Smith, Benedict (2019) 'Hume on belief and vindicatory explanations.', Philosophy., 94 (2). pp. 313-337.
Abstract
Hume's account of belief is understood to be inspired by allegedly incompatible motivations, one descriptive and expressing Hume's naturalism, the other normative and expressing Hume's epistemological aims. This understanding assumes a particular way in which these elements are distinct: an assumption that I dispute. I suggest that the explanatory-naturalistic aspects of Hume's account of belief are not incompatible with the normative-epistemological aspects. Rather, at least for some central cases of belief formation that Hume discusses at length, S's coming to believe that p can be explained in a way that vindicates S's belief that p.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Full text: | (AM) Accepted Manuscript Download PDF (855Kb) |
| Status: | Peer-reviewed |
| Publisher Web site: | https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819119000111 |
| Publisher statement: | This article has been published in a revised form in Philosophy All author information hidden https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819119000111. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2019. |
| Date accepted: | 11 January 2019 |
| Date deposited: | 06 February 2019 |
| Date of first online publication: | 25 April 2019 |
| Date first made open access: | 06 February 2019 |
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