On the Sub-optimality of Entry Fees in Auctions With Entry

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel

doi:10.1007/s10058-006-0001-4

On the Sub-optimality of Entry Fees in Auctions With Entry

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel

Authors

Professor Angel Hernando-Veciana angel.hernando-veciana@durham.ac.uk
Visiting Professor

Abstract

We study a variation of Myerson’s (1981) model in which we allow for uncertainty about the number of bidders. In our set-up, an appropriate reserve price in a standard auction maximizes the auctioneer’s expected revenue. However, entry fees can be optimal only under some special conditions. Basically, there must be some homogeneity in bidders’ beliefs about the number of bidders and the auctioneer must know, to some extent, these beliefs.

Citation

Hernando-Veciana, Á. (2006). On the Sub-optimality of Entry Fees in Auctions With Entry. Review of Economic Design, 10(1), 53-61. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0001-4

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Mar 30, 2006
Online Publication Date	Jun 23, 2006
Publication Date	Apr 1, 2006
Deposit Date	Jun 15, 2018
Publicly Available Date	Jul 2, 2018
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Print ISSN	1434-4742
Electronic ISSN	1434-4750
Publisher	Springer
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	10
Issue	1
Pages	53-61
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0001-4
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1356837