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Durham Research Online
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The seconomics (security-economics) vulnerabilities of decentralized autonomous organizations.

Massacci, F. and Ngo, C.N. and Nie, J. and Venturi, D. and Williams, J. (2017) 'The seconomics (security-economics) vulnerabilities of decentralized autonomous organizations.', in Security protocols XXV : 25th international workshop, Cambridge, UK, March 20-22, 2017 : revised selected papers. Cham: Springer, pp. 171-179. Lecture notes in computer science. (10476).

Abstract

Traditionally, security and economics functionalities in IT financial services and protocols (FinTech) have been perceived as separate objectives. We argue that keeping them separate is a bad idea for FinTech “Decentralized Autonomous Organizations” (DAOs). In fact, security and economics are one for DAOs: we show that the failure of a security property, e.g. anonymity, can destroy a DAOs because economic attacks can be tailgated to security attacks. This is illustrated by the examples of “TheDAO” (built on the Ethereum platform) and the DAOed version of a Futures Exchange. We claim that security and economics vulnerabilities, which we named seconomics vulnerabilities, are indeed new “beasts” to be reckoned with.

Item Type:Book chapter
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71075-4_19
Publisher statement:The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71075-4_19.
Date accepted:21 May 2017
Date deposited:30 January 2018
Date of first online publication:29 November 2017
Date first made open access:29 November 2018

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