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Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?

Cowie, Christopher

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Abstract

In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. I focus on a constitutive norm relates that relates belief to knowledge. I develop this explanation. I then present a challenge to it. Norm-based explanations of Moore’s Paradox must appeal to a ‘linking principle’ that explains what is wrong with violating the constitutive norm. But it is difficult to articulate a plausible candidate linking-principle. I show this by canvassing the obvious candidates and articulating the problems with each.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2020). Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?. Philosophical Studies, 177(6), 1685-1702. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01280-6

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Mar 6, 2019
Online Publication Date Mar 25, 2019
Publication Date Jun 30, 2020
Deposit Date Mar 6, 2019
Publicly Available Date Apr 5, 2019
Journal Philosophical studies
Print ISSN 0031-8116
Electronic ISSN 1573-0883
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 177
Issue 6
Pages 1685-1702
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01280-6

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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Copyright Statement
Advance online version © The Author(s) 2019.
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.





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