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Hume on belief and vindicatory explanations.

Smith, Benedict (2019) 'Hume on belief and vindicatory explanations.', Philosophy., 94 (2). pp. 313-337.

Abstract

Hume's account of belief is understood to be inspired by allegedly incompatible motivations, one descriptive and expressing Hume's naturalism, the other normative and expressing Hume's epistemological aims. This understanding assumes a particular way in which these elements are distinct: an assumption that I dispute. I suggest that the explanatory-naturalistic aspects of Hume's account of belief are not incompatible with the normative-epistemological aspects. Rather, at least for some central cases of belief formation that Hume discusses at length, S's coming to believe that p can be explained in a way that vindicates S's belief that p.

Item Type:Article
Full text:(AM) Accepted Manuscript
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819119000111
Publisher statement:This article has been published in a revised form in Philosophy All author information hidden https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819119000111. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2019.
Date accepted:11 January 2019
Date deposited:06 February 2019
Date of first online publication:25 April 2019
Date first made open access:06 February 2019

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