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Successful uninformed bidding

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel

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Abstract

This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multi-unit auctions in which some bidders have more information than others. We show that in a generalized second price auction with single-unit demand, bidders with less information do surprisingly well: they can have a greater probability of winning than bidders with more information do, and may even have a higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success of less-informed bidders and a ratio of units for sale to bidders.

Citation

Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2004). Successful uninformed bidding. Games and Economic Behavior, 48(1), 29-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.002

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Nov 18, 2003
Publication Date Jul 1, 2004
Deposit Date Jun 15, 2018
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 48
Issue 1
Pages 29-53
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.002
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1328827

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