Saunders, Joe (2019) 'Kant and degrees of responsibility.', Journal of applied philosophy., 36 (1). pp. 137-154.
Kant views every human action as either entirely determined by natural necessity or entirely free. In viewing human action this way, it is unclear how he can account for degrees of responsibility. In this article, I consider three recent attempts to accommodate degrees of responsibility within Kant's framework, but argue that none of them are satisfying. In the end, I claim that transcendental idealism constrains Kant such that he cannot provide an adequate account of degrees of responsibility.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12293|
|Publisher statement:||This is the accepted version of the following article: Saunders, Joe (2019). Kant and Degrees of Responsibility. Journal of Applied Philosophy 36(1): 137-154, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12293. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.|
|Date accepted:||No date available|
|Date deposited:||13 December 2018|
|Date of first online publication:||04 January 2018|
|Date first made open access:||04 January 2020|
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