Protectionism and the EU market for corporate control : is it possible to get the best of both worlds?

Abstract

Recent reports of the Commission and the European Parliament have revisited the concerns of protectionism in the EU. This article discusses these concerns in light of the liberal and protectionist divide in the EU market for corporate control, focusing on the board neutrality rule during takeovers. The arguments advanced in this article are threefold. First, that liberal markets are likely to encourage takeovers, but breed short-termism. Second, that protectionist markets are likely to discourage takeovers, but facilitate long-termism. Third, that short-termism in the UK and the so-called protectionism in Germany are the result of entrenched policy choices made in those jurisdictions in regard to the interests they protect in regulating the market for corporate control. The article draws a conclusion that it is hard for the UK and Germany to get the best of both worlds, that is, the liberal market and long-termism.