Professor Angel Hernando-Veciana angel.hernando-veciana@durham.ac.uk
Visiting Professor
Competition among auctioneers in large markets
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
Authors
Abstract
We analyse a multistage game of competition among auctioneers. First, the auctioneers commit to some reserve prices; second, the bidders enter one auction, if any; and finally, the auctions take place. We show that for any finite set of feasible reserve prices, each auctioneer announces a reserve price equal to his production cost if the numbers of auctioneers and bidders are sufficiently large, though finite. Our result supports the idea that optimal auctions may be quite simple. Our model also confirms previous results for some “limit” versions of the model by McAfee (Econometrica 61 (1993) 1281–1312), Peters (Rev. Econ. Stud. 64 (1997) 97–123), and Peters and Severinov (J. Econ. Theory 75 (1997) 141–179).
Citation
Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2005). Competition among auctioneers in large markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 121(1), 107-127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.001
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Mar 11, 2004 |
Online Publication Date | May 28, 2004 |
Publication Date | Mar 1, 2005 |
Deposit Date | Jun 15, 2018 |
Publicly Available Date | Jun 28, 2018 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Print ISSN | 0022-0531 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 121 |
Issue | 1 |
Pages | 107-127 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.001 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1324060 |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Copyright Statement
© 2014 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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