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We have no reason to think there are no reasons for affective attitudes.

Faraci, David (2020) 'We have no reason to think there are no reasons for affective attitudes.', Mind., 129 (513). pp. 225-234.

Abstract

Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best explained by differences between actions and affective attitudes, not between kinds of normative support. In closing, I argue that even if Maguire were correct, the extent of the threat to one of his central targets—so-called ‘buck-passing’ views—would remain unclear.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy054
Publisher statement:This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The version of record Faraci, David (2020). We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes. Mind 129(513): 225-234. is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy054
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:14 November 2018
Date of first online publication:25 October 2018
Date first made open access:25 October 2020

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