Skip to main content

Research Repository

Advanced Search

Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders

Anbarci, N.; Roy, J.

Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders Thumbnail


Authors

J. Roy



Abstract

Do hard budget constraints work in favour or against truth telling in double auctions? McAfee (1992) constructed a simple double auction mechanism (MDA), which is strategyproof and minimally inefficient, but may resort to dual prices, where the difference between prices is channelled as a surplus to the market maker, preventing MDA from achieving a balanced budget. We construct a variant of MDA in which no-loss constraints play a major positive role. Our variant of MDA is also strategyproof, as efficient as MDA but improves on it by achieving a balanced budget via always having a uniform price.

Citation

Anbarci, N., & Roy, J. (2017). Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders. Theory and Decision, 84(1), 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9627-7

Journal Article Type Article
Online Publication Date Aug 16, 2017
Publication Date Aug 16, 2017
Deposit Date Aug 16, 2018
Publicly Available Date Mar 29, 2024
Journal Theory and Decision
Print ISSN 0040-5833
Electronic ISSN 1573-7187
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 84
Issue 1
Pages 1-9
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9627-7
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1351673

Files




You might also like



Downloadable Citations