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Transcendental freedom and its discontents.

Saunders, Joe (2018) 'Transcendental freedom and its discontents.', Con-Textos Kantianos : International journal of philosophy., 1 (8). pp. 319-322.


This introduction briefly lays out the basics of Kant’s concept, transcendental freedom, and some of its discontents. It also provides an overview of the dossier itself, introducing Katerina Deligiorgi’s discussion of ought-implies-can, Patrick Frierson’s account of degrees of responsibility, and Jeanine Grenberg’s treatment of the third-person.

Item Type:Article
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Publisher statement:This article has been published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence.
Date accepted:28 September 2018
Date deposited:10 January 2019
Date of first online publication:31 December 2018
Date first made open access:No date available

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