon the ego is a typically Freudian refrain, insofar as it does not console us with a single meaning. From one perspective, melancholia constitutes a denial of loss – *I keep the other alive inside myself*. This, Freud warns us, has delightfully punitive consequences due to the force of ambivalence – *I hate loving you because you’ve abandoned me; I love hating you because you’re still here*. A love object that cannot be given-up becomes the occasion for an ‘enjoyable’ self-hatred once it imaginatively inhabits the confines of a single breast.

From another perspective, however, the same melancholic praxis of self-berating, reveals more than it denies. Instead of only being a disavowal of loss, melancholia also connects us to the psychoanalytic rudiments of ego-formation. This is indicated by another of Freud’s refrains: the melancholic ‘knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him’ (245). Whereas so-called healthy mourning entails a conscious absorption in the work of separating the lost object from the self, by finding reparative, substitutive objects; melancholia persists in a state of confusion; (though at this point we might want to soften the conceptual distinction in Freud’s paper, on the grounds that *all* meaningful losses trouble what we think we know). Whether it is an actual death, the end of a love affair, the secession of a country from a political union, or a more enigmatic shift in circumstance, the lost object is difficult to define – it is
never simply itself. To take a commonplace example: when a man dies, it is not simply the man who is lost; rather we might have lost a greater, symbolic value which the man has come to represent (fatherhood or authority, for example), or instead a more minor characteristic which the man has been considered to possess (the way he laughed for example, or his uneven gait). In this way, because the contours of the lost object are not fixed, ordinary loss is always ambiguously defined. In melancholia this ordinary ambiguity is exacerbated by the operation of incorporation, in which the double elusiveness of the lost object (not only missing but also ambiguously delineated) is translated back into the terms of self-definition.

The melancholic ‘knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him’ (245); in other words, not only does he suffer the epistemological uncertainty of not knowing the limits of the lost object, but he suffers, additionally, the inconvenience of having to make room, in some sense to become, this ill-defined other. Here we glimpse the becoming of oneself through irregular imbrication with others. And we find a complementary process at work in the ‘On Narcissism’ paper when Freud offers us the imprecise formulation of a ‘new psychical action’ to be added to the auto-erotic instincts, ‘in order to bring about narcissism’. (ON, 77). Although it is clear that the self can only conceive of itself through the supplement of the outside (where the ‘new’ resides), it remains fundamentally unclear what form this self will take.

It will become apparent across this volume that both of Freud’s papers return us to the intricacies of ego-formation, but there is no easy consensus regarding their implications for clinical practice, or for culture more broadly. That said, all the chapters in this volume return to metapsychology to interrogate its value for social thought. In the century since the papers were composed, narcissism and melancholia
have crossed the psycho-social divide in a variety of ways. To begin with narcissism: whereas psychoanalysis has always been equipped (though not necessarily inclined) to appreciate the normalcy of narcissistic fantasy and to speak of the necessity of healthy narcissism, within the sociological landscape this has not always been the case. When we look to the sociological literature we don’t find many positive appraisals of the narcissist. Finding a high point –more probably a low point– in Christopher Lasch’s damning attack on the New (American) Narcissist of the 1970s, narcissism became, for a while, the prevalent metaphor for the crisis in contemporary Western culture, and a place-holder for all manner of malaise: impoverished social relations, a weak public culture, permissive or confessional politics, and the triumph of the therapeutic (Lasch, 1979). It is fair to say that narcissism’s currency became so embroiled with the lamentations of this mid-to-late twentieth-century cultural criticism that the pleasures of narcissistic seduction, and the possibilities of narcissistic sociability acknowledged by Freud were almost entirely overlooked.4

Commentaries on this discursive history have tended to identify narcissism as the dominant cultural diagnosis of Western society from the period of the 1970s to the 1990s, following which there was a discernible turn to melancholia (Frosh 2016; Jacobsen 2016; Walsh 2015). As Frosh narrates it ‘narcissism was perhaps the term of choice for examining the problem of forging relationships that feel meaningful in the context of rapid change and neo-liberal expansions; then melancholia was (and is) drawn on to conceptualize the challenge of confronting loss and colonial theft […]’

4 Freud's identifies numerous narcissistic figures that embody a positive social attraction for the other: children in a state of self-contentment; 'certain animals [...] such as cats and the large beasts of prey'; literary representations of 'criminals and humorists'; and charming of narcissistic women (ON, 89).
(2016, 1). Acknowledging that the mourning and melancholia framework was deployed as a category of social analysis as early as 1974 in the Mitscherliches’ seminal text *The Inability to Mourn*, it is true to say that the new millennium brought with it a renewed appetite for melancholia. As Frosh suggests, this often took place within the context of decolonising critique; for example, Paul Gilroy’s writing on postcolonial melancholia, which redirected the work of the Mitscherliches by positing the melancholic’s disavowal of loss and resulting self-hatred as a structural model for thinking about the British response to the end of empire (2005, 87-88). It is further notable that in the year 2000, David L. Eng could observe that, Fanon aside, ‘little [had] been written on the question of racial difference and melancholia’ until the emergence of work by Ann Anlin Cheng and José Esteban Muñoz – today it is fairly stated that racial melancholia studies comprises an academic field in its own right.\(^5\)

This important shift from the almost-default Americanism of mid-century critiques of narcissism to the more recent use of melancholy within critical-postcolonial and race studies, has been accompanied by a further discursive rehabilitation of melancholia through feminist and queer scholarship (notably Judith Butler 1997, 2004, 2005; and Douglas Crimp 2002). Significantly, the use of the mourning and melancholia framework here has been less concerned to diagnose as pathological cultural disavowals of loss (e.g. the British denial of a changing world order), than to detect the operation of melancholia within the formation of critical subjects. If narcissism and melancholia have both conventionally been taken to

\(^5\) Eng is citing Cheng’s 1997 article ‘The Melancholy of Race’, and Muñoz’s article of the same year ‘Photographies of Mourning: Melancholia and Ambivalence in Van Der Zee, Mapplethorpe, and Looking for Langston’. In addition to Cheng’s subsequent monograph *The Melancholy of Race* (2001), we might now add to this roster of names: David Eng & Shinhee Han (2000), Ranjana Khanna (2003), Paul Gilroy (2005), Derek Hook (2014), Jermaine Singleton (2015).
signify rigidity, symptomatic of a closed economy of desire, then queer melancholia is more readily associated with modes of openness and not-knowing that correlate to expressions of ambivalence. The melancholic turn, suggests Butler, returning our eye to the metapsychological level, is the process by which ‘one makes of oneself an object for reflection; in the course of producing one’s alterity, one becomes established as a reflexive being’ (1997, 22). Through this reflexivity all cultural diagnostic practices are called into question, most tellingly those patrician critiques which would seek to denounce so-called ‘identity politics’ on the grounds of narcissism, whilst at the same time disavowing their own processes of identification (i.e. those critics – mostly men – who uphold the faith in the impersonality of the social order while refusing to interrogate the privilege of their own subject positions within it). The ascendancy of melancholia more recently is of a piece with the need for a political language that addresses the themes of displacement and dispossession. The question which the melancholic subject never directly asks herself, but which she carries around with her at all times, what have I incorporated in order to be? (or, what amorphous lost object occupies the space of myself?) is nonetheless posed through the reflexivity of her actions and expressions. Even if she doesn’t resolve upon fixed critical positions (the diagnosis of all society), the queer melancholic generates critical practices.

Moving away from the generality of negative critique, then, recent attempts to think metapsychologically about such terms as hospitality, exile, border-control, and parasitism – including those collected in the essays here – have tended to draw from art, literature and other cultural forms to describe the intimate politics of inclusion and exclusion. This is not to discount broad structural analyses of melancholic (or narcissistic) societies undertaken in the mode of the Mitscherliches and Gilroy, but it
is to admit a different point of emphasis. Butler’s focus is on melancholia as the ‘mechanism by which the distinction between internal and external worlds is instituted’: it creates a ‘variable boundary between the psychic and the social […]’ (171). Though this ‘variable boundary’ is described here in spatial terms, it must also be considered temporally in recognition of the shifting relations between the past, the present and the future. These shifting horizons will have further implications for our understanding of community. Often consigned to the past within modern social critique (and reduced to a fantasy object of nostalgia), it is our ambition in this volume to recover community’s character as both interstitial and intermittent. By attempting to address these characteristics, one inevitably finds oneself occupying the ‘variable boundary’ in often-uncomfortable ways. As we’ve already suggested, we prefer to view this uncertain occupation as both melancholic and narcissistic, insisting that, minimally, these terms can be productively confused. The ‘new psychical mechanism’, which for Freud makes narcissism possible, might also be conceived as the means by which the embodied query of melancholia – *what have we lost?* – will be productively reprised as: *what will we become?*

**Identifying Community**

‘If a community is based on agreement upon a few cardinal points’, Freud once wrote, ‘it is obvious that people who have abandoned that common ground will cease to belong to it’ (1925, 53). When we’re informed, in this fashion, that something is ‘obvious’, it’s good practice to pause for thought. Let’s, for now, bracket any desire to know the context of Freud’s common-sense statement, and simply put it to work as a provocation for our ongoing discussion. In doing so, we will approach a series of
questions to be borne in mind over the course of the volume: for example, what types of community are imaginable when the cardinal points of agreement are put under strain? How do non-consensual dynamics – antagonism and dissent – shape the formation of a community’s self-image such that belonging can be negotiated across uncommon ground? And, how is the relationship between the (isolable) figure and (common) ground unsettled and resettled by acts of ‘abandonment’?

We can note that Freud’s casual formulation positions the individual, through her action of abandoning the common ground, as turning her back on the community; in a mode of self-imposed excommunication, it is the one who abandons the many. More resonant to readers of contemporary critical theory, however, might be an inversion of this dynamic wherein the common ground is pulled out from under the feet of particular (isolable) figures, displacing them from a state of prior belonging, or barring a priori their access to a given site of community. If to hold something in common is also to be held by it, then the risk prevails of being mishandled, dropped, shunted aside, or let fall through the proverbial net. The themes of precarity, dispossession, and exilic subjectivities, having been brought to the fore in much recent critical discourse, focus our attention on the edges of community – frontier-sites where the contingencies of the ‘always already’ contested claims of identity and belonging are heightened.

Axiomatic to any psychosocially oriented analysis of community is an appreciation of how the identity of the ‘in-group’ is achieved through the position of the ‘outsider’, how, in other words, that which is located beyond a given site of belonging is nonetheless vital as the ‘constitutive outside’ to the positive term of reference. The familiarity of this logic should not blind us to the multiplicity of its operations – operations that, one way or another, return us to the question of
identification. If, as Stuart Hall reminds us, identification ‘turns out to be one of the least well-understood concepts’, it is perhaps because of the disarming readiness with which we are inclined to understand it: ‘In common sense language, identification is constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation’. Hall argues against the ‘natural’ stability of group identity: identification, he writes, is ‘a construction, […] – always ‘in process’ […] the total meaning it suggests is, in fact, a fantasy of incorporation’. In language that reminds us of the Lorde poem with which we began, Hall tells us that identification necessarily entails ‘too much’ or ‘too little’, [there is] ‘never a proper fit, a totality’ (1996, 2-3). As with Lorde’s act of poesis – ‘I want to make you / more and less / a part / from my self’ – acts of identification produce unstable boundaries.

A psychoanalytic appreciation of identification as a process, then, opens-up the ‘natural closure of solidarity’ by demonstrating how even the most foundational of identifications (or rather, especially the most foundational - think Oedipus) are rifted by ambivalence, the force of which becomes a ‘precondition of the institution of any identification’ (Laplanche & Pontalis, 207). Psychoanalysis postulates a human subject constituted through identifications formed in response to the simultaneous and at times inseparable coexistence of opposing emotional attitudes – primarily, love and hate. These arche-antonyms, however, require scrutiny lest the famous ‘conflict due to ambivalence’ they provoke be taken as the resting point of an analysis rather than its beginning.6

6 Identified as a foundational psychical conflict that can inspire a vast range of defensive responses, 'conflict due to ambivalence' is a favored coinage across Freud's work.
In her highly influential project of refiguring psychoanalytic ideas and terminology, Sara Ahmed encourages her readers to consider identifications as ‘forms of alignment’: ‘thinking of identification as a form of alignment’ she says ‘shows us how identifications involve dis-identifications or an active ‘giving up’ of other possible identifications’ (2014, 52). The orienting strategy here, invaluable for underscoring the translatability of psychoanalytic theory into a contemporary cultural politics, is to analyse the means through which bodies are constructed in (and against) contingent, historical discourses such that they come to be (dis)aligned with certain other bodies. Following Freud in considering the ‘relationship between ego formation and community’, Ahmed writes:

The ego is established by intimating the lost object of love; it is based on a principle of a likeness or resemblance or of becoming alike. However, I would argue that love does not pre-exist identification (just as hate does not pre-exist dis-identification); so it is not a question of identifying with those we love and dis-identifying with those we hate. Rather, it is through forms of identification that align this subject with this other, that the character of the loved is produced as ‘likeness’ in the first place. [...] (2014, 52)

We are being asked to scrutinize how liking and likeness are linked. There is no inevitable order of play that aligns degrees of emotion (on a spectrum of love to hate) with the characteristics of resemblance (on a spectrum of sameness to difference). Rather, the force of the emotion does the work of producing the object it is regarded as being a response to: ‘What is at stake in the emotional intensities of love and hate’ writes Ahmed, ‘is the production of the effect of likeness and unlikeness as
characteristics that are assumed to belong to the bodies of individuals’ (Ibid.). Or, as she puts it elsewhere, ‘likeness is an effect of proximity or contact, which is then “taken up” as a sign of inheritance’ (2006, 123). This duly troubles commonsensical or naïve psychologicist accounts that posit a ‘natural’ causation between non-resemblance and antagonistic emotion – in other words accounts that leave un-interrogated the discursive techniques that produce the homology between ‘stranger’ and ‘danger’.

In our view, it is a staple of psychoanalytic enquiry to wonder at what point, and under what conditions, we might get to know what we are like. The language of psychoanalysis, extrapolated from the clinic, permits a detailed examination of the boundaries which construct and challenge likenesses. Specifically, this takes place though careful reading of the complex practices of (dis)identification at the heart of ego-formation (at both individual and group levels), and the associated mechanisms of defence, for example: introjection, incorporation, projective-identification, and splitting. Of importance to the title terms of this volume is an appreciation for how these various mechanisms allow us to describe the operation of two related fantasies: fantasies of distinction (or separation), and fantasies of unboundedness (or merging). It is a familiar analytic strategy to diagnose within the melancholic’s nostalgia for a lost golden age, as well as the narcissist’s self-aggrandizing fantasy of coherence, the dangerous illusion of internal homogeneity. Well-worn critiques of such imaginary identifications or cultural fantasies, provoke another question, however: namely, is every expression of commonality reducible to a mechanism of defence? Although ‘community’ might sounds old-fashioned or unredeemably localist in an age of state politics and the formations of mass-society, the term remains useful, nonetheless, for how it registers the indefiniteness of identification: the everyday spatial practices
which produce ruptures or apertures within any given enclosure, signaling the potential for movement of members ‘in’ and ‘out’ of community, as well as the temporal intermittencies which necessarily structure the way different people come to hold something, or nothing, in common.

It is perhaps worth stressing, then, that in exposing the fantasy element involved in the conception of a commonality around which solidarities and allegiances are declared, the intention is not to dismiss the need (or simply the circumstance) for its construction; rather it’s precisely to focus attention on how such identifications get made – both the motivations for them (historical, social, psychological), and the mechanisms of their production (historical, social, psychological). It is an assumption of this work that a psychoanalytic lens does not only lend itself to the third of these parenthetical terms. Highlighting the requirement to conceive the interplay of the psychic with the social as a profoundly relational affair, Diana Fuss states that ‘identification names the entry of history and culture into the subject’ (3). To speak of narcissistic or melancholic identifications is thus to use the tools of psychoanalysis to detail the why and the how of identificatory processes and practices – that is, to discern the motivations and mechanisms through which history and culture come to enter the subject from the so-called ‘outside’. The psychosocial tenor of enquiry represented across the chapters in the volume foregrounds the need for sophisticated thinking about the valence of ‘inside’ / ‘outside’ terminology as both necessary-impossible conceptual schemas relating to the theorization of the unconscious, and as utterances that enact the truth of lived experiences, such as being cast out of, imprisoned within, or living on the edge of society.
Now that we’ve begun to outline some of the formative concerns that accompany our title terms, we can look further into Freud’s comment regarding the obviousness of the rules of community: ‘If a community is based on agreement upon a few cardinal points, it is obvious that people who have abandoned that common ground will cease to belong to it’ (1925, 53). To be fair, Freud’s unusually straightforward statement, does not come from one of his explicit theorisations on group psychology, or the nature of the social bond, rather the occasion is autobiographical – at least, as autobiographical as Freud was prepared to be. He is reflecting on psychoanalysis’s strength as an international movement to withstand the secession of some of its most eminent members, including Alfred Adler and C. G. Jung, in the adolescent years of the new century (1911-13). The cardinal point abandoned by both men was the importance of sexuality (infantile sexuality and the Oedipus Complex for Jung; sexuality per se for Adler). That the dissenters could not hold to a belief in the force of a formative psychosexual life signaled the undoing of their ties with the psychoanalytic community. On Freud’s direction, the separation settlement permitted neither to use the name ‘psycho-analysis’ to refer to their work. Here is Freud, writing in its direct aftermath about the case of Adler:

Then Adler took a step for which we are thankful; he severed all connection with psycho-analysis, and gave his theory the name of ‘Individual Psychology’. There is room enough on God's earth, and anyone who can has a perfect right to potter about on it without being prevented; but it is not a desirable thing for people who have ceased to understand one another and have grown incompatible with one another to remain under the same roof.

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7 It has been well noted that the only autobiography Freud willingly offered up to history was the biography of his association.
Adler's ‘Individual Psychology’ is now one of the many schools of psychology which are adverse to psycho-analysis and its further development is no concern of ours. (1914a, 52)

With Freud’s blessing, then, Adler (and the Adlerians) were left to ‘potter about’ [herumtummle\(^8\)] with matters more trifling, we infer, than ‘psycho-analysis’. The extent to which the severing that Freud speaks of here was more bloody than benign has been thoroughly addressed by the many chroniclers of the field: for one, the Adlerians did not immediately renounce the subject-designation psycho-analysis, rather the establishment of Adler’s ‘Society for Free Psychoanalytic Investigation’ was so named in response to the unfreedom he experienced in attempting to challenge the cardinal points of the Freudian science (Makari, 281).

When writing the official autobiographical account of the formative divisions, Freud is compelled to defend himself against the charge of intolerance: as he lists the men whose enduring loyalty and friendship he (and his science) have enjoyed, the numbers stack-up in his favour. He ventures that ‘an intolerant man, dominated by an arrogant belief in his own infallibility, would never have been able to maintain his hold upon so large a number of intellectually eminent people, especially if he had at

\(^8\) It is possible that James Strachey’s rendering of herumtummle as ‘to potter about’ misses the dig in Freud’s language; alternative translations such as ‘to romp’ or ‘to mess about’ perhaps give a better sense of the sexual component which Freud sneakily attributes to Adler’s new freedom. [Es ist soviel Platz auf Gottes Erde und es ist gewiß berechtigt, daß sich jeder, der es vermag, ungehemmt auf ihr herumtummle, aber es ist nicht wünschenswert, daß man unter einem Dach zusammenwohnen bleibe, wenn man sich nicht mehr versteht und nicht mehr verträgt.] (GW, X: 95-6).
his command as few practical attractions as I [Freud] had’ (1925, 53).

This is a delicate statement indeed: part bashful (*I have few practical attractions*), part boastful (*I have few practical attractions, and yet...*). It keeps us wondering as to the quality of Freud’s ‘hold’ on the members of the surrounding community, and the means through which it was maintained. Precisely because Freud’s character remains on trial here, his defence against the charge of intolerance is made from a *personal* perspective (*I’m not an intolerant man*). However, the point he wishes to stress is that Adler and Jung lost their place at the psychoanalytic table due to irreconcilable disagreements of a *scientific* nature: the supposition being that questions of character are superfluous to the work of a science whose job is not to extend a tolerant inclusivity to research programmes that are incompatible with the ‘cardinal points’ of the field. This suggests that whilst accusations of intolerance on the part of the *man* may be hard for the scientist to stomach, the idea of an intolerant *science* is less troublesome because it indicates that the field in question is sufficiently secure in its identity to pronounce with certitude what belongs outside of it.

But of course, psychoanalysis itself undermines this very logic with its persistent reminders that questions of *character* can never be left aside! Nowhere is this more obvious than in the boundary disputes that defined psychoanalysis’s early institutionalization – who’s in, who’s out; according to what theoretical and methodological principles were the lines of exclusion to be drawn; and what forms of

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9 Strachey has translated the German verb *fesseln* which connotes both captivation and tying-up as ‘to hold’. Perhaps there is a stronger sense of the charismatic, or at least libidinally charged, quality of the hold in question in Freud’s original expression. [Aber ich darf wohl für mich geltend machen, daß ein intoleranter und vom Unfehlbarkeitsdünkel beherrschter Mensch niemals eine so große Schar geistig bedeutender Personen an sich hätte fesseln können, zumal wenn er über nicht mehr praktische Verlockungen verfügte als ich] (*GW*, XVI: 80).
community policing were to be deployed to safeguard the ‘homogeneity of the core’.\(^{10}\) The developmental tale of psychoanalysis, which we can hardly do more than allude to here, is wonderfully intricate, with the play and counter play of transferences restaging rivalries and opening old wounds. That the discipline’s identity is impossible to separate from the identity of its founder, accounts for why so many of the so-called scientific critiques of psychoanalysis continue to take a profoundly ad-hominem turn.

It cannot escape anyone’s attention here that we are once more attending to the grounds of narcissism. If narcissism marks the point at which the distinction between subject and object fails to hold, then perhaps it is legitimate to call psychoanalysis a narcissistic science. Similarly, psychoanalysis has often been conceived as a melancholic science due to its enduring concern with the lost object, the misplaced affect, and its theorization of belatedness - all elements reinforced by the discipline’s own apparent cultural belatedness as a European bourgeois science at the end of the age of the European bourgeoisie (Baraitser, 2012: 224). The point of most enduring interest though, is whether such a double designation can only be a slur against both the science and the scientist(s), or whether it can stand as a general and insurmountable truth about the scientific discourse as such.

In addition to naming infantile sexuality, Freud would go on to adduce several other cardinal points as being foundational to his discipline: the ‘assumption that there are unconscious mental processes, the recognition of the theory of resistance and repression’ as well as the facticity of the transference. ‘No one who cannot accept

\(^{10}\) In a letter to his trusted ally Lou Andreas-Salomé, Freud resolved to ‘hold onto the homogeneity of the core’ of his scientific discipline lest it become ‘something else’ (Gay, 216) – this after having frankly admitted his personal opinion of Adler ‘he is a loathsome individual’ (Freud, 1914c: 19).
them all should count himself a psycho-analyst’, he states (1923, 247). Who gets to count (zählen) as a community member is determined by allegiance to the founding principles of the science, which, in turn, become the principles that safeguard the Freudian body-politic. We might note that this business of counting is not altogether incidental, for when an association has grown from one, to several, then on to a known number of bodies that can still meet around a committee table, the task of counting seems to be manageable. But once the numbers exceed the boardroom, the lecture hall, the town square, or indeed the boundaried polis, counting becomes more problematic. There is of course the difficult exercise of tallying-up the numbers, finding reliable measures to ensure that votes get counted such that something like the general will can be given form. Additionally, there is the question of who is count-worthy: whose vote matters, or, indeed, who is even eligible to vote? Fundamentally, however, if number remains of significance to Freud, and the persistence of quantity poses a problem worth considering, it is never simply a matter of political representation, of casting votes to establish an arithmetic majority. The fact that others count, doesn’t tell us how they count. Counting matters for psychoanalysis because ‘one’ is always ‘more and less’ (Lorde) than itself, a confusion between self and other which makes adding-up a difficult business. The negotiation of psychoanalytic authority likewise, and despite Freud’s retrospective claim to the contrary, is based upon acts of identification which don’t resolve wholly on cardinal points. Indeed, at an historical moment of scientific schism (precipitated by the breaking of ties with Adler and Jung), and when the European world was about to descend into a catastrophic war, Freud withdrew to write two papers about how every ego arrives on the world stage with a misaligned account of its own value.
Not-knowing Community

In his 1967 book *The Sociological Tradition*, Robert Nisbet pointed out that from Auguste Comte on, the ‘social’ in the sociological was firmly wedded to the moral component of the concept ‘community’. ‘[T]he referent of the ‘social’’, he wrote, ‘was almost invariably the communal. *Communitas*, not *societas* with its more impersonal connotations, is the real etymological source of the sociologist’s use of the word ‘social’ in his studies. […]’. For Comte, according to Nisbett, ‘the ghost of traditional community hovers over […] sociology’ (56).

We can find an equally definitive articulation of sociology’s haunting by community in Ferdinand Tönnies’ 1887 account of the move from *Gemeinschaft* (community) to *Gesellschaft* (civil society). Tonnies’s narrative is often designated a scriptural moment in the history of sociological thinking, announcing an abiding anxiety with the transformation of public space and related modes of association. Of course, anxiety and the lost object of community go hand in hand; and, we might quip, that the former is all the more obstinate when the latter was never present in the first place. However, we are not concerned in this work to re-diagnose a structural nostalgia at the heart of the sociological discipline (Stauth & Turner 1988, Walsh 2015), or to rehearse the relation between elitist critiques of mass society and the melancholic disposition of the critic (see Wendy Brown, 1999). The idea that sociological thinking has been propelled by the impulse to mourn the social bonds of community is well established, as is the myth of premodern coherence and stability that such a mourning requires.

Benedict Anderson (1983) has shown, for example, in his account of the emergence of modern nations as ‘imagined communities’, that such myths continue to operate in powerful ways. Anderson’s famous illustration of the tomb of the unknown
soldier points to the foundational melancholia of national communities, which owe their persistence, in the face of Marxist or liberal critique, to both their strong feeling for death, and strategic ignorance about what has died (the soldier should not be identified). Anderson points us towards a deep social structure of elegy, always mediated through changing technologies (new print media in the 15th and 16th centuries; the internet today), which helps inaugurate a group-ego among people who have never met in person – whose proximity is imaginary. Needless to say, such national formations are not always benign. History is littered with quasi-religious national movements – from European fascism to the proliferation of protectionisms around the globe today – which demonstrate the violence of identification by securing borders against immigration, suppressing internal dissent, and annexing foreign space. The value of Anderson’s analysis, however, and the kernel of his soft defence of nationalism as a diffuse political force, is that the general form of any given national imaginary might contain a multiplicity of identifications. In other words, because the tomb is anonymous, its specific contents remain always undefined, and therefore open to historical change.

At the risk of rehearsing the obvious, it is worth adding here that neo-liberal critiques of nationalism do not necessarily circumvent the dangers of reproducing securitized and exclusionary forms of identity – globalization produces a wealth of gated ‘communities’. Furthermore, following Zygmunt Bauman (2001), instead of regarding the multiple minoritarian communities which emerge within supra-national and neo-imperial space as the avatars for a Habermasian conversation in the public sphere, they can be read symptomatically. Whilst the organization of cultural difference within a ‘progressive’ liberal politics might be seen as straightforwardly positive, Bauman suggests (as do many critics of the neoliberal economy) that such
apparent diversity disguises systemic assimilation and exclusion. The failed promise of multiculturalism is that the terms of universal citizenship which it infers, and which are necessary in order to open the possibility of contest and consent between ‘equals’, are fatally beset by economic unevenness, unacknowledged and unknown historical exclusions, and unpredictable cultural fragmentations. In this way, the delineation of different communities, imagined as being somehow *in conversation*, can also, paradoxically, mark a profound failure of social communication.

Drawing on the work of Giorgio Agamben and Jean Luc Nancy, among others, we can attribute this failure of communication – the failure to arrive properly at intersubjective recognition – to the limitations of enacting politics in a representational mode. Community understood according to the rule of all of its members possessing, and being represented by, an essential or definitive characteristic (a named ethnicity, a skin colour, an avowed creed, a shared myth of origin) misses, according to both these writers, the true precarity of what it is to be *in* common. Agamben in *The Coming Community*, envisages community unbound by any common property, identity, or essence, holding out the possibility of ‘co-belong[ing] without any representable condition of belonging’. What he calls the ‘whatever [*qualunque*] singularites’ of community ‘cannot form a *societas* because they do not possess any identity to *vindicate* nor any bond of belonging for which to seek recognition’ (Agamben, 1993: 86). He points us here towards a politics of dispossession – a dispossession that can somehow be shared, or identified with. To be in common is not to belong to a predefined enclosure, but rather to enact the possibilities of an irreducible singularity coming to be itself. This repeats some familiar notes from the Freudian metapsychology discussed above, where the unconscious incorporation of loss and the ‘new psychical *action*’ of ego formation can militate against a closed representation
of the subject. It also returns our attention to the matter of counting: Agamben’s “whatever singularity” can never be simply ‘one’, where one is the abstracted and countable quality that determines the political representation only of those subjects who are already seen to count.

Nancy uses an equally apposite terminology in his study *The Inoperative Community* when he writes that ‘Being in common means [...] no longer having, in any form, in any empirical or ideal place, [...] a substantial identity, and sharing this (narcissistic) “lack of identity”’ (Nancy, xxxviii). This shared ‘narcissistic lack’ might also be termed an unconsciously common melancholia; and it is significant that at the same time as extolling such a melancholic structure, Nancy is also concerned to challenge the melancholia of the sociological script. Community does not designate a premodern *Gemeinschaft* intimacy, he argues, but rather gestures to an intimacy yet to come.

‘[S]ociety was not built on the ruins of a community. It emerged from the disappearance or the conservation of something -tribes or empires- perhaps just as unrelated to what we call ‘community’ as to what we call ‘society’. So that community, far from being what society has crushed or lost, is what happens to us – question, waiting, event, imperative – *in the wake of society.*’ (Nancy, 11)

The re-temporalisation of community implicit in both Nancy and Agamben’s works signals a break with representational historical narratives in favour of a politics of process and co-presence-ing, as well as of contingency. For both writers, the prepositional inflections are highly important (more important that the subject itself):
being in and being with indicate the acts of being placed that produce community. These communities are not ideal enclosures, but rather, through the operations of division (being in) and relation (being with), they converge always upon the question of borders. Which is to say, community takes place in temporally and spatially unsecured circumstances.

This is a good point at which to return to Freud, and specifically to his 1921 text ‘Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego’, wherein he explicitly connects narcissistic identification to the politics of being with others (Gemeingeist). Freud’s paper aims, in the most general terms, to explain the fluctuating feelings of omnipotence and self-divestiture within the narcissistic dynamics of homosocial identification: an institution of fellow-feeling mediated through the idealized figure of a leader. By Freud’s account, the politics of any given community implies a form of seduction between the leader and the led: horizontal relations are only made possible through the social bond tied on the vertical axis. In other words, investment in the authority ‘above’ permits the forging of bonds between subjects positioned laterally (it’s through my father that I may come to love my brother). The authority to which the group is libidinally tied is given form through a particular figure; as Philip Rieff puts it, ‘authority’, for Freud, ‘is always personified’ (235).

At face value, this positions Freud at some distance from contemporary demands to develop an ethics of community, not least because of his insistence that it requires a hierarchical structure to develop a fraternal bond. Not only is Freud’s notional ‘band of brothers’ secured on a quasi war-footing, aligning themselves in tribal terms under the banner of the father, who is both alive and dead, but also, as Freud tells us explicitly in Totem and Taboo, the brothers’ task comprises the theft
and exchange of other bodies – specifically women.\textsuperscript{11} We can detect, then, that for Freud the anthropological structure persists symbolically in modern group formation (e.g. the mythic production of fraternity is isomorphic to the production of modern \textit{esprit de corps}). Accordingly, we might join with Jacques Derrida and ask, ‘why privilege the brother over the sister, the female cousin, the daughter, the wife or the stranger, or the figure of anyone or whoever’ (see Matthews, 2016, 80). The common man, it may be said, is a dangerous reduction of community: though a reduction which may well be embedded in the word ‘community’ itself.\textsuperscript{12}

Our suspicion is that Freud’s group psychology, secured through identification with the leader, does not pay sufficient attention to the specificity of different

\textsuperscript{11} The condensed narrative that Freud offers in \textit{Totem and Taboo} runs as follows: ‘Sexual desires do not unite men but divide them. Though the brothers had banded together in order to overcome their father, they were all one another's rivals in regard to the women. Each of them would have wished, like his father, to have all the women to himself. The new organization would have collapsed in a struggle of all against all, for none of them was of such overmastering strength as to be able to take on his father's part with success. Thus the brothers had no alternative, if they were to live together, but—not, perhaps, until they had passed through many dangerous crises—to institute the law against incest, by which they all alike renounced the women whom they desired and who had been their chief motive for despatching [sic] their father. In this way they rescued the organization which had made them strong—and which may have been based on homosexual feelings and acts, originating perhaps during the period of their expulsion from the horde’ (144).

\textsuperscript{12} Though this is an obvious critique of Freud, Derrida is in fact interrogating the work of Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot and Nancy. Indeed Nancy concedes, responding to Derrida’s query, that ‘community’ does indeed resonate with Christian references to spiritual and brotherly love, which threaten to idealize and thereby cover-over the prepositional fragility of the ‘with’. A community of priestly brothers in transcendent identification with the father attain their ‘proximity and intimacy’ symbolically, without suffering what Nancy calls ‘removal’ – which is to say, the immanent, embodied discomfiture of sharing space. (For a fuller discussion of this debate, see Matthews, 80-81).
historical identifications. However, it’s still worth remaining with Freud’s text a little while longer, paying particular attention to the mechanisms of social attachment it details – not least because this theme will be returned to in several of the chapters in this volume. The crucial figure here is ‘the ego-ideal’, which, most straightforwardly, we are told, fulfills the role of ‘self-observation, moral conscience, the censorship of dreams, and the chief influence in repression’ (1921, 110). This entity is representative of ‘the ego divided, fallen apart into two pieces’ as a result of the melancholic incorporation of a lost object (109). As with many of Freud’s concepts, however, the ego-ideal is a piece of theory-in-motion, pointing both to the social and the metapsychological spheres.\footnote{Most obviously, within Freud’s corpus, the theorisation of the ego-ideal was set to receive further redefinition with the introduction of the superego in 1923.} First, as a critical agency set up within the ego (the manifestation of the melancholic split within the ego between ‘native’ and ‘foreign’ components) the ego-ideal is transferred into the social through identification with the leader. Second, and moving back towards individual ego-formation, we find something slightly different – namely what Freud calls the ‘ideal-ego’, defined in ‘On Narcissism’ as the ‘target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. […] [In appearance it is] possessed of every perfection that is of value’ (94). The distinction between ideal ego (narcissistic admiration) and ego ideal (melancholic ambivalence) may seem a minor one, but, once perceived, it permits alternate readings of Freud’s paper (see also Wright; Bonnigal-Katz; and Watt below).

In the more conventional reading, Freud’s group psychology depends on difference: the lost object/other, once incorporated, creates an ego divided, an ego which has to make room for the other within it. This conflict underwrites the ego-
ideal whose punitive function can only be consoled through an identification with an external figure: an identification in the world which imaginatively re-separates the self from the other. This results in a narcissistic politics of minor differences, in which a common identification – having certain qualities in common – is organized on the basis of an unconscious hostility to the other.

On a second reading however, reading through the idea of the ‘ideal-ego’, we can apply narcissism much more radically to the phenomenon of group psychology. If the lost object unconsciously incorporated into the ego is the very image of the ego itself, then the predicament which results is not that of difference (the conflict between ego and incorporated object within the same psychic space) but of sameness (the enigma of having (re)incorporated my imagined self perfection). Leo Bersani has probably pushed this second reading the furthest, dissolving any fundamental distinction between narcissistic and object-libidinal attachments; taking seriously in other words, the thought that it is an original mourning for ourselves that motivates all of our identifications. Disputing the necessity for a punitive ego-ideal, or the inevitability of a tragic psycho-sexual conflict resolved through social splitting, Bersani proposes an alternative spatialisation of community, modeled upon the activity of cruising for sex.14 Defining cruising as ‘a nameless, identity-free contact –contact with an object I don’t know and certainly don’t love’– he provocatively insists that ‘contact’ should not ‘degenerate’ into an inter-subjective relationship. In other words, it is important that the object is not delineated in terms of identifiable difference, but rather is infiltrated by the enigma of sameness. Thus, in cruising, we move impersonally and

14 Bersani takes his lead from Freud’s Group Psychology text: ‘It seems certain, writes Freud in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, “that homosexual love is far more compatible (than heterosexual love) with group ties, even when it takes the shape of uninhibited sexual impulsions – a remarkable fact, the explanation of which might carry us far”’ (Bersani, 2010: 49).
anonymously through space, identifying our missing selves in the bodies of strangers. Sexual excitement, Bersani has written in *The Culture of Redemption*, is ‘both a turning away from others and a dying to the self,’ a paradox which establishes the terms of narcissistic sociability: a withdrawal into the self which is yet a shattering of self-coherence through acts of sexual identification with others (1990, 45). Here what is *in common* is narcissism itself: the task of finding in others the self which will never be possessed.

Bersani’s is one especially ingenious example of post-Freudian community, which disputes the hierarchical and boundaried nature of Freud’s conception of group psychology (demonstrating a Freudian metapsychology that is more radical than many of its cultural applications would suggest). Of course we can acknowledge the limitations of his model of gay cruising for an application beyond its first context, specifically on the questions of scale (is the affective power of cruising determined by its status as minority pursuit?), and opportunity (is cruising for sex open to all?). It provides us, nonetheless, with a compelling notion of community as an itinerant ‘counter public’. Indeed, this modern tradition of proposing counter publics, in order to contest and deliberately fragment dominant ‘public sphere’ discourse, has been led by feminist and queer theorists, including Nancy Fraser and Michael Warner, and has often explicitly drawn from Michel Foucault’s (1984 [1967]) influential idea of the ‘heterotopia’. Heterotopias, according to Foucault, are ‘real’ sites of emplacement (e.g. boarding schools, cemeteries, ships), reserved for crises or transitions (e.g. adolescence, illness, old age, travel) which connect disparate ‘ordinary’ spaces, and which are connected to the public sphere without ever being only public. For Foucault, a heterotopia ‘presupposes a system of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable,’ a characteristic he deems to be under threat
as sites of ‘transition’ are further transformed by modern institutions into states of ‘deviation’; as the privatization (and increasing uniformity) of modern ‘public’ space reduces the possibilities for heterotopic crises (7, 5). With this cultural transformation in mind, and its corresponding politicization, much recent writing on counter publics has emphasized the ‘agitational’ quality of group formation, and the shifting terms of difference and sameness which determine the lines of inclusion. As Nancy Fraser puts it ‘on the one hand, [counter publics] function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics’ (Fraser 1992: 124). The terms of ‘withdrawal’ and ‘regroupment’ suggest a necessary narcissistic investment of libido into the ego: a community grows its practices through turning its back on the dominant discourse. At the same time, however, this ego-investiture calls into question its own boundaries: the community’s ‘agitational’ activities ensure that its self-identifications are never fulfilled.

The summoning of everyday practices is particularly important in this context, especially if we want to understand why counter publics are not reducible to advocacy groups, directly representing the interests of one marginal identity to the political centre. Indeed, it is the activism of ‘taking place’, and using things in common, that is stressed in most contemporary revivals of ‘commons’ discourse (Harvey 2011, Tyler 2013). For example, writing about the eviction of gypsies and travelers from the Dale Farm site in Essex, in the UK in 2011, as well the forms of resistance that emerged at the same time, Imogen Tyler connects the question of the common land to the practice of commoning. ‘Many [such] social and political movements draw inspiration from the philosophy of the commons and explicitly understand their politics as a politics of occupation and their activism as forms of commoning against (capitalist) forms of...
The ecological tenor of this language is not adventitious, returning us, as it does, to the prepositional logic encountered above, of being ‘in’ and being ‘with’, and the inescapable question of resources: *how will scarcity or lack get distributed?* The implication is that political resistance is also, inevitably, a precarious community-building endeavor. In fact, it seems that one of the impossible, though compelling challenges of thinking community today is the requirement that we both find a way to withdraw from state-run ‘society’ in order to register and resist its structure, and at the same time learn how to take place in social space *with* others.

Ours would not be a psychoanalytic account of community if we failed to notice that we’re gesturing here towards a formula for paranoid sociability: at once fantasizing retreat or disappearance from the established social-symbolic network and actively engaging with the messy entanglements of the social scene. Engin Isin (2004) has offered ‘the neurotic citizen’ as the dominant character type of the post 9/11 era, suggesting that ‘anxiety about the Other […] has been articulating itself [for several decades] through various discourses on the border […] their disappearance, fluidity, malleability, porousness, penetrability and smartness’. His suggestion is that the border itself has become ‘neuroticized’ as ‘part of a larger domain of practices through which the neurotic citizen has formed’ (231-2). The words ‘porousness’ and ‘penetrability’ evoke Freud’s exemplary narcissist, paranoid, and psychotic, Judge Schreber. But as well as being reminded that narcissism itself sits as a border-concept between neurosis and psychosis within Freudian nosology, Isin’s thesis on border-anxiety invites us to think about the unique challenges of the contemporary situation. Whilst the American President Donald Trump’s threat to ‘build a wall’ between the U.S. and Mexico is an exaggerated (and exaggeratedly narcissistic) iteration of old
geo-political fantasies, the rise of the internet has surely exacerbated questions of scale and ontological distinction – pertaining to ego formation and permeability – such that they can appear as brand new problems. Resisting incorporation by the other, and learning to cooperate with others, can take place today, simultaneously, in both the virtual and physical worlds, and therefore has to be negotiated on two vastly different scales, with two vastly different notions of propinquity at play.\textsuperscript{15} There is no doubt that the contemporary question of community is haunted by the idea of the virtual world: millennial ‘narcissism’, ad hominem politics, the phenomenon of the echo chamber effect on social media – all undersigned, of course, by the melancholy of patrician critiques of new media.

Allowing for these new and complex ways in which we have to think about being in and being with, and how community gets made, we can gather that much of the recent literature on counter publics, the commons and community, opposes representational politics with an affective politics of proximity (even if this means proximity through screens).\textsuperscript{16} Another way of putting this is to say that political community today does not directly infer Communism: it is not a direct attempt to take hold of and reorganize state power. The fundamental problem of being \textit{in common} is not resolved by having, and representing to oneself and others, certain essential qualities or values; just as the awkward interpositions of ego formation will not resolve upon the idealism of an inter-subjective relationship. Accordingly, we can see community \textit{taking place}, temporally and spatially, at unsecured borders where the

\textsuperscript{15} See Calhoun (1998) for a pre-Millennium appraisal of ‘community without propinquity’ that warns against exaggerating the novelty of the Internet.

\textsuperscript{16} Nancy speaks of community as ‘literary communism’, the interruption of the myth of the one, which is not necessarily communicable – ‘no form of intelligibility or transmissibility is required of it’ – but which nonetheless constitutes a ‘work’ offered up for communication (73).
operations of interpellation and ambivalence, and the facticity of contingency, cut across any blandly utopic notion of the commons. Lauren Berlant has warned us against the undue ‘positivizing’ of commons discourse:

Politics is also about redistributing insecurity, after all. So whatever else it is, the commons concept has become a way of positivizing the ambivalence that saturates social life about the irregular conditions of fairness. I’m not arguing against the desire for a smooth plane of likeness, but arguing that the attachment to this concept is too often a way of talking about politics as the resolution of ambivalence and the vanquishing of the very contingency of nonsovereign standing that is at the heart of true equality, where status is not worked out in advance or outside of relation. (2016, 395)

What must be worked out through, and within ‘relation’, is the density of its affective life, replete with feelings of awkwardness, inconvenience, shame as well as pride, and even disgust. The attainment of ‘likeness’ is work, suggests Berlant, necessitating negotiations and acknowledgements which are negative as well as positive; identifications which collapse distances too soon to the point of merging, as well as preserve them too long to the point of indifference. This is the struggle of community: the work it takes to not assume that we are one; to aim at the ‘true equality’ Berlant speaks of, rather than at the presumptive equality among those we already know are going to count.

**Chapters**
Though by no means representing the same intellectual outlook, the chapters that follow attest to the ways in which the capaciousness of the terms narcissism and melancholia – connoting psychic structure, developmental stage, syndrome or disorder, cultural mood, political mode, and the possibility of strategic refusal – permit us to think rigorously, and in complex ways, about modern community.

Chapter 2 begins with an explicit ‘rejection of Freud’s original theory of primary narcissism’. Licensed by a reading of Melanie Klein and the Object Relations school of psychoanalysis, Michael Rustin argues for the ‘innate object-relatedness’ of the self, with narcissism acting only as a secondary defence mechanism against a hostile environment. Rustin allows that defining the point at which the infant is able to determine between itself and others is profoundly ideological; and, consequently, he proposes a distinction between the hedonistic-utilitarian (an ultimately capitalist) characterization of self-development, to which social relations are mere additions, and a welfare-state model of essential relatedness. By no means exempting psychoanalysis from the operations of capitalist systems of representation, neither does Rustin reduce the Freudian or Lacanian traditions to individualist philosophies – both, he concedes, are philosophies of relation. Yet he does see an importance difference between what he terms the ‘pessimism’ of Lacan, focusing always on the cultural and the linguistic, and the optimism of Klein, working to cultivate relations which nurture and support. Ranging broadly in his social examples through the Mitscherlichs and Gilroy, to contemporary social phenomena, Rustin presents the damaged states of narcissism and melancholia as general symptoms, which demand close, context-specific treatments.

Jay Watts’s chapter, ‘Narcissism Through the Digital Looking Glass’, while not a riposte to Rustin’s perspective does offer a compelling version of Lacanian
optimism with respect to our understanding of the digital world and ‘new media’. Watts pointedly revises ‘neo-Laschian’ critiques of digital space as determinate of pathological narcissism (symptomized by feelings of disembodiment and insecurity). By taking Lacan’s mirror phase where ‘the specular I turns into the social I’ and adapting it into the ‘Millennial’ culture of the selfie, Watts advises that we resist the temptation of the underdetermined narrative which sees narcissistic fantasy give way to mature object choice (Lacan, 1996: 98). We might focus instead, she suggests, on the productive and responsible conditions of play made possible by the internet. The internet provides new models for enjoying ourselves together, unsecured by the patrician fantasy of ‘a stable, situated, superior relational self’. Here, the clinical case study of Mohammed, a young Muslim immigrant to London, whose selfie-taking and online cruising (vaguely reminiscent of Bersani’s model mentioned above), models what she calls a ‘radical narcissism’. Radical narcissism is the means by which Mohammed can transition out of a traditional set of cultural norms into a different world.

In chapter 4, Lynne Layton continues to apply psychoanalytic thought to media, specifically to the forms of identification the media permits, through a reading of David Fincher’s 1999 film Fight Club. Writing back to the moment of the late 70s, wherein the then ‘new’ Narcissist received his most forceful treatment from Lasch, Layton demonstrates how the seemingly constitutive link between capitalism and narcissism remains in need of further critical analysis today: Fincher’s film, and cultural productions like it, are read as symptomatic of ‘a social structure that splits autonomous from relational capacities and does so in support of a neoliberal, global order of consumer and finance capitalism’. Key to Layton’s analysis is an appreciation of the gendering of narcissism’s fundamental dialectic, with the
‘grandiose’ masculine pole connoting a ‘devaluation of the other […] with isolating defenses against merger’, and the ‘self-deprecating’ feminine pole connoting ‘idealization of the other, and a defensive longing to merge and lose oneself in the other’. With this framework in mind, Layton surmises that neo-liberalism’s hallmark repudiation of dependency (the putatively feminine) is of a piece with the cultural denigration of particular gendered, classed, and racialized subject positions: if *Fight Club* stages the violence of white heterosexual masculinity, it ultimately proposes that its subjects’ ‘narcissistic wounds are best treated by shoring up male narcissism.’

We suggested above that the conceptual distinction between mourning and melancholia, as drawn by Freud, has been considered somewhat *overdrawn* by critics wishing to stress either the ‘madness’ of so-called normal mourning or, indeed, the ‘normalcy’ of melancholia. However, in his chapter ‘Melancholia, the Death Drive and *Into the Wild*’, Derek Hook makes the case for strengthening the distinction between the two psychical schemas. Hook is not alone amongst the writers in this volume in making plain the value of narcissism and melancholia for enriching both clinical and cultural thought around the phenomenon of psychosis, where the experienced security of psyche-soma borders is imperiled by the *over-proximity* of the object. Deploying a rereading of melancholia advanced by the Lacanian theorist Russel Grigg, Hook asks us to question whether we can think of melancholia otherwise than ‘within the parameters of the lost, resented and subsequently internalised object’. Central to this shift in focus, from the *lostness* of the object to the *too muchness* of the object, is Hook’s appreciation of the death drive. The drive to remove oneself from life, not through active suicidality, but rather by ‘going off grid’ - endeavoring to exempt oneself from the network of symbolic relations through which we are named and placed - characterizes the clinical and cultural material
examined in this chapter. In addition to outlining key features of a case from his own practice, Hook offers a reading of Christopher McCandless, the American graduate in his early twenties who, as told by Jon Krakauer in his book *Into the Wild*, ‘dropped out of sight’, pursuing an itinerant life on the edge of society. In both instances considered, Hook identifies features of a melancholic subjectivity, including: ‘difficulties in processing symbolic exchanges [and] a yearning for anonymity and disappearance’. With appropriate caution, we are directed to a consideration of the psychosocial dimensions of this melancholic portrait, and their implications for an understanding of community. Might the longing for self-sufficiency to the point of self-erasure that the two male subjects of Hook’s account share, be adequate grounds for a community? A community of narcissists, perhaps – eschewing the echoes of the social, as did the eponymous mythic hero. To successfully *disappear oneself* no doubt has a formative function (the Freudian ‘Fort-Da!’ game supports this), but might it also have a cultural urgency when the omniscience eyes of a surveillance society and the interminable memory of the internet are just two social symptoms of a world in which the ‘lost object’ insists on its re-presentation?

In chapter 6, Dorothée Bonnigal-Katz also features the role of the death drive as central to her analysis of primary narcissism and melancholia. Proving the importance of metapsychological thinking for clinical work, Bonnigal-Katz offers the figure of ‘the monster in the mirror’ to capture the complex operations of the melancholic ego, which tend towards the seemingly ceaseless production and destruction of an impossible self-image. Following Freud, she reminds us that the nurturing object of the (m)other comprises a primary and conflictual border zone through which the marking of a bodily limit also entails an ‘unamendable loss’. Key to her argument is the resurrection of infanticide as a necessary psychoanalytic
coordinate (‘infanticide is as structural as incest in the making of the human subject’), as well as its coupling with fantasies of maternal omnipotence: ‘like the gaze of the Medusa, the maternal gaze […] endows the budding subject with petrifying omnipotence, inscribing death, from the outset, as an inherent constituent of primary love’. Through a fascinating discussion of the Medusa myth, we are taken directly into the intensities of the clinical scene, wherein the eyes of the analyst and the patient meet to play a game of waiting. With an astute clinical focus, this chapter affirms Freud’s conviction that the clinical picture of melancholia is both ‘so interesting – and so dangerous’ (MM, 252).

The next two chapters are both explicitly concerned with the constitutional violence of colonialism. Juliet B. Rogers in chapter 7 develops a version of the Mitscherlichs’ thesis concerning the cultural ‘inability to mourn’, applying it to the case of ‘Australia’, specifically to the constructed feeling of ‘white’ Australia today. According to Rogers, white Australia continues to protect itself from the shame of its racist constitution through two related displacements: the first, that of fantasizing a nostalgic object of Australia as it used to be when it was more ‘authentically’ white, before more recent waves of immigration (from Southern Europe, South America and East Asia); and the second, that of apologizing to the Indigenous Peoples for an historical act of expropriation. As Rogers suggests, liberal white Australia finds it easier to apologize to the Indigenous Peoples than to directly address the terms of the Australian Constitution, and the question of indigeneity it covers over. The constitutional document secures the essential ‘goodness’ of Australia: what it once was when it was more ‘white’; or what it is now as it apologizes for an historical crime. To challenge this document, then, is to disrupt the imaginary goodness of the Australian community, as well as the structural melancholia which underwrites it.
Detailing what is known as the ‘Black Process’, and the current move towards non-indigenous ‘readiness’ to recognize the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Peoples, Rogers argues that the Constitution must be re-written, and, moreover, be seen to be re-writable. Only then can white Australia come to mourn, and move on from its self-image as a unitary community possessing essentially virtuous qualities.

In ‘Dr Fanon on Colonial Narcissism and Anti-Colonial Melancholia’, Colin Wright reconnects Fanon the psychiatrist to Fanon the anti-colonial revolutionary. He does so by detecting the mutations of narcissism and melancholia from Fanon’s early, Lacan-inspired text *Black Skins White Masks* (1986 [1952]), to the late writings on Algeria, specifically the essay ‘Colonial War and Mental Disorders’ (2001 [1961]). Wright reminds us of Fanon’s debt to Lacan – the importance of the mirror phase for deducing ‘the effects of internalized racist stereotypes’ – as well of Fanon’s critique of psychoanalytic universalism: ‘like it or not, the Oedipus complex is far from coming into being among Negroes’ (Fanon, 1986: 151-2). ‘The catastrophic failure of narcissism’ designated in *Black Skin White Masks* remains operative in Fanon’s later works as a politicized melancholia. But this is a melancholia which, in Wright’s view, remains unsusceptible to the ‘multicultural conviviality’ proposed as a possible solution to postcolonial melancholia by Gilroy. In the Gilroy model (as in the Mitscherlich’s, and the one proposed by Rogers in chapter 6) the structural splitting and cultural stagnation caused by an inability to acknowledge the loss of a good self-image describes the predicament of the colonizer. The psychopathology of the colonized subject is a different matter, however. Lacking narcissistic resources, according to Fanon, the colonized African subject transforms the more common auto-destructive impulses of melancholia into a hetero-destructive mania. This is a mania,
however, which may sometimes, in Wright’s view, following Fanon, take revolutionary form.

The final three chapters of the volume present us with very different takes on the fundamental question of what it means to act. The ‘withdrawal of interest [or investment] from the outside world’, which we have seen to be a key narcissistic component of melancholia, of course translates politically: and, there’s no shortage of opportunities today to be politically depressed. But it is by no means self-evident how the relationship between psychoanalytic and political forms of action (including active resistance) should be conceived, or how withdrawal from certain social structures might itself comprise a politics. The dilemmas of how to participate in and partake of political-community life, are addressed directly by Barry Watt in chapter 9, who brings his experience as a therapist and a community activist to bear on his development of a theory of activism beyond the ‘community of one’. With clear stakes in the question ‘how to collectivise amidst the cult of the individual?’, Watt’s ambition is to find within the grounds of Freudian metapsychology scope for affirming key tenets of an anarchist philosophy, especially with respect to the question of possession of private property. Engaging with political commentary of the post-capitalist/neoliberal era (Nick Srnicek & Alex Williams, 2015; Jeremy Gilbert, 2015), as well as contemporary philosophies of community (Roberto Esposito), he argues for the need to ‘negativise’ community, ‘away from reifying, narcissistic notions of the communal towards an emphasis on a melancholic foundation […], as that which is not held in common.

In chapter 10, Stephen Frosh presents us with a consideration of the politics of indifference via the classic statement of Herman Melville’s Bartleby; I would prefer not to. Recounting how Bartleby’s flat refrain, which ultimately resists definitive
interpretation, has been held as ‘an ideal in the context of neoliberalism’s massive pressure towards action’, Frosh offers a counter tale: the story of *Bontsha the Silent*, by Yiddish writer Isaac Leib Peretz (1894). With this story, Frosh asks how the psychoanalytic and political configurations of silence come to be so culturally overdetermined. From one perspective, silence today is a possible response to the neurotic anxieties impelled by global capitalism: the constant goading of desire that will never be fulfilled. Frosh sees two complementary character types emerging from this contemporary milieu: the hysteric moving endlessly towards the ‘big Other without a lack’, and the paranoid willing to stand in for the big Other as long as he is bolstered ‘more and more by a community of followers’. ‘The number of hysterical subjects who are on the run, looking for a new master, keeps on increasing’ writes Frosh characterizing the psychic disturbances of modern life to which silence might be one answer. His reading of Bontsha however deflates any default notion that silence is dignified, or apparent passivity underwritten by a superior political faith. Bontsha’s fate in the afterlife, able to summon only the weakest, most comfortable and self-serving desire (a hot roll with fresh butter for breakfast) when *anything* is possible, serves as a counter-weight to the enigmatic subversion of Bartleby. Withdrawal is understandable, but it might also replicate the structures it retreats from; above all, it might replicate paranoia. The cost of Bontsha’s silence, suggests Frosh, is closure and the incapacitation of a political community founded on ‘speaking out’.

In the final chapter of the volume, Anastasios Gaitanidis connects Freud’s conception of the ego as ‘the precipitate of abandoned object cathexes’ to the motif of the journeying subject who returns home. The sense of mobility is important to Gaitanidis, as much as the sense that the subject always returns home different from
when he left, because it allows him to foreground the value of transience in any community-building endeavor. Gaitanidis’s argument is at odds with what he sees as the valorization of melancholia in Judith Butler’s work; although we may concede the virtues of a ‘collectivity which prioritises our ethical responsibility to each other generated by our common experience of loss’, Gaitanidis warns us to be wary of replicating in inverted or negative terms the narcissistic illusion of permanence and stability. Butler, he argues, through her kinship of the precarious, has neglected to focus enough on the interruptive or transient nature of journeying, migrant subjects, and the unreliable pleasures to be had in letting go, or moving on. In the place of melancholia, Gaitanidis places the figure of exhaustion. The exhausted subject who fails to arrive back home, and whose attachments are transient and un-recuperated through time, carries with her the important realization that as much as communities must be made, they will also end.
References:


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