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Insanity, deep selves, and moral responsibility : the case of JoJo.

Faraci, David and Shoemaker, David (2010) 'Insanity, deep selves, and moral responsibility : the case of JoJo.', Review of philosophy and psychology., 1 (3). pp. 319-332.

Abstract

Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives from what she takes to be our “pretheoretic intuitions” about JoJo. As it turns out, though, experimental data on actual pretheoretic intuitions does not seem to support Wolf’s claim. In this paper, we present such data and argue that, at least with respect to this particular objection, the RSV can survive Wolf’s attack intact.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z
Publisher statement:This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Review of philosophy and psychology. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0026-z
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:04 September 2018
Date of first online publication:19 March 2010
Date first made open access:No date available

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