Smith, Benedict (2019) 'Hume on belief and vindicatory explanations.', Philosophy., 94 (2). pp. 313-337.
Hume's account of belief is understood to be inspired by allegedly incompatible motivations, one descriptive and expressing Hume's naturalism, the other normative and expressing Hume's epistemological aims. This understanding assumes a particular way in which these elements are distinct: an assumption that I dispute. I suggest that the explanatory-naturalistic aspects of Hume's account of belief are not incompatible with the normative-epistemological aspects. Rather, at least for some central cases of belief formation that Hume discusses at length, S's coming to believe that p can be explained in a way that vindicates S's belief that p.
|Full text:||(AM) Accepted Manuscript|
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|Publisher Web site:||https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819119000111|
|Publisher statement:||This article has been published in a revised form in Philosophy All author information hidden https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819119000111. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2019.|
|Date accepted:||11 January 2019|
|Date deposited:||06 February 2019|
|Date of first online publication:||25 April 2019|
|Date first made open access:||06 February 2019|
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