When we think of exile in nineteenth-century France, we tend to think of the political Left. A recent crop of scholarship has demonstrated that the years spent outside France were fundamental for 1848 socialists, banished Communards and anarchist refugees.1 Deprived of financial resources, and viewed with suspicion by foreign authorities, the struggles of displaced radicals form the core of what Sylvie Aprile identifies as ‘le siècle des proscrits’.2 More slowly, the transnational turn has also begun to transform our understanding of the Right, whether the carousel of court diplomacy that characterized the ‘royal international’, or the Ultramontane crusade mounted from Geneva by the shadowy presses of the Black International.3 As Philippe Levillain has underlined, exile was intrinsic to the experience and the mythology of French royalism too.4 In the shadow of the émigrés of the 1790s, exile was no mere parenthesis but figured in monarchist culture as via dolorosa of suffering, which often culminated in the indignity of foreign burial. If Napoleon Bonaparte was at least repatriated from the lonely outcrop of St Helena in 1840, his nephew Napoleon III remains buried in the crypt of St Michael’s Abbey, Farnborough. The last reigning Bourbon, Charles X, lies next to his grandson the comte de Chambord at Gorizia, in modern-day Slovenia. ‘Usurper’ of Chambord’s throne, citizen king Louis-Philippe, died in 1850 at Claremont House, Surrey, and was temporarily interred at Weybridge. ‘When one thinks that his reward

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for eighteen years of peace and prosperity,’ mused king Leopold of Belgium, ‘is a little burial vault in some obscure English village, that gives long pause for some sad reflections’.5

But monarchs in exile were rarely passive victims of circumstance, and the maudlin account of their privations should not disguise the concerted attempt to turn distance to their advantage. To cite the editors of an anthology on the topic: ‘Exile is one of the dynamics of European history. Not only can it induce a constant sense of danger, humiliation and exclusion. It can also provide opportunities for transformation, influence and action.’6 Such views are an important corrective to the stubborn assumptions about the necessary failure of French royalism and its irrelevance to the development of modern France.7 Unlike the wanderings of Left-wing intellectuals, whose very defeats are re-described as productive learning curves, the activities of the French royals are written off as sterile, both literally and metaphorically sans issue. Yet as Philip Mansel has demonstrated, Louis XVIII capitalized on his years in Hartwell House to persuade the sceptical British establishment that the restoration of the Bourbons was essential for the stability of Europe as a whole.8 Chambord did not set foot in France between the July Revolution of 1830 and the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, yet he travelled widely in Europe, and relaunched his international profile from a house on Belgrave square in 1843. Over two and half months Chambord received Legitimist delegations from Paris and the French provinces, prompting protests from Guizot to put a halt these scandalous displays of disloyalty.9 Adherents of the Bourbons and the Bonapartes alike discovered that residence in Britain gave a valuable freedom for manoeuvre, and provided fertile conditions for intrigue and conspiracy. Moreover, when their regimes crumbled, Britain also provided a space for commemorating dynasties written out of

the French national narrative after 1870. ‘It was Eugénie, foreign-born Empress,’ writes Alison McQueen of the Farnborough memorial, ‘...who continued to regard France as ‘notre pays’, and commissioned the most significant memorials to the Second Empire period raised, ironically, on English soil.’

Despite its ubiquity, the experience of exile has only partially been integrated into the growing literature on Anglo-French national identities. No less than in the incessant wars of the ‘long eighteenth century’, British and French self-perceptions in the relative peace of the mid nineteenth century hinged on attitudes to the ‘Other’. For British intellectuals and essayists such as John Stuart Mill, Thomas Carlyle, Matthew Arnold and Walter Bagehot, France remained an indispensable reference-point for notions of ‘national character’ and ‘civilization’; the revolutionary spasms and authoritarianism to which France had succumbed after 1848 reminded some English liberals that ‘their ‘secret’ of liberty was not going to travel as easily as they and their foreign admirers had hoped it would.’ The braying confidence of John Bull in the providential perfection of the English Constitution fed on revulsion for the unfree, despotic, luxuriant, immoral spectacle of the French Second Empire. In turn, French observers variously interpreted British commercialism and individualism as either or an alluring alternative or a dark harbinger of the future. The experience of exile shaped these perceptions in unpredictable ways. The poverty and isolation experienced by Alexandre Ledru-Rollin on his arrival turned him into a vociferous Anglophobe, whereas the circle of friendships enjoyed by fellow republican Louis Blanc-

notably with John Stuart Mill- led him to leaven his political critiques with bemused and sometimes affectionate cultural reportage.\textsuperscript{14}

The most faithful champions of English virtues remained the French liberals. Unlike the republican refugees, they were free of the taint of sedition, and their wealth and connections provided smooth entry into the upper echelons of English society. ‘Liberal writers in their desire to extricate France from the clutches of Bonapartist dictatorship turned unerringly to the English model of government,’ Jeremy Jennings explains. Albert de Broglie, Alexis de Tocqueville and Lucien Prévost-Paradol lauded the merits of England’s upper house, limited franchise, jury system, habits of self-government and robust freedom of the press.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, England was the epitome of what Annalien De Dijn has branded ‘aristocratic liberalism’: building on earlier royalist thought, Second Empire liberals extolled the hegemony of the British territorial elite, secured by primogeniture, as a check against the dangers of democratic levelling and atomization.\textsuperscript{16} The sharp contrast drawn between French and British political outcomes raised nagging and enduring issues about whether liberalism was a universal creed or split into national declensions. A disciple of Tocqueville, Edouard Laboulaye affirmed that liberty was a product of civilization, that transcended the existence of individual states, and that France should take stock of English and American experience.\textsuperscript{17} Such a comparative perspective was integral to liberalism in the 1850s and 1860s, predicated on studying the political institutions of the Anglosphere to unlock models for general human progress.

Yet the Anglophilia of the French liberals was more brittle than often supposed. Charles de Montalembert’s influential *L’Avenir de l’Angleterre* in 1856 aimed to rebut fears that the British system stood in danger of collapse following the embarrassments of the Crimea War. Nonetheless, Montalembert did not shy away from searching criticism of British colonial policy.¹⁸ His diary demonstrates that, in spite of his English mother and English education, Montalembert’s feelings towards Albion oscillated wildly. During his trip in May and June 1855 he praised London as ‘a sort of fatherland for my mind’ and compared the Channel crossing to departing ‘the land of the living to return to the dead sea.’¹⁹ He struggled to comprehend how his spiritual fatherland could strike a diplomatic alliance with the Bonapartist dictatorship. Back in France, news of Palmerston’s election in June 1859 convinced him that English liberty was in jeopardy. After hearing the testimony of Albert de Broglie, Montalembert exclaimed that: ‘Democracy has yielded the same fruit there as everywhere else: the death of public opinion and *la décadence sociale*. England is no more!’²⁰ These outbursts suggest that Anglophilia or Anglophobia were far from stable positions, but were subject to volatile emotional fluctuations depending on events. Moreover, Montalembert’s anxieties about English liberalism were refracted through his close relations with the ‘chivalrous’ and ‘intelligent’ sons of Louis-Philippe, ‘the most distinguished princes of the 19th century.’ They provided the only hope and counterpoint to ‘the horrible mob of the modern Caesar, to whom France has wretchedly and willingly enslaved itself!’²¹

Central actors in cross-Channel liberalism, the Orléans family been treated rather cursorily compared to the Orleanist party in France. Scholars of French liberal thought have tended to minimize its dynastic dimensions, assuming most Orleanists in France remained

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¹⁸ Jennings, ‘Conceptions of England’, pp.75-76.
agnostic about forms of government so long as broad principles of 1789 and the 1814 Charter of constitutional freedoms were upheld. In contrast with the mystical devotion to the Bourbons’ bloodline, and its inheritor Chambord, the desacralized citizen king in 1830 had invoked not divine right but national sovereignty and political expediency.  

As a result, Roger Price has stressed how easily French liberals during the Second Empire drifted away from any sense of attachment to Louis-Philippe and his descendants. ‘The reserved attitude of the Orleanist princes towards French politics reinforced a tendency to almost forget their existence,’ he argues. ‘Orleanism was transformed easily into a liberalism devoid of dynastic loyalty.’ This judgement may be premature, however, as the leaders of opposition to the Second Empire- including Adolphe Thiers, Odilon Barrot, Alfred de Falloux, even Léon Gambetta- regularly consulted with the family after their relocation to England, seeking updates on the attempted ‘fusion’ with the elder branch of the Bourbon line or devising tactics for the Liberal Union in France. Following the king’s death in 1850, it devolved onto the four surviving sons of Louis-Philippe- Nemours, Joinville, Montpensier and Aumale- re-define the meanings and prospects of Orleanist liberalism, with British political culture as their stimulus, resource and mirror.

In this project, the Orléans princes drew on contacts and traditions cultivated ever since the seventeenth century. As Olivier Meslay has noted, England offered not just asylum, but une seconde patrie: ‘No other princely or royal family is as well grounded in the culture of English society. The ancient ties which were formed in splendour and power were not broken by the reversal of fortune.’ Louis-Philippe spoke English fluently thanks to his travels in America, where he had fled the Jacobins; he sat out the Hundred Days in England,

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shaping events at a safe distance in Twickenham.\textsuperscript{27} To the end of his life, Louis-Philippe recalled the peculiarity and sensitivity of his position in England as Napoleon’s empire crumbled, where ‘he was not quite a Prince, not quite a \textit{particulier}, not quite a prisoner, but yet he felt a step taken any way might place him in one of these categories.’\textsuperscript{28} One of his brothers, the duc de Montpensier, died from the tuberculosis contracted in prison during the Terror and was buried in Westminster abbey in 1807; another unfortunate brother, the comte de Beaujolais, was buried the next year under British auspices in the Knights of St John chapel in Malta. Only after Waterloo did the Orleans decide to centralize all family tombs at the neo-gothic sanctuary at Dreux.\textsuperscript{29} If in the 1840s Louis-Philippe’s minister Guizot had been the architect of the first ‘entente cordiale’ with Foreign Secretary Aberdeen, England was the most convenient refuge in February 1848 (even if Louis-Philippe’s daughter Louise regarded it as an undignified solution).\textsuperscript{30}

With the exception of Antoine, duc de Montpensier, who resided in Spain, all the sons of Louis-Philippe relocated to Britain in 1848, and settled in properties clustered around West London.\textsuperscript{31} This article will concentrate on two central figures in the development of Orleanist politics after the death of Louis-Philippe. The first is his grandson, and heir, Philippe d’Orléans the comte de Paris, whose upbringing he supervised following the tragic death of Ferdinand d’Orléans in a cabriolet accident. After her failed bid to establish a Regency in February 1848, Philippe’s mother raised him in Eisenach, where he stayed until her death in 1859. Then Philippe d’Orléans and his brother, Robert duc de Chartres, re-joined their uncles

\textsuperscript{29} S. Glover, \textit{Funerary Arts and Tomb Cult- Living with the Dead in France, 1750-1870} (Farnham, 2012), pp.119-50.
in Britain; the comte de Paris lived in York House, Twickenham, whilst his brother occupied Morgan House on Ham Common. The political acumen of Philippe d’Orléans has often been underrated, but his letters as a young man already attest to his wide curiosity about global affairs and propensity for intellectual analysis.\textsuperscript{32} The second critical figure was his uncle Henri d’Orléans, duc d’Aumale, who before 1848 had distinguished himself in the military pacification of Algeria, but who declined to use the troops under his command to restore the family to power. He and his Neapolitan wife Maria-Carolina settled in a Georgian villa Twickenham, known as Orléans House, the very property where his father had lived between 1814 and 1817. In April 1853 he gave a tour of the place to the translator of Tocqueville into English, Henry Reeve, who recorded it was already ‘full of pictures and relics after the great shipwreck’\textsuperscript{33} Aumale went on to dramatically extend the premises in order to make room for his spectacular acquisition of rare books, manuscripts, prints, paintings and decorative arts, winning recognition as one of the most prodigious collectors of the age.\textsuperscript{34} The vast topic of the Orléans as collectors in Britain can only be alluded to here, but art and erudition were a critical means for integration, dynastic assertion and defiance.\textsuperscript{35}

The Orléans family were keen to stress that their two decades of residence in England were politically inconsequential. Formally banished by the Second Republic in 1848, and stripped of their assets by Napoleon III in 1852, the prince de Joinville insisted that he and his brothers would not be drawn ‘out of the reserve that exile imposes upon us’, and would meet the malice heaped on them only with ‘silence and contempt’.\textsuperscript{36} Over the following years, the princes reiterated many times that they stoically submitted to fate and shunned thoughts of

\textsuperscript{32} Thiers unfairly described him as ‘un zero’, who looked like ‘a German’ from a distance. M. Barrière, Les princes d’Orléans (Paris, 1933), p.11.
\textsuperscript{34} E. Woerth, Le duc d’Aumale. L’étonnant destin d’un prince collectionneur (Paris, 2006).
\textsuperscript{35} Alongside the bibliography of superb works by Nicole Garnier-Pelle, see my chapter on Aumale and Orleansian memory in the forthcoming volume A Revolution in Taste: Francis Haskell’s Nineteenth Century.
\textsuperscript{36} B[ritish] L[ibrary]/M[ss]/52115, no.70, Aumale to Lady Holland, Feb. 1852.
resistance. This position was confirmed by later biographers who were eager to present the long separation from France as little more than a trial of patience, lest too much assimilation undermine the family’s patriotic credentials. Ernest Daudet stressed that the duc d’Aumale lived in London ‘like a guest who is only passing through, ready to return to his country at any moment’. 37 Similarly, the comte d’Haussonville remembered ‘the weight of exile’ as suffocating the comte de Paris, who dreamed only of returning to his ‘native soil’. Such a possibility was a torment, ‘making his exile more painful, like a prisoner would find the atmosphere of his cell more oppressive and choking, after having breathed in for a moment the breeze outside the bars.’ 38 The self-denying protestations of the Orléans family, coupled with the aggressive nationalism of their first historians, have conspired to conceal the strategies pursued by the family during the Second Empire. These strategies, sometimes subtle, were central for simultaneously honouring and transforming the legacies of the July Monarchy. This entailed launching a ‘vicarious’ version of French liberalism nourished in the social networks, cultural institutions, imperial geographies and political debates of their British hosts. Through these myriad borrowings, the Orléans became at once assimilated ‘insiders’ and defiant ‘outsiders’ in Britain, who engaged closely with British foreign and domestic preoccupations, whilst never deviating from their dynastic and French objectives.

In what follows, three aspects of the exiles’ dual agenda will be analysed in turn. The first section frames the diplomatic sensitivities and anomalous social position attendant upon the family’s relocation to Britain. In this situation they were especially dependent on the friendship of Frances, countess Waldegrave, a liberal society hostess who brokered their dealings with the English aristocracy and allowed them to infiltrate the English press. The second section examines the princes’ pan-European sphere of operations and resurgent imperial aspirations, bringing them into direct conflict with Palmerstonian priorities. Thirdly,

the Orléans’ fascination with the evolution of English parliamentarianism, as well as their interest in the emerging industrial society, permit a reconsideration of their attitudes towards mass democracy. Taken together, the exile episode reveals the mutations in the complex ideology of Orleanism after 1848, as the family continued the modernization of the monarchical principle begun by Louis-Philippe. Pairing French sources with the untapped English archives reveals the febrile ambitions of the Orléans, the critical role of their British sponsors, and their embrace of the opportunities afforded by exile. However it also underlines the limits of their Anglophilia, and the obdurate differences that divided French from British liberals. The Orléans found it extremely difficult to capitalise on their British connections and experiences after their return to France in 1871. This failure reflected changes in political culture and the character of liberalism on both sides of the Channel in the 1870s under the pressure of new ideological and democratic pressures. Rather than suspend the Anglo-French conversations begun during the Orléans’ years in exile, however, these pressures served to push these conversations in pessimistic or illiberal directions.

A Family Apart?

The status of the Orléans family in Britain remained delicate. On the one hand, Britain’s asylum laws presented no obstacle to any foreigner entering the country, and protected them by right from foreign extradition.39 Conversely, few British people expressed much sympathy for any of the French refugees, and much less for the fallen dynasty, who were perceived as corrupt and untrustworthy. Queen Victoria felt personally conflicted, since she was directly related to the Orléans through marriage (the duchesse de Nemours was first cousin to both her and Prince Albert). She placed Claremont House at their disposal, and despite its treacherous plumbing, relations between the royal houses became warm, with the

initial domestic visits developing into invitations to court. However, Victoria reminded the refugees that while she pitied their predicament, she could not make ‘common cause’ with them nor assist them in regaining the throne. Any marks of special favour needed to be avoided. When the Orléans petitioned to have their property shipped over from France, Lord Aberdeen replied the import duties could be waived only on items intended for domestic usage, not for sale, in order to head off ‘very disagreeable’ questions in the Commons.

Central to this reticence was the diplomatic alliance struck with Napoleon III. Although his loose talk on the subject brought down his Premiership, Palmerston approved of the coup d’état launched by Louis-Napoléon in December 1851 as preferable to the scourge of the Red Republic. The incoming foreign minister in the Derby administration, Lord Malmesbury, has been an old friend of the new Emperor for twenty-three years, and was determined to maintain strong ties with a country that represented ‘both the most immediate threat and a significant ally.’ These ties having been tested and reaffirmed during the Crimean War, Victoria took a resoundingly successful trip to France in 1855- the first visit by an English monarch to the French capital in 400 years. So confident did Napoleon III feel in front of his visitor that he brazenly discussed the Orléans family, showing her the cabinet in the Tuileries where Louis-Philippe had abdicated, and even presenting her with medals depicting Ferdinand d’Orléans and the comte de Paris. Tensions with Napoleon III, as Jon Parry has illustrated, whether the Orsini bomb plot or the invasion scare of 1859-60, caused serious ripples in British domestic politics. It was incumbent on the Orléans to do nothing to jeopardize this sensitive alliance and to stand aloof from any hint of provocation. Reports that

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42 Aberdeen to Dumas, 15 March 1853, BL/Ms/4305, no.316.
the Orléans might be on the brink of ‘fusing’ with the elder Bourbon line in January 1854 prompted Victoria to temporarily suspend her court invitations. As she complained to Aberdeen, she had since 1848 ‘openly but unostentatiously’ received the family, and now worried how to avoid this sudden discourtesy being ‘misconstrued into an admission of having encouraged intrigues’ or being mistaken as ‘submission to the will and pleasure of Louis-Napoleon?’ While she hated to ‘neglect the poor exiles as she has done this winter,’ she nonetheless recognized that, ‘the present moment is one of unparalleled excitement and of great political importance, which requires great prudence and circumspection.’

The Orléans recognized this need for circumspection, since they wanted to avoid any pretext for seizing their estates in France. On his visit to Claremont in September 1848 Disraeli found the family lamenting their mistreatment by the Republic and ‘engrossed in hopes & plans for regaining their private property.’ Clearly they had not abandoned their political interests in France, but having refrained from unleashing a civil war, the family had to proceed through alternative electoral or covert channels. Throughout 1851 it was mooted that the prince de Joinville should run as a candidate in the forthcoming elections, much to Victoria’s dismay (‘it is impossible for him to be President of the French Republic’). It was only Louis-Napoléon’s coup in December which scuppered these plans and pre-empted the gathering military conspiracy. From this point on, the family took care to avoid antagonizing their British hosts by attracting unwanted publicity. In organizing the celebrations for his marriage to his cousin Isabella d’Orléans in the Catholic chapel at

48 Letters of Queen Victoria, II, p.388, Victoria to Leopold of Belgium, 22 Sept. 1851.
49 Broglie, L’Orléanisme, p.314-16.
Kingston-on-Thames in 1864, the comte de Paris strictly controlled invitations and press reporting, ‘in order to not give to a family party the character of a political gathering’.

The burdens of exile were lightened through reliance on a small but extraordinarily influential group of allies. Lord and Lady Holland had offered to put their home at the family’s disposal in the desperate months of 1848, and in the coming years the duc d’Aumale would be charmed to ‘pay court’ at Holland House. When Napoleon III decreed the confiscation of the Orléans’ estates in 1852, Aumale was able to avoid losing Chantilly thanks to a dummy sale arranged through Coutts bank. Coutts was henceforth known as ‘the house in the Strand’ by Aumale, who cherished the many years of ‘loyal, trusting, affectionate’ relations with its employees like Edward Marjoribanks. Disraeli lamented the enforced indolence and obscurity of Louis-Philippe’s sons. While they had to avoid ‘mixing in the miscellaneous crowds of London saloons’, they were still eligible for country house entertaining, namely ‘occasions where the Princes might create sympathies & make friends whose good feeling and influence might hereafter be useful’. If they could not openly mingle in London society, then it was only politic that London society be brought to them. This was the function provided by Frances, countess Waldegrave, whom Aumale dotingly christened ‘Wawa’. Kim Reynolds has celebrated Lady Waldegrave as perhaps the last great political hostess in Victorian Britain. This remarkable woman, the daughter of acclaimed Jewish tenor John Braham, had risen through four marriages to become the doyenne of fashionable liberal society. Through her second marriage she had inherited Strawberry Hill, the neo-gothic confection built by Horace Walpole in the late eighteenth century; the fruits of her restoration works there can be seen in the photographs by Philippe Henry Delamotte,
which also capture how the portraits of the duc and duchesse d’Aumale hung on either side of her fireplace.\(^{55}\)

Her dealings with the royal family are abundantly documented, thanks to the voluminous surviving correspondence (preserved at Somerset Heritage Centre and at Chantilly) and the diaries of her patient suitor, and eventual fourth husband, liberal politician Chichester Fortescue.\(^{56}\) Looking back in his memoirs, Frederick Leveson-Gower insisted that Lady Waldegrave and Lady Molesworth— who also regularly hosted the duc d’Aumale and the comte de Paris at Pencarrow— were the ‘chief entertainers in London society in the third quarter of the last century’. He spotted the curious affinity in their lives:

Both were born in a lower position than that to which they subsequent attained. They both married Cabinet Ministers, and both, during the lives of their husbands and afterwards, in town and country, exercised the most boundless hospitality. Neither was what I should call intellectual, but they both possessed considerable cleverness in the performance of their social duties. They ended by attaining a considerable position in society.\(^{57}\)

If Lady Waldegrave ‘did not much care for politics in the abstract’, she was addicted to playing with its human outcomes. ‘Her power of attaching people was very remarkable,’ Leveson-Gower remembered, especially the almost Gallic animation she brought to political gatherings: ‘her bonhomie- I know no English word to express it- was irresistible, and she showed much tact in her invitations.’\(^{58}\)

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\(^{55}\) The portraits were painted by Auguste Jalabert and James Sant. See Meslay, *L’Art anglais*, pp.90-91.

\(^{56}\) O.W. Hewett, ed., *"...And Mr Fortescue": A Selection from the Diaries from 1851 to 1862 of Chichester Fortescue, Lord Carlingford* (London, 1958).


\(^{58}\) Leveson-Gower, *Bygone years*, p.276.
These invitations were intentionally broad, since she hoped to reunify the two wings of the Liberal Party embodied in the factions behind Palmerston and Russell. But unlike her society rival, Lady Emily Palmerston, Lady Waldegrave reached out to embrace Tories, Radicals, journalists and men of letters. Her weekend parties from Saturday to Monday at Strawberry Hill thus allowed her Orléans neighbours to meet an intriguing spectrum of the British establishment, with the Duke of Newcastle, the Clarendons, the Greys, the Grovesnors, the Staffords, Lord Lansdowne, the Countess of Sutherland, and the Bishop of Oxford all staples of the guest-list (not to mention the French, Belgian, Prussian and Sardinian ambassadors).<sup>59</sup> Residential proximity permitted a constant round of conversation, dinners and balls. ‘Strawberry Hill, uninhabited, seems very sad to me,’ grumbled the duchesse d’Aumale Maria-Carolina in July 1861, when Frances was out of town, ‘and I greatly miss my good and dear neighbour.’<sup>60</sup> Strawberry Hill acted almost as a subsidiary to Orléans House, allowing the French royals to meet the leading lights of London society, without the inconvenience of travelling to the metropolis, or navigating its potentially hazardous spaces. In essence, Lady Waldegrave accommodated her own entertaining around the Orléans’ particular needs. She respected the decorum imposed by observation of religious rites and family anniversaries, and helped them weed out any disreputable acquaintances. Conversely, she also gave them an escape from decorum, through her delight in parlour games, theatricals and ‘antics’.<sup>61</sup>

Leonore Davidoff has argued that in the increasing complexity and diversity of the composition of ‘society’ from the mid-nineteenth century, society hostesses played a key role in maintaining exclusivity and legitimizing newcomers on the scene, replicating the

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<sup>60</sup> SHC/DD/SH/296, no.68/60, Maria-Carolina to Waldegrave, 1 Sept. 1861.

<sup>61</sup> Hewett, ed., “...And Mr Fortescue”, p.97, 13 Aug. 1856.
sponsorship formerly provided by kinship. Relishing this familial metaphor, Lady Waldegrave described Aumale and his wife as her surrogate ‘children’. They in turn expressed their immense gratitude for her friendship and counsel. Maria-Carolina pledged in her letters that they enjoyed a bond ‘through life and death,’ a motto ‘which exactly depicts the character of my affection for you.’ The young Orléans heir, the comte de Paris, effusively thanked Lady Waldegrave for ‘inviting me to all the best houses in London and giving me therefore the means to make contacts there.’ He flattered her as his ‘fairy’ protectoress. Lady Waldegrave’s acuity as a guide to British aristocratic society reflected her own enduring sense of being an outsider within it, an insight which comes through in one telling exchange about reading. In 1874 she urged Aumale to get hold of Charles Greville’s memoirs from the 1820s and 1830s, which ‘are very interesting and not at all boring & I know you will like them.’ She was not wrong in her prediction, although Aumale was taken aback at how ‘this loyal subject talks about his sovereigns,’ in particular about Louis-Philippe. Yet in defence of the waspish Greville, Waldegrave explained:

Charles Greville is less nasty about the king Y.R.H. father than he is about most people. He shows in perfection the spoilt, sneering, caustic, dyspeptic humour of the rotten fashionable clique of the English aristocracy. That in spite of these unpromising ingrates so much good liberal public wit should have come out of this set, is wonderful.

This consciousness of her distance from the ‘rotten clique’ of the aristocracy might explain Lady Waldegrave’s aptitude in helping Maria-Carolina decode some of its rituals and laugh

63 Archives de Chantilly/Ms/PA/139, no.53, Waldegrave to Aumale, 6 Sept. 1866.
64 SHC/DD/SH/296, no.68/26, Maria-Carolina to Waldegrave, 14 Sept. 1859.
65 SHC/DD/SH/297 no.69/1, Paris to Waldegrave, 1 July 1859.
66 SHC/DD/SH/297, no. 69/8a, Paris to Waldegrave, 27 April 1861.
67 Chantilly/Ms/1/PA/140, no.46, Waldegrave to Aumale, 1 Nov. 1874.
69 Chantilly/Ms/1/PA/140, no.46, Waldegrave to Aumale, 1 Nov. 1874.
at its foibles. She was constantly on hand to proffer advice on fashion, etiquette, medical
cures, and furnishings, as well as relishing jokes about the *faux-pas* of society rivals (such as
the bizarre blue bonnet bought by Lady Palmerston for the visit of Empress Eugénie).70

What did she get out of this arrangement? Her sole biographer Osbert Hewett presents
the ‘over-attentive’ and ‘rabidly Anglophobe’ Orléans as exploitative encumbrances,
monopolizing her time and energies.71 In this he echoes suspicions voiced by friends,
including the poet and painter Edward Lear, who blamed the princes for warping her opinions
on the Risorgimento. He warned Fortescue that she should help ‘that effete & bad lot- as a
sovereign family- to a future power would be vexatious to all who know & like her.’72 Yet
her motives went beyond simple charity. She embraced the Orléans as her protégés partly
because their interests tallied with her own. She relished the glamour they brought to
Twickenham social occasions, and knew that through them she moved closer to dabbling in
international diplomacy. In a letter from 1855, she rejoiced candidly: ‘I am so glad that the
Orleans are using their influence in the way I felt certain they would’.73 Theirs was a
partnership of equals in which Lady Waldegrave retained personal initiative. In 1858 she
orchestrated a meeting around her dining table between Aumale and Bonapartist ambassador,
General Pélliéssier, forcing the reluctant family to socialize across partisan lines.74 She
supplied the Orléans princes with all the gossip that she had extracted from her acquaintances
and informants about events in Britain and in France. Meanwhile her distance from French
affairs made her an ideal sounding-board for sensitive conversations about the family’s
ambitions, just so long, as Aumale reminded his confidante, that ‘nothing of all this spills into

70 SHC/DD/SH/296 no. 68/115, Maria-Carolina to Waldegrave, 19 May 1868; no.68/146, Maria-Carolina to
Waldegrave, Vendredi (no year).
71 Hewett, *Strawberry Fair*, p.xii.
72 Lady Strachey, ed., *Letters of Edward Lear to Chichester Fortescue, Lord Carlingford and Frances countess
73 Chantilly/Ms/1/PA/139, no.6., Waldegrave to Aumale, 4 Dec. 1855.
74 Hewett, ed., “.....And Chichester Fortescue”, 16 May 1858, p.129.
your conversations nor into society nor into government.'

The family’s desire for expert English advice, like their aptitude at English-language correspondence, was sharpened by the conviction that their letters in French were intercepted by imperial spies.

Most important was the entrée she provided into the British press. Raymond Cazelles has identified the significant funds Aumale expended in order to keep opposition newspapers afloat on the continent. Yet thanks to Lady Waldegrave and her circle- including Abraham Hayward, essayist for *Frasers* and for the *Quarterly*, and J.D Cook of the *Saturday Review*- the Orléans’ cause gained a sympathetic hearing in the more authoritative English broadsheets too. In 1857, upon encountering unfavourable comments by Normanby on the reign of Louis-Philippe, Lady Waldegrave convened a meeting between Aumale and Fortescue so that the latter could write a sustained rebuttal. After Aumale had approved Fortescue’s draft- ‘very good from the English point of view, very able paper, etc’- Waldegrave brought Cook round to luncheon and persuaded him to print the article. From 1863 the editor of *The Times*, John Thaddeus Delane, became a regular in Lady Waldegrave’s set, and he too was soon prevailed upon by Fortescue to give sympathetic coverage of the comte de Paris’ wedding. In June 1864 the comte de Paris urged her to pass on his thanks to Delane in person:

I have been very touched by the way in which my marriage has been reported in the Times and especially by the so kind words for my family and I found in the middle of the article. I could say the same for more or less all the papers who covered the

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75 SHC/DD/SH/296 no.68/174, Maria-Carolina to Waldegrave, 6 March (no year).
76 Robert d’Orléans encouraged Lady Waldegrave to write to his brother in Seville but stressed ‘your letters will be read at least by the French and Spanish governments’. SHC/DD/SH/298 no.70/3, Chartres to Waldegrave, 6 March 1864.
79 Hewett, ed., “.....And Mr Fortescue”, pp.114-17, November 22, November 25 and December 2 1857.
80 SHC/DD/SH/297 no.69/19, Paris to Waldegrave, 25 May 1864.
ceremony. In this occasion the English press has understood and exercised in the most amiable way the hospitality that exile forced us to ask from this country.\textsuperscript{81}

The comte de Paris regularly poured over the English newspapers- the \textit{Times}, the \textit{Daily Telegraph}, the \textit{Standard}, the \textit{Globe}, the \textit{Pall Mall Gazette}- and passed on documents to Waldegrave and Fortescue to ensure that his interpretation of French affairs slipped in amongst their pages.\textsuperscript{82} She was also invaluable in circulating his writings among serious readers; Isabella d’Orléans forwarded twelve copies of her husband’s book on unions for Lady Waldegrave to distribute, ‘knowing full well all the interest you have taken in this work, and that thanks to you and your acquaintances, it will be much read, and appreciated in the English world.’\textsuperscript{83}

Lady Waldegrave was therefore vital in spatially and politically situating the Orléans within English society. She gave them privileged access to London circles, through the reunions that took place at Strawberry Hill, at her central ‘town’ residence Carlton Gardens, or at her country seats at Nuneham and Dudbrook. When it came to choosing their own country retreat, Waldegrave advised them on the purchase of Woodnorton ‘cottage’, in Evesham, Worcestershire, for which service they christened her its honorary ‘godmother’.\textsuperscript{84} She acted as the gatekeeper for the social calendar, passing on letters of introduction only from those individuals she deemed appropriate or advantageous (‘a great \textit{liberal} friend of ours’).\textsuperscript{85} Her knowledge of the machinations of the cabinet made her a diverting and reliable source of information, which the Orléans implored to send their way.\textsuperscript{86} Above all her hold over London editors and \textit{literati} allowed her to wage a covert campaign in the dynasty’s favour in the court of public opinion. If, as Palmerston complained to Fortescue, the Emperor

\textsuperscript{81} SHC/DD/SH/297, no.69/22, Paris to Waldegrave, 6 June 1864.\textsuperscript{82} SHC/DD/SH/297, nos.69/74, 69/87, Paris to Waldegrave, 13 July 1868, 14 April 1870.\textsuperscript{83} SHC/DD/SH/297, no.69/67, Isabella d’Orléans to Waldegrave, 9 April 1869.\textsuperscript{84} SHC/DD/SH/296 no.68/28, Maria-Carolina to Waldegrave, 18 Oct. 1859.\textsuperscript{85} This is her description of Charles Forster. Chantilly/Ms/1/PA/139, no.18, Waldegrave to Aumale, 15 Oct.1858.\textsuperscript{86} SHC/DD/SH/297, no.69/43, Paris to Waldegrave, 1 Nov.1866.
was ‘absurdly thin-skinned about the English press’, it reflected in part an awareness that its respectable columns had been infiltrated by a pro-Orleanist faction. In her blend of intelligence gathering, partisan lobbying, informal patronage and social filtering, Lady Waldegrave enabled the dynasty to engage with the British elite on its own, necessarily selective, terms. Her empire of informal influence- which collapsed the distinction of public and private spheres, blurred familial and party interests, and transported Westminster to the salons of Twickenham- meshed perfectly with the Orléans’ own oblique strategies in exile. She provided the web of acquaintance and influence through which the princes gained access to the British parliamentary establishment, whose debates and far-flung interests the Orléans were eager to master.

**Dynasticism and the Global Vision**

When the shrewd liberal diarist and essayist Charles de Rémusat visited Twickenham in 1864 he was astonished by the optimism and enlightened perspectives that the family retained:

> Exile has preserved them from the sceptical reaction which reigns in France, and since they live in England, they know the world better than we do. They follow with an attentive eye all political movements, all the improvements in the social arts, all the applications of science to war, navigation, international communications, indeed all the signs of democratic developments. They are not angry with their times. I know few men less reactionary than those émigrés.

Rémusat attributed this open-mindedness to the freedom of the British press and London as a nexus of global information. The comte de Paris in particular was loathe to leave London as a

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87 Hewett, ed., “....And Mr Fortescue”, p.117, 3 December 1857.
news hub. Complaining at the ill-timing of a trip to visit Montpensier in Seville in 1866, he was glad he would not be ‘away for a long time from my proximity to France and the centre of information that England affords me.’ Any future restoration would hinge not on the family’s birth right but on popular consent and the pressure of circumstance: London was therefore the ideal vantage point from which to monitor the public mood, gather intelligence and calculate their next move accordingly. ‘We are, if you like, the first, and most famous, public servants;’ the prince de Joinville told Rémusat in 1852, ‘we are public servants at the discretion (à la nomination) of events.’ The English-language press engendered a simultaneously French, continental and global overview of events, and even allowed the Orléans to maintain their own foreign policy, albeit now in the absence of a government. Prohibited from active service, the princes tried to recoup authority in print through immersing themselves in military campaigns and colonial affairs, on which topics they became important commentators. Whilst vilifying the recklessness of Napoleon III, in foreign affairs they continued to advocate the rights of an idealized ‘France’, even if these blatantly nationalist designs were couched in the rhetoric of ‘progress’ and ‘civilization’ palatable to liberals on both sides of the Channel.

We might classify the Orléans as ‘vicarious’ imperialists, feeding off the news channels provided by their hosts, and tailoring their own ambitions to fit the theatre of both the French and British empires. David Todd has reclaimed the mid-century as a French ‘imperial meridian’, marked by not just the dramatic expansion of overseas trade, missions and military engagement, but also the growing ‘co-operative emulation’ between France and Britain. Liberals in France such as Michel Chevalier and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu called for

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90 SHC/DD/SH/297, no.69/43, Paris to Waldegrave, 1 Nov. 1866.
91 Cited in Teyssier, Les enfants, p.198.
92 The prince de Joinville published in the Revue des deux mondes on the Mediterranean fleet and the use of steamships in battle, writing under the pseudonym Victor de Mars. Many scholars have not realized that the Orléans princes were often the real authors behind pieces signed by Xavier Raymond. See J. Guillon, François d’Orléans, prince de Joinville (Paris, 1990), p.211-212.
greater inter-state collaboration in order to exploit global resources.\(^{93}\) The Orléans’ parallel fascination with British imperialism, and calls for cross-Channel collaboration, were hampered by mistrust of their ambitions in Europe. The marriage of the duc de Montpensier to the Spanish infanta in 1846 seemed to confirm Louis Philippe’s dishonesty as a British ally, and exposed his inability to disentangle ‘family interest from national interest’.\(^{94}\) The comte de Paris tried to reassure Lady Waldegrave that dynasticism was now a relic of the past: ‘For you know my family keep itself absolutely aloof from everything in European politics which does not exclusively concern France. Family alliances mixed up with politics, which do not belong to our times, are essentially contradicted by our current ideas.’\(^{95}\) Nonetheless, the younger members of the Orléans family were obliged to make appropriate matches, either within their own ranks (just as Philippe did with his cousin, Isabella, the daughter of Montpensier), or by branching out to other royal houses. Marital alliances compelled the Orléans to become embroiled in the domestic politics of neighbouring kingdoms, and coloured their attitude to European crises. Hence the kinship they enjoyed with the Neapolitan Bourbons through Queen Marie-Amélie and Maria-Carolina, duchesse d’Aumale, hardened the Orléans against the Risorgimento, which to them symbolized the alliance of Bonapartist adventurism and the Garibaldi rabble. ‘For a long time England should have expected to be treated by Louis-Napoléon as the National Assembly was in France,’ Aumale wrote to Aberdeen in April 1859, linking the Emperor’s contempt for constitutionalism at home with his upending of international security. ‘We are witnessing the beginnings of the *coup d’état européen*.‘\(^{96}\) Confessing that he preferred Louis-Napoléon to

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\(^{95}\) SHC/DD/SH/297 no.69/75, Paris to Waldegrave, 8 Aug. 1868.

\(^{96}\) BL/Ms/43051, no.323, Aumale to Aberdeen, 28 April 1859.
either of the Bourbon branches, Lord John Russell grumbled that ‘the good, sound Orleanists have all turned sour in the Italian thunderstorm.’

If family alliances made them deaf to the appeal of Italian unification among British liberals, marital ties to the King of Belgium, the duke of Wurttemberg and the Prince of Saxe-Coburg made the Orléans passionately concerned with the borders of central Europe too. During his research on the seventeenth-century Grand Condé, Aumale took the chance to inspect the battlefields of the Austro-Prussian War. His seemingly antiquarian study of French military institutions under Louvois and St Cyr was prefaced with reflections on how far the telegraph and railway explained Sadowa, ‘the most striking victory that history has recorded for a long time.’ Prussian tactics contrasted with Napoleon’s III’s reforms which threatened France’s armed forces with both ‘chaos’ and ‘nullity’. Through his Saxon heritage, the comte de Paris was also naturally preoccupied by the transformations wreaked by Bismarck. His friend Eugène Forcade published a long excerpt from Philippe d’Orléans’ letters on ‘La Nouvelle Allemagne’ in the Revue des deux mondes in 1867. This prescient article brooded that the noble dream of a united, liberal Germany would be swallowed up within Prussian conservative and militarist culture. He forecast that Napoleon III’s belligerent handling of the Luxembourg issue had already convinced many in the south German states of France’s determination for another war.

In their engagement with the changing map of Europe, the Orléans were not simply self-interested opportunists, and they dithered over the vacant thrones offered to them during the exile years. In 1862 Aumale agonized over his candidature for the kingdom of Greece. ‘I shall hate losing my children, if they go to Greece,’ Lady Waldegrave told Maria-Carolina,

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98 Aumale, Les institutions militaires de la France (Brussels, 1867), pp.7-8.
‘but as I am convinced it will be for their good I shall not grumble but rejoice, & make up my mind to go to see them in their new country.’

The Orleanist bid for Greece hinged on a promise to bring internal reform and external peace. Aumale sought the advice of ambassador Cowley and tried to gain clarification of Napoleon III’s likely response to this elevation. He drew up detailed proposals for what his rule would bring, including respect for Greek orthodox rites (although conversion was out the question), a new constitution and universal suffrage. He wrote affirming his readiness to accept Greek support in March 1863. Palmerston, however, plainly told the Greeks that if they chose Aumale they would lose control of the Ionian Islands, and instead pushed them to accept George of Denmark, the brother-in-law of the Prince of Wales. As he explained to Lord Russell, in the event of Aumale’s coronation, ‘all the Orléans Frenchmen would flood there, and it [Greece] would become a centre of intrigue of all sorts against England.’ Palmerston clearly believed that the exiled family, once enthroned again, would quickly turn against their erstwhile friends.

Allowing for Palmerston’s personal animus, he was right that the Orleanists’ ambitions did not easily align with British interests. Whilst they paid tribute to an idea of cross-Channel co-operation, their reading of world politics emphasised the responsibilities and blessings of French intervention abroad. The princes’ expansionist zeal perpetuated the propaganda first developed around Louis-Philippe’s sons during the July Monarchy. The comte de Paris grew up in awe of his father’s part in the subjugation of Algeria, and in 1870 he published the diary of the campaign out of ‘filial piety’. Paris viewed the global proliferation of liberal, progressive institutions as indispensable for governments in Europe

101 Chantilly/MS/1/PA/139, no.30, Waldegrave to Maria-Carolina, 6 March 1863.
and the economic transformation of the colonies. He had reached this conclusion during the course of his own travels in the world’s conflict zones. ‘I hate armchair theoreticians,’ he told Lady Waldegrave, and in 1860 he had journeyed with Chartres to Syria and Lebanon, regions whose civil war, uprisings and interfaith massacres had converted into a humanitarian cause célèbre. The trip convinced Philippe that the hold of the Ottomans was fast unravelling, and that the European powers should cooperate to replace the degenerate empire with independent states. As he explained to his confidante, this was necessary to head off a later violent conflagration between European rivals. Those looking for proof of such arguments need only consult, like he had, the parliamentary bluebooks and the speeches of Lord Stratford or Lord Dufferin. Hence he was incredulous that faced with their own reports the British government should continue to prop up a sclerotic Turkish regime whose weakness caused the murder of Christians and stoked the risk of violent disaggregation. In the anonymously published diary of his travels, he argued that France alone could bring commercial energy and religious solidarity to the Lebanon, and fulfil a ‘civilizing role’ there.

The comte de Paris was also at odds with British responses to the American Civil War. In 1861 he and his brother had crossed the Atlantic with Joinville and signed up in the Union armies under General McClellan. This embrace of the Northern cause was markedly different from Napoleon III’s explicit neutrality, or Legitimist nobleman Camille de Polignac’s enrolment under the Confederate banner. Paris’ reasons were personal, jealous that Chartres had been able to take part in the fighting in Piedmont in 1859. He wrote to Lady

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107 SHC/DD/SH/297 no.69/12, Paris to Waldegrave, 20 July 1861.
108 SHC/DD/SH/269 no.69/13, Paris to Waldegrave, 26 July 1861.
Waldegrave from Washington D.C. to explain the decision, identifying the intellectual and psychological attractions of the Civil War:

We have come to America to take advantage to the travel of my uncle Joinville, and to see with him this great country. The current events did not put us off because we thought that we would find a special interest in study in the midst of the very serious crisis which is raging....You know that I have always vividly wanted to see a war, and that all Europe being closed to me, I could only find the opportunity here and that I have suffered all the more in seeing the young members of my family lead an active life and distinguish themselves each in their way. The temptation was too easy, I gave into it, and I believe to have done the right thing.111

Aumale had been briefed in advance and approved of his nephew’s bold decision: ‘he is not a tricolour comte de Chambord; he is not a principle; he must be a man. A bit of youth and ardour will do him good.’112 But the comte de Paris was disturbed by the very real possibility that Palmerston might intervene on the side of the Confederacy. Lady Waldegrave was appalled by ‘the heat of John Bull’ and blamed the equivocation of British policy for encouraging Napoleonic meddling in Mexico.113 The comte de Paris vented his frustration that his British hosts, nominally committed to the same liberal values, could defend such contrary positions:

There is something which distresses me and moreover that I cannot understand, it is that in admiring English institutions, enjoying English society and personally liking a large number of them [the English], I find myself in disagreement with them on nine-

112 BL/Ms/37621, no.393, Aumale to Panizzi, 19 Oct. 1861.
113 Chantilly/Ms/1/PA/139, no.36, Waldegrave to Aumale, 25 April 1863.
tenths of the great foreign questions. I believe, however, to be as liberal as them, and
to carry this liberal spirit equally into all my judgements.

He concluded optimistically that such misunderstandings was bound to ‘diminish’, and noted
‘true friendship does not depend on always being in agreement.’

Such hopes rang hollow, for as the clash over Italy and Greece, Syria and the United
States revealed, the Orléans could not agree with British foreign policy; if they deplored the
havoc caused by Napoleon III in Europe, they also viewed Palmerston as a barrier to the
advance of France’s civilising mission. The grounds for suspicion ran deep. On the British
side, Louis-Philippe had done lasting damage to the family’s perceived trustworthiness over
the Spanish Marriages. Following the revolution in Spain in 1868, it appeared as if the old
diplomatic quarrel could resurface, as Montpensier and his wife were viewed as contenders
for the throne. Aumale and the comte de Paris both appealed to Lady Waldegrave and
Fortescue to quell the slanderous depiction of Montpensier as an arch-conspirator which
appeared in the English press (to no avail). On the French side, the Orléans raged against
the discrepancy in Westminster’s commitment to English liberties at home whilst sacrificing
these to realpolitik abroad. For instance, in 1866, the princes were shocked to learn that a
man convicted of forgery in France, Ernest Lamirande, was apprehended in Canada and
extradited across the Atlantic before the details of his case had been properly heard and
despite a later judicial ruling that the initial French arrest warrant was invalid. Aumale
reeled off the irregularities: ‘habeas corpus’ vainly invoked, the rulings of judges disdained,
English police lending a blind support to the imperial police, all this makes one ponder.

115 SHC/DD/SH/297 no.69/77, Paris to Waldegrave, 27 Oct. 1869; SHC/DD/SH/295, no.67/33, Aumale to
treated like ‘pariahs.’ The princes’ alarm reveals how deeply they identified with historic British freedoms and internalized them as universal rights, expressing outrage when the British government proved unwilling to uphold them.

Locked out of France and frustrated in Europe, the Orléans in the 1850s and 1860s were increasingly turning their energies to the imperial frontier. In this approach they employed the information supplied by the English press and gathered from Strawberry Hill, which thanks to the regular visits of the Duke of Newcastle and his under-secretary Fortescue resembled ‘almost an annex of the Colonial Office.’  When Aumale’s eldest son planned his trip to the East, the duke solicited the advice of both Fortescue and Hugh Rose, a veteran of the Indian Mutiny.  Departing from Southampton in February 1866, Condé’s round-world trip stopped first at Suez, where he caught a passenger steamer to Australia, pipping Prince Alfred to become the first royal visitor from any dynasty to visit the colony. Besides its exotic flora and fauna, Australia also offered the chance to study the flourishing self-governing institutions and nascent settler democracy (which the Orléans princes’ travel companion, Ludovic de Beauvoir, contrasted with the famine and arbitrary rule currently wrecking French Algeria). Yet the trip ended in tragedy. Having been warmly received in Sydney and visited the city’s attractions, Condé contracted typhoid and died in May 1866, ‘doubly exiled’ from the France he ‘never ceased to serve’, and from his family in England. He received a requiem mass in a packed St Mary’s cathedral (the French consul attended...

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120 SHC/DD/SH 296, no.68/100, Maria-Carolina to Waldegrave, 7 Jan.1866.,
in a private capacity, unwilling even in death to recognize Orleanism) before the body was returned to the heartbroken parents for burial in Weybridge.124

Condé’s mission to Australia echoes the appeal of ‘Greater Britain’ in the later 1860s, an idea whose panegyrist, Charles Dilke, was another regular at Strawberry Hill.125 The absorption of settler colonies within the Orléans’ worldview supports Jennifer Pitts’ contention that views on empire were shaped through constant Anglo-French exchanges and comparisons, and the spectre of democratization.126 Condé’s trip appears less foolhardy or exceptional when compared with other, young scions of the family: the duc de Penthièvre, inspired by his father Joinville, studied at Newport Naval College before joining the Portuguese navy and embarking on a Pacific odyssey, taking in California, China, Japan, Java and Tasmania, where he laid memorials at Hobart to French mariners who had perished there; the duc d’Eu, the eldest son of Nemours, participated in the Hispano-Moroccan War in 1859-60 and married the daughter of the Emperor of Brazil, plunging him into conflict in Paraguay; meanwhile the duc d’Alençon, Nemours’ second son, had won permission to join a Spanish offensive against indigenous peoples in the Philippines (pitting artillery against bows and arrows) before sailing on to Japan and Korea. ‘It is a distinctive feature of these young princes of the House of Orléans,’ noted Charles Yriarte, ‘that wherever a cannon is fired in the world, when political incompatibility does not remove them from the battlefield, they have gladly run into danger.’127 The far-flung trajectories of these princes illustrate not just the need to find a diplomatically acceptable theatre to prove themselves as explorers and warriors, but also the self-conscious positioning of the Orléans as the paladins of an intrepid, global France.

126 J. Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, 2005), pp.247-54, 256.
127 C. Yriarte, Les princes d’Orléans: préface d’Edouard Hervé (Paris, 1872), pp.183-84,
Democracy and Industrial Society

Historians have assumed that democracy was anathema to Orleanism, since it contradicted the July Monarchy’s faith in the sovereignty of reason and government by capacités. For De Dijn, the debacle of 1848 only deepened the need for ‘intermediary powers’ which could defy both the despotism of the state and the brute despotism of the majority. In Hazareesingh’s incisive analysis, Orleanism was wilfully and fatally elitist: outside of the echo-chamber of ‘gilded salons’, the Orleanist notables ‘lacked secure ideological moorings in the political culture of nineteenth-century France’ and were ‘vulnerable and inexperienced in their practice of universal suffrage.’ Whilst this holds true in Paris, it may not apply as readily in London. For the Orléans princes were fascinated by the spectacle of Westminster politics, whose domestic and imperial controversies they followed closely. Montalembert recorded his joy at attending a meting of the House of Lords in May 1858: ‘I sat behind the balustrade of the throne, next to the duc d’Aumale and the comte de Paris,’ mesmerized by ‘the sparkle and liveliness of this solemn club of the hereditary lords of a great people deliberating on the most serious questions of its past and future.’ Liberals like Montalembert revered the upper house as a counterweight to vulgar democratic extremism. But the Orléans princes denied the British parliamentary system had attained perfection. Palmerston was a bête noire, not just for his jingoism, but his ‘senile’ prejudice against electoral reform, ‘prejudices which I hope public opinion will free itself of more and more,’ Aumale opined. It was precisely because of its dynamism, not some immemorial wisdom, that Britain furnished the princes with fruit for meditation.

‘Mr Gladstone surpassed himself in his last speech,’ the comte de Paris enthused to Lady Waldegrave following a session on the suffrage in 1866. ‘I have no need to say that I celebrate in the interests of England and the honour of free governments the determination of the minister to persevere and uphold right to the end the cause of reform.’

The progress he saw in Britain gave comfort that Bonapartism’s days were also numbered. It also vindicated his belief that the elite must reach an accommodation with the gathering forces of democracy:

‘...the future of England seems very uncertain to me. The struggle of the classes emerges, the old aristocratic traditions must fall away or they will very well carry away the constitution with them. We are approaching now one of the great crises which define an era in the life of peoples, such as that which preceded Catholic Emancipation and the 1832 Reform....I hope that we will be able to come through it. But it will require a different political outlook from that which has inspired the ruling classes in recent years.’

These quotations suggest that Aumale and Paris made their peace with extending male suffrage and recognized the need for a government which was responsive to public opinion (or at least the respectable working classes). In light of Louis-Philippe’s failure to heed calls for electoral reform in the 1840s, this support for the wider franchise is doubly significant, and is corroborated by their English acquaintances. John Bright drew close to the comte de Paris after a dinner hosted by Lady Waldegrave and Fortescue in April 1868. In his diary, Bright recorded his approval of his interlocutor’s knowledge of ‘English and French affairs. He is a great friend of America and reveres the memory of President Lincoln.’ Although the future was ‘uncertain’, when it came to what regime might replace the Empire there seemed little to differentiate the heir to the throne from currents of radical opinion. ‘Between them

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132 SHC/DD/SH/297 no.69/38, Paris to Waldegrave, 2 May 1866.
133 SHC/DD/SH/297, no.69/42, Paris to Waldegrave, 26 September 1866.
and the Republicans there was no great difference. Universal suffrage was a settled fact, and the only question was whether an hereditary or an elective head of State.\footnote{P. Bright, ed., *The diaries of John Bright* (London, 1930), p.319, 25 April 1868.}

The Orléans’ philosophy evolved in tandem with that of the Gladstonian liberals. It was an admiration that went both ways.\footnote{One 6 March 1858, Gladstone noted: ‘Dined at Mr Harcourt’s to meet D & Ds d’Aumale. To the latter I was not presented but I like the Duke particularly.’ H.G. Matthew, ed., *The Gladstone Diaries vol.V* (Oxford, 1978), p.282.} Jon Parry has characterized the men swept to power in 1868 as a ‘cross-class propertied and wise elite... capable, they thought, of operating a rational and ethical politics designed to uphold the rule of law, to promote moral values and to provide low-cost efficiency.’\footnote{Parry, *The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain* (New Haven and London, 1993), p.227} Philippe d’Orléans equally championed the masses against the classes, welcomed the Second Reform Bill, and soon applied his keen intelligence to the knotty issue of Irish church disestablishment. His knowledge was enormously enriched by his Dublin contacts Waldegrave and Fortescue, who by 1868 had been named Chief Secretary of Ireland and was the unsung architect of Gladstone’s policies. Philippe’s detailed analysis appeared in *Revue des deux mondes* under the alias of Xavier Raymond.\footnote{X. Raymond, ‘L’Église d’État et l’Église libre en Irlande’, *Revue des deux mondes*, 75 (1868), pp.465-503.} The essay typified the Orleanist genre of bifocal political analysis, musing on the political experience of one nation (the British Union), although with applications in another nation (France) always in mind. The engagement with Gladstonian thinking also stirred the first Orleanist answers to the social question.

Nowhere was this clearer than in the comte de Paris’ interest in the co-operative movement. During the July Monarchy, interest in rectifying the problems created by rapid urban change and industrial growth had been the preserve of Catholic Legitimists. When Chambord had resided in London in 1843, he tellingly made a trip to the industrial conurbations of Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, and Glasgow.\footnote{D. de Montplaisir, *Le comte de Chambord: dernier roi de France* (Paris, 2008), p.202.} By contrast, the egotism of
the bourgeois monarchy and its indifference to the plight of the workers was tirelessly condemned by its republican and socialist critics before 1848. Fourteen years later, and the comte de Paris chose to spend Christmas in those depressed districts of Lancashire in the grip of the Cotton Famine. ‘I have just been to Manchester and the study of the wonderful organization of national charity in that distressed town has deeply impressed my mind,’ he wrote to Monckton-Milnes on Boxing Day 1862.139 Recently returned from the Union armies, he analysed how the economic dislocations of the Civil War provoked misery across the Atlantic. After a later visit taking in Stockport and Blackburn, he described the response as exemplary of English virtues:

This crisis will be the opportunity to renew the bonds which unite the different classes of society and in which I see the best guarantee of liberty in England. The sufferings are also very great in France, but the public is not moved by it because it is too accustomed to see the government do everything for it, and because all the newspapers except two are content with treating foreign policy and completely neglect the business even of the country. When a press is not free it loses the feeling for its duties.140

In making observations of industrial distress, he followed the promptings of the comte d’Haussonville, who had encouraged him to view Britain as a ‘laboratory’ for developing a new ethics of responsibility. Philippe d’Orléans corrected him:

You address me on the great social questions that I would like to see all the liberals as preoccupied with as you [are], which all those who are distinguished by talent or by rank ought to preoccupy themselves with, even if they don’t believe they should or can enter into politics. It is the common ground on which all opinions must unite, not

140 WLTC/Houghton/Mss/19, no.12, Paris to Monckton-Milnes, 7 Jan. 1863.
through what we now please to call a coalition of parties, but by the sense of a great
task to accomplish. It's the recognition of this duty which marks the great superiority
of modern civilization over former societies. To strive to fulfil it is to respond to
everything that is fair and generous in the democratic instincts of our times.

It was also to obey Christian commandments.\textsuperscript{141} Paris’ initial reflections were published
under an alias in an 1863 article in the \textit{Revue des deux mondes} extolling the paternalism of
the industrial elites of Manchester in providing relief for the working classes, as well as
hailing models of self-help organized by the workers themselves, such as the Huhne
Institute.\textsuperscript{142} Although documenting local solutions, he told Lady Waldegrave his article aimed
‘to stimulate private charity in France by the example of England’.\textsuperscript{143} This circuitous way of
proceeding, and aim of speaking to two audiences at once, saw the comte de Paris convert his
‘in-between’ exile status into an asset.

After 1863 industrial relations dominated his thinking, and he returned to Manchester
in the company of French positivist Jules Simon. By this point there were around 100,000
consumer cooperative in England and Wales, which expressed the cross-class commitment to
civic improvement. Having laid aside secrecy, these organizations promoted the virtues of
’self-help, respectability, and sound and moderate habits’.\textsuperscript{144} The most influential of these
profit-sharing cooperatives were the Rochdale Equitable Pioneers, founded in 1844, and
whose democratic organization, effective management, moral consequences and economic
performance were singled out by Simon. If there were any remaining doubters in France
about the progressive results of cooperation, ‘it is best to take them to Rochdale and say to
them: behold!’ While parallel French initiatives at Lyons and Mulhouse were focused on

\textsuperscript{143} SHC/DD/SH/297, no.69/16, Paris to Waldegrave, 24 May 1863.
cooperative production, echoing old utopian schemes, Simon insisted that a consumer cooperative, such as Rochdale, furnished the model of how to generate the prerequisite capital (‘they have a goal: Rochdale is a means’). Iowerth Prothero has pointed out that by the 1860s cooperation in both Britain and France had been cut free from socialist experimentation- indeed, it was as often seen as its antidote- and integrated into the mainstream of liberalism. The comte de Paris endorsed this search for ‘a better, more moralized form of capitalism.’

In 1868 the comte de Paris received from his bookseller the bluebooks detailing the commission into trade unions. Eager for more information, he contacted Christian Socialist Thomas Hughes and took another visit to the Manchester suburbs to collect workers’ testimonies at first-hand. Published anonymous in French, his weighty 1869 study, *Les Associations ouvrières en Angleterre*, offered to French readers ‘the spectacle of the operation of institutions in a free country’ which could have pertinent application across the Channel. ‘In the midst of the uncertainties which shroud the future of France, we cannot too often probe into the passage of our neighbours, who are still navigating the same perils.’ There was much to admire in British political culture, from the impartiality of the commission, the enlightened and affordable press (‘public opinion in England never confirms precipitate judgements’) and the respectability of the working classes (the toppling of the Hyde Park railings at the recent rally was pinned on a few roughs). He insisted that the fruitful application of the principle of association would overcome the false distinction between capital and labour. In past times of persecution, the unions had been shrouded in secrecy and resembled ‘war machines’ for waging strikes; today, thanks to the gift of liberty,

148 Ibid., p.3, 9, 310, 312.
they could instead be ‘either disarmed, or replaced, or rather employed for works fruitful for society as a whole.’

Evidently proud of his work, the comte de Paris leaned on Lady Waldegrave to pass it to John Bright, and urged her to look into an English translation or coverage within *The Times*. The translation by Nassau Senior Junior appeared in 1869 under the imprimatur of Thomas Hughes himself, who identified with its plea for ‘laissez-faire collectivism’. The comte de Paris had persuasively equated unionism with the blessings of British free institutions, free association and a free press, advantages sorely missing from the Second Empire. Gladstone told the author that reading it confirmed his own ‘cheerful view of the question of Trades Unions.’ Far from seeing Britain solely as a repository for aristocratic hegemony, the comte de Paris celebrated the emerging forces of industrial democracy, hailing the power of co-operation to turn the industrious worker ‘directly into a capitalist’. In France, progress in this direction was in its infancy, since association had been mired in socialist theories and had only been decriminalized in 1864; by contrast, in Britain, Philippe d’Orléans rejoiced, ‘we have seen put into practice an institution which had been many times treated as utopian.’ The comte de Paris at least believed that the remaking of industrial relations in Britain represented a possible and desirable future for France too, even if, as Ernest Daudet assured fellow monarchists, ‘nothing has entered into his mind which is in contradiction with conservative interests.’ In this way French republican and socialist experiments in collectivism and association in 1840s, once absorbed and adapted by British radicals, were rediscovered twenty years later in the north of England by the French heir to the throne, who found in them a guarantee of cross-class solidarity within a free-market economy.

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149 Ibid., p.44.
150 SHC/DD/SH/297 no.69/72, Paris to Waldegrave, 9 May 1869.
The Legacies of Exile

In March 1870 Lady Waldegrave sent Aumale a cutting from the British press, which characterized the princes’ exile as a long, patient slumber:

It is not often that the French papers refer to the Orleanist family in any way, and it must be confessed that the royal exiles of Twickenham have given the Emperor Napoleon and his Government very little trouble during the present reign. They have accepted their removal from the troubled and anxious vicinity of the throne, for the calm of a private life, with a dignity which is perfectly free from intrigue....We suppose Chantilly is still the property of the exiled royal family, and we know that the princes occasionally purchase works of art. But there is nothing in these facts remarkable; nothing to show any desire to make passing political events reminds France of the virtues and misfortunes of Louis-Philippe’s children.\(^{154}\)

The article deliberately underplayed the ongoing political engagement of the Orléans at a moment when it seemed the laws of banishment could finally be abrogated.\(^{155}\) It ignored the pragmatic reasons for the Orléans’ quiescence, seeking to simultaneously integrate into British society whilst not abandoning a fitting royal reserve; it overlooked the enlargement of the family’s outlook, immersed in continental and global crises and exploring solutions to the problems of mass society. While the slogan of Aumale may have been ‘j’attendrai’, exile was not synonymous with empty waiting but was a constructive and generative episode. In contrast to the Legitimist retreat into a ‘politics of abstention’ under the Second Empire, refusing to participate in the political life of Napoleon III’s regime, the Orleanists grounded their resistance in long-standing alliances within the spheres of diplomacy, journalism,

\(^{154}\) Reproduced in Chantilly/Ms/ PA/140, no.6, Waldegrave to Aumale, 5 March 1870.
\(^{155}\) There were unsuccessful attempts at repealing the banishment legislation in February and July 1870. Robert, *L’Orléanisme*, p.67.
erudition and the arts. The Orléans’ case cuts against and confounds recent attempts to distinguish between modalities of migration as either ‘maintien’ or ‘retour’, because their partial assimilation into the British establishment equally advanced their chances of an eventual restoration in France.

The family’s activities during the 1850s and 1860s were pursued with a dual audience in mind. Treading a fine line between circumspection and subversion, the Orléans outwardly did nothing to thwart the Empire, whilst also not relinquishing their pose of opposition. As the example of art collecting attests, this opposition was instead conducted through avenues extrinsic to formal politics. They drew on all the resources that British high society and culture had to offer- friendships, periodicals, exhibitions and political vocabularies- to assert the undimmed allure of the Orléans dynasty whilst re-orientating its intellectual commitments. Whilst they were fluent in the different registers of Anglo-French liberalism, the Orléans’ conventional label as Anglophiles requires three serious caveats. The first is that although they lived in England, mastered its language, enjoyed its literature and infiltrated its institutions, the family took care to appear culturally French, since France remained the unvarying goal of their activities. The second caveat is that their participation within British society was enabled and circumscribed by various high society gatekeepers, especially Lady Waldgrave, who endowed them with an anomalous and privileged position. Thirdly, the very independence afforded by exile allowed the Orléans to formulate international strategies which were sometimes parasitic upon, but also sometimes adversarial to, British global dominion, since the interests of an enlightened and free France were seen as indispensable for a prosperous and peaceful world order. Their admiration for their hosts’ parliamentary institutions and historic freedoms co-existed with critique whenever Britain betrayed its

ideals at home or abroad. As a comparison of Richard Cobden and the Saint-Simonians has argued, the divergences in British and French thinking- in that case again, over the benefits of European colonial empires- are just as important as the similarities in understanding the varieties of mid-century ‘liberalism’.  

Nonetheless, mixing in circles that included not just Gladstone, Russell and Bright, but also Arnold, Bagehot, even Trollope, Louis-Philippe’s descendants deserve to be written back into histories of both French and British politics. The mobility of the family has dispersed the relevant documentation, fragmented between Britain and France, metropolitan and provincial archives. As other case-studies have demonstrated, re-assembling such papers discloses the continuous translation of English and French ideas. In this rich interplay, different national inflections were imparted to shared political idioms: we might consider how Charles Dilke’s republicanism diverged from that of his ally Léon Gambetta, or recall Georges Clemenceau’s unexpected debt to English Positivists. If exile unhelpfully separated the Orléans family from their French supporters, it also gave them scope to refashion July Monarchy thinking in progressive new directions, quite distinct from the ‘Parnassian liberalism’ or ‘liberalism of fear’ identified by historians. Roger Price is right to stress that Orléanists in France lacked both ‘contact with the masses’ and ‘emotional appeal’, representing a movement of ‘chiefs without soldiers’. The heirs of Louis-Philippe in England, however, showed themselves attuned to democracy, national pride and the self-organization of industrial society. For instance, the comte de Paris’ hymn to English trade-unionism contrasts starkly with another liberal Anglophile, Hippolyte Taine, who still

tarnished English workers’ associations with allegations of robbery and murder, claiming unions ‘naturally lead to the establishment of a dictatorship.’

The exile experience has been discounted because of the overwhelming fact that its lessons failed to take root in France after the twin shocks of military defeat and Parisian insurgency in 1870-71. There is no scope to rehearse the varied factors behind the disappointment of Orleanism. Suffice to note that the hardened opposition of Legitimists scuppered the prospects of a constitutional monarchy à l’anglaise. Just as his inability to compromise with the Republic cost him the throne, so too Chambord’s supporters frustrated hopes that the Orléans princes might pave the way for an eventual restoration from within republican politics. Widely tipped for the presidency of the Third Republic, Aumale’s candidacy was strenuously opposed by the Legitimists. The long-dreamed of ‘fusion’ between the Bourbon and Orleanist branches occurred in November 1873, when the childless Chambord acknowledged the comte de Paris as his heir. But this symbolic victory brought few gains and entailed enormous risks. A sceptical Lord Derby observed: ‘the party really compromised is the Orleanists, who have sacrificed their separate position as a political party (the only French representatives of constitutional monarchy) for the sake of a fusion which has come to nothing.’ The Orléans’ bid to be recognized as rightful heirs to the throne came at the price of relinquishing their liberal heritage, and some historians hence view the acclamation of the comte de Paris as Phillippe VII in 1883 as marking the demise of Orleanism as a subsidiary political tradition. This did not mark the eclipse of the English model in French politics more broadly, however; after all, its oligarchic strains can be detected in both the 1875 Constitution and in the technocratic cadre of the École libre des sciences politiques;

165 Broglie, L’Orléanisme, p.365.
meanwhile the Anglophile wing within the republicans (not least Léon Say) promoted the economic liberalism which ensured, in Jean Garrigues’ terms, that the Third Republic spoke with ‘a British accent’. 166

Rather than insist on failure, it would be more productive to think about how the diverse exile activities created loyalties, ideas and practices which were adapted and endured. Firstly, ties of friendship proved tenacious. Only in June 1871, in the wake of the Commune, was the law of banishment finally repealed. ‘You well understand all our joy,’ the comte de Paris wrote to Lady Waldegrave, ‘and I am convinced that our true friends, assured of the bonds formed during so many years of residence on the welcoming soil of England, will persist in the new circumstances presented to us, and will sincerely rejoice with us.’167 The family’s patrimony was restored to them, as Philippe reclaimed the ancestral properties at Ambroise and Eu, the latter of which he had renovated by Viollet-le-Duc.168 In returning to Chantilly, Aumale viewed Orléans House as a ‘laboratory’ (in Nicole Garnier’s terms) for the enormous house-museum complex he constructed.169 Nonetheless, Queen Victoria cautioned Nemours that it would be ‘very unwise, considering the terrible uncertainty of things in France, where there had been four Revolutions (including this last of the Commune) in forty years, if all the members of the family did not keep some pied à terre in England.’170 The properties of Orléans House and York House were retained for several years, and the family only relocated the bodies of those buried at Weybridge for transfer to Dreux in 1876.

168 See the exhibition catalogue Viollet-le-Duc au château d’Eu (1874-79) (Rouen. 1979).
170 A. Benson, Viscount Esher, eds., The letters of Queen Victoria, II, pp.138-39, 28 June 1871.
No doubt influenced by Lady Waldegrave’s advocacy, many British observers were convinced after the fall of Napoleon III that the exiles’ hour had finally come: ‘The Republicans seem to have little hold on France,’ Fortescue assured Edward Lear in October 1870, ‘so I suppose the Orléans family will have a turn.’\footnote{Strachey, ed., Later Letters of Edward Lear to Chichester Fortescue and Frances countess Waldegrave (London, 1911), p.126, Fortescue to Lear, 19 Oct. 1870.} Next month Lady Waldegrave told Aumale her friend Mr Vernon had met the Lord Chancellor ‘who said the only hope for the future of France was the Orléans family.’\footnote{Chantilly/Ms/PA/140 no.9, Waldegrave to Aumale, 23 Nov. 1870.} She was baffled when their enthronement did not occur, although Aumale and Paris continued to keep her abreast of their calculations until the distressing news of her death in 1879. Increasingly outflanked by their republican opponents, the Orléans relied more heavily on the commiserations and counsel of their English confidantes. In letters written to Henry Reeve in 1885 Philippe d’Orléans dared to intimate the existence of schemes to overthrow the Republic.\footnote{See the run of letters from Paris to Reeve in Laughton, ed., Memoirs of the Life, II, pp.311-347.} When the government banished the royal princes as a pre-emptive strike in 1886, the Orléans naturally made their way back across the Channel, with Philippe d’Orléans settling at Stowe and Sheen House. The alliances forged during the Second Empire were hence re-activated only sixteen years later.

Secondly, the Orléans retained their extra-European perspectives, and the comte de Paris advertised his global credentials by authoring a vast chronicle of the American Civil War.\footnote{Paris, Histoire de la guerre civile en Amérique (2 vols, Paris, 1874).} Their early distrust of British foreign policy seemed amply vindicated by the country’s pose of neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War. Whilst Lady Waldegrave sponsored fund-raising initiatives to provide charity for destitute French citizens, the comte de Paris was vexed by the sluggishness of Britain to stand up to Bismarck as the punishing war dragged on: ‘It seems that this is a last chance for England to exercise her influence in a
decisive manner both for Europe and for herself....\(^{175}\) This was simply a matter of British self-interest, Paris insisted, and painted the consequences of allowing the bloodletting rage on, both for the resurgence of Russian aggression in the east, and for the creation of a permanently vengeful and unstable France.\(^{176}\) Yet rather than heed these warnings, British public opinion seemed inexplicably receptive to the wiles of a Bonapartist committee in Britain who, under the guise of philanthropic associations, were working covertly for an imperial restoration.\(^{177}\) The Orléans were incredulous when the same lax asylum laws which had provided them with shelter in 1848 were exploited by the Bonapartists and ‘the author of all our ills’. Philippe d’Orléans prayed that London stop sympathizing with these illiberal intriguers, ‘because it hurts me to see people who I like and admire struck by this strange aberration. Here in France, the friends of England do not understand it at all.....’\(^{178}\)

Conservative monarchists in the 1870s viewed Britain as a barrier to French hopes of *revanche* or extra-European territorial compensation. The discord over Egypt after 1881 was especially vexing for Philippe d’Orléans, who still dreamed of a ‘friendly agreement’ for joint Anglo-French stewardship over the colonized world.\(^{179}\)

This disappointment mirrored frustrations with the promise of democracy, as the Orléans realized that the political structures they had diligently observed in Britain did not map onto the French landscape. At first, the large monarchist majority that voted for the National Assembly in February 1871 had convinced the princes that a wider suffrage could be tamed and rendered compatible with aristocratic government, just as occurred in Britain after 1867.\(^{180}\) Yet only shortly after his comfortable election to the Senate in 1872, it dawned on Aumale that the centre ground was evaporating. On the right, liberals were shocked by

\(^{175}\) SHC/DD//SH/297 no.69/100, Paris to Waldegrave, 26 Jan. 1871.
\(^{176}\) SHC/DD//SH/297 no.69/92, Paris to Waldegrave, 12 Sept. 180.
\(^{177}\) SHC/DD//SH/297 no.69/97, Paris to Waldegrave, 13 Jan. 1871.
\(^{178}\) SHC/DD//SH/297 no.69/119., Paris to Waldegrave, 7 Sept. 1872.
the intransigence of Chambord and his followers; Philippe d’Orléans complained that moderate defence of Gladstone in Ireland led him to be branded an ‘atheist’ by some Legitimists.\textsuperscript{181} On the left, they were appalled by the republican rhetoric against the church and social hierarchy. As Aumale observed regretfully to Lady Waldegrave, ‘our radicals are not like the English radicals,’ because the same term in French signified worryingly destructive tendencies.\textsuperscript{182} The only hope, so the Orleanists believed, was to constitute a broad conservative party, committed to reform but in defence of order, on the model of the English Whigs. Only this, the comte de Paris believed, could prevent the unstoppable polarization: ‘all the nuances are more and more disappearing before the sole distinction of conservatives and radicals. The former feel the absolute necessity to unite in order to block the latter whose victory would be the ruin of France.’\textsuperscript{183} Repeated attempts at building this coalition proved fruitless, however, and the family increasingly withdrew from politics by the late 1870s: Aumale resigned senatorial office to concentrate on military responsibilities, transforming Chantilly and collecting, while the comte de Paris opted for relative seclusion at Eu as he dutifully waited for Chambord to die.

In his classic study of later French royalism, Samuel Osgood proposed that the estrangement from France accentuated among pretenders those ‘those escapist, dream-world tendencies inherent to their very title’.\textsuperscript{184} Yet throughout their earlier migrations, the Orléans remained pragmatic in outlook, shunning cloudy dreams in favour of careful scrutiny of the Times. The danger of exile stemmed less from isolation or delusion than from a conflation of French and British perspectives. Throughout the 1850s and 1860s, the princes had become so accustomed to view French problems through British lenses, and vice-versa, that they lost sight of how radically the material circumstances were changing. ‘Ah! I did not suspect how

\textsuperscript{181} SHC/DD/SH/297 no. 69/124, Paris to Fortescue, 29 March 1873.
\textsuperscript{182} SHC/DD/SH/295 no.67/92, Aumale to Waldegrave, 11 Nov. 1872.
\textsuperscript{183} Paris to Waldegrave, 1 February 1873, SHC/DD//SH/297 no.69/123, Paris to Waldegrave, 1 Feb. 1873.
\textsuperscript{184} S.Osgood, French Royalism since 1870 (The Hague, 1970), p.42.
deep was the evil that twenty years of the Empire did to my country,’ Aumale confessed in shock in 1873. If the ideological conflicts of the 1870s were a rude awakening for France’s liberal monarchists, the decade also marked the swansong for the brand of aristocratic liberalism personified by Lady Waldegrave, whose informal sway of influence and entertaining was menaced by the professionalization of political parties. When Fortescue failed to be re-elected at Louth in 1874, she warned Aumale that ‘no one can be perfectly safe with the ballot’. The Orléans dynasty were divided between those members- such as Aumale- who felt obliged to bow to necessity, and accept with dignity their marginalization from French public life, and those members- like his nephew, Paris- who were willing to throw their lot in with the populist and xenophobic forces of mass politics, as later incarnated by Boulangism.

Even in this gamble, however, the lessons acquired in England were not denied so much as reconfigured. In hindsight, the brand of ‘free-market collectivism’ that Paris picked up in Britain was quickly overtaken in the 1870s by more popular ways of winning over the working-man. The associationist ideas studied by Paris as proof of British modernity soon lost their purchase and smacked of paternalism. Yet in France their very anachronism lent these ideas a new political inflection. Passing through multiple re-publications and fresh editions, what had begun as the comte de Paris’ fascination with Gladstonian Liberalism had mutated by the fin-de-siècle into a Radical Right programme for decentralization, religious liberty and the corporate state. Such was the 1907 manifesto stitched together by Philippe’s son, Henri, duc d’Orléans, another self-styled ‘exile’ and restless global traveller (at that

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185 SHC/DD/SH/295, no.67/100, Aumale to Waldegrave, Good Friday 1873.
187 Chantilly/Ms/PA/140, no.38, Waldegrave to Aumale, 6 Feb. 1874.
189 Paris’ work on Trades-Unions was edited and republished as Les Questions ouvrières in 1888, and Une Liberté nécessaire, le droit d’association in 1893 and 1901.
moment sailing to plant the French flag at the North Pole). He rooted his calls to overturn the chaotic parliamentary Republic in his father’s earlier commitment to liberty and in his first-hand study of its ‘beneficial effects on the English monarchy’. Such unexpected adaptations and deformations of liberalism until it became its seeming antithesis form an intriguing chapter in the cross-Channel circulation of ideas.

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