Companions in Guilt Arguments

Cowie, Christopher

doi:10.1111/phc3.12528

Companions in Guilt Arguments

Cowie, Christopher

Authors

Dr Christopher Cowie christopher.d.cowie@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor

Abstract

Arguments for some controversial positions in metaethics—typically moral scepticism or the moral error theory—are sometimes thought to overreach. They appear to entail sceptical or error‐theoretic views about non‐moral branches of thought in a sense that is costly or implausible. If this is true, those metaethical arguments should be rejected. This is the companions in guilt strategy in metaethics. In this article, the contemporary use of the companions in guilt strategy is explored and assessed. The methodology of the strategy is discussed, and criteria for assessing specific instances of its use are identified. Prominent instances of its use in the contemporary literature are then examined. The focus is on those that take (a) epistemic judgment, (b) prudential judgment, and (c) mathematical judgment as “companions,” with a view to undermining the moral error theory and moral scepticism, respectively.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2018). Companions in Guilt Arguments. Philosophy Compass, 13(11), Article e12528. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12528

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Feb 15, 2018
Online Publication Date	Jun 26, 2018
Publication Date	Nov 30, 2018
Deposit Date	Feb 18, 2018
Publicly Available Date	Jun 26, 2020
Journal	Philosophy Compass
Publisher	Wiley
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	13
Issue	11
Article Number	e12528
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12528

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Copyright Statement
This is the accepted version of the following article: Cowie, Christopher (2018). Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Philosophy Compass, e12528, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12528. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.