James, Simon P. (2018) 'Merleau-Ponty and metaphysical realism.', European journal of philosophy., 26 (4). pp. 1312-1323.
Global metaphysical antirealism (or “antirealism”) is often thought to entail that the identity of each and every concrete entity in our world ultimately depends on us—on our adoption of certain social and linguistic conventions, for instance, or on our use of certain conceptual schemes. Drawing on the middle‐period works of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, I contend that metaphysical antirealism entails nothing of the sort. For Merleau‐Ponty, I argue, entities do not ultimately owe their identities to us, even though—as he puts it—their “articulations are the very ones of our existence.” Once this is recognised, I maintain, certain interpretations of phenomenology are revealed to be caricatures and certain general objections to antirealism lose their force.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12386|
|Publisher statement:||This is the accepted version of the following article: James, Simon P. (2018). Merleau-Ponty and Metaphysical Realism. European Journal of Philosophy 26(4): 1312-1323, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12386. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.|
|Date accepted:||17 June 2018|
|Date deposited:||04 July 2018|
|Date of first online publication:||26 July 2018|
|Date first made open access:||26 July 2020|
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