On the optimality of not allocating

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016

On the optimality of not allocating

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio

Authors

Professor Angel Hernando-Veciana angel.hernando-veciana@durham.ac.uk
Visiting Professor

Fabio Michelucci

Abstract

We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.

Citation

Hernando-Veciana, Á., & Michelucci, F. (2014). On the optimality of not allocating. Economics Letters, 125(2), 233-235. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Sep 12, 2014
Online Publication Date	Sep 19, 2014
Publication Date	Nov 1, 2014
Deposit Date	Jun 15, 2018
Publicly Available Date	Jun 28, 2018
Journal	Economics Letters
Print ISSN	0165-1765
Publisher	Elsevier
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	125
Issue	2
Pages	233-235
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1328858

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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Copyright Statement
© 2014 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/