Kant and Degrees of Responsibility

Saunders, Joe

doi:10.1111/japp.12293

Kant and Degrees of Responsibility

Saunders, Joe

Authors

Dr Joe Saunders joe.saunders@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor

Abstract

Kant views every human action as either entirely determined by natural necessity or entirely free. In viewing human action this way, it is unclear how he can account for degrees of responsibility. In this article, I consider three recent attempts to accommodate degrees of responsibility within Kant's framework, but argue that none of them are satisfying. In the end, I claim that transcendental idealism constrains Kant such that he cannot provide an adequate account of degrees of responsibility.

Citation

Saunders, J. (2019). Kant and Degrees of Responsibility. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 36(1), 137-154. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12293

Journal Article Type	Article
Online Publication Date	Jan 4, 2018
Publication Date	Feb 28, 2019
Deposit Date	Sep 26, 2018
Publicly Available Date	Jan 4, 2020
Journal	Journal of Applied Philosophy
Print ISSN	0264-3758
Electronic ISSN	1468-5930
Publisher	Wiley
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	36
Issue	1
Pages	137-154
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12293

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Copyright Statement
This is the accepted version of the following article: Saunders, Joe (2019). Kant and Degrees of Responsibility. Journal of Applied Philosophy 36(1): 137-154, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12293. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.