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Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Kamei, K.

Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma: Experimental Evidence Thumbnail


Authors

K. Kamei



Abstract

Exogenously imposed infinite repetition is known to mitigate people’s uncooperative behaviors in dilemma situations with partner matching through personal enforcement. One as yet unanswered question is whether people collectively choose to interact with each other under the partner matching condition when there exists an alternative possibility under random matching. In an indefinitely repeated public goods game framework, I let subjects democratically choose whether to (1) play with pre-assigned specific others for all rounds or to (2) play with randomly matched counterparts in every round. The experimental results revealed that most groups collectively opt for the partner matching protocol. The data also indicated that groups achieve a higher level of cooperation when they democratically select the partner matching protocol by voting, relative to when the same option is exogenously imposed. These findings imply that people’s equilibrium selection may be affected by how the basic rules of games are introduced (endogenously or exogenously). The paper provides further evidence to suggest that the positive effect of democratic decision-making is stronger when the majority voting rule, rather than the unanimity rule, is applied.

Citation

Kamei, K. (2019). Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma: Experimental Evidence. International Journal of Game Theory, 48(3), 797-834. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00663-7

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Feb 9, 2019
Online Publication Date Feb 28, 2019
Publication Date Sep 30, 2019
Deposit Date Feb 14, 2019
Publicly Available Date Mar 1, 2019
Journal International Journal of Game Theory
Print ISSN 0020-7276
Electronic ISSN 1432-1270
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 48
Issue 3
Pages 797-834
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00663-7
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1337690

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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Copyright Statement
Advance online version © The Author(s) 2019. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.





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