Cowie, Christopher (2020) 'Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore's Paradox?', Philosophical studies., 177 (6). pp. 1685-1702.
Abstract
In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. I focus on a constitutive norm relates that relates belief to knowledge. I develop this explanation. I then present a challenge to it. Norm-based explanations of Moore’s Paradox must appeal to a ‘linking principle’ that explains what is wrong with violating the constitutive norm. But it is difficult to articulate a plausible candidate linking-principle. I show this by canvassing the obvious candidates and articulating the problems with each.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Full text: | Publisher-imposed embargo (AM) Accepted Manuscript File format - PDF (292Kb) |
| Full text: | (VoR) Version of Record Available under License - Creative Commons Attribution. Download PDF (Advance online version) (248Kb) |
| Full text: | (VoR) Version of Record Available under License - Creative Commons Attribution. Download PDF (238Kb) |
| Status: | Peer-reviewed |
| Publisher Web site: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01280-6 |
| Publisher statement: | © The Author(s) 2019. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. |
| Date accepted: | 06 March 2019 |
| Date deposited: | 06 March 2019 |
| Date of first online publication: | 25 March 2019 |
| Date first made open access: | 28 April 2020 |
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