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Constitutivism about epistemic normativity.

Cowie, Christopher and Greenberg, Alexander (2018) 'Constitutivism about epistemic normativity.', in Metaepistemology : realism and anti-realism. , pp. 173-196. Palgrave innovations in Philosophy.

Abstract

According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth. We ask whether there are persuasive arguments for the claim that belief stands in such a relation to truth. We examine and critique two arguments for this claim. The first is based on the transparency of belief. The second is based on Moore-paradoxical sentences. We develop a common objection to both. Both arguments are reliant on implausible claims about the relation between accepting a norm and being motivated by it. This point has sometimes been made in connection with the transparency of belief. But its development and application to Moore-paradoxical sentences are, we believe, novel.

Item Type:Book chapter
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8
Publisher statement:Cowie, Christopher & Greenberg, Alexander (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Kyriacou, Christos & McKenna, Robin Palgrave Macmillan. 173-196 reproduced with permission of Palgrave Macmillan. This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive, published, version of record is available here: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8
Date accepted:No date available
Date deposited:17 January 2019
Date of first online publication:20 September 2018
Date first made open access:20 September 2020

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