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Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore's Paradox?

Cowie, Christopher (2020) 'Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore's Paradox?', Philosophical studies., 177 (6). pp. 1685-1702.

Abstract

In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. I focus on a constitutive norm relates that relates belief to knowledge. I develop this explanation. I then present a challenge to it. Norm-based explanations of Moore’s Paradox must appeal to a ‘linking principle’ that explains what is wrong with violating the constitutive norm. But it is difficult to articulate a plausible candidate linking-principle. I show this by canvassing the obvious candidates and articulating the problems with each.

Item Type:Article
Full text:Publisher-imposed embargo
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Full text:(VoR) Version of Record
Available under License - Creative Commons Attribution.
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Status:Peer-reviewed
Publisher Web site:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01280-6
Publisher statement:© The Author(s) 2019. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Date accepted:06 March 2019
Date deposited:06 March 2019
Date of first online publication:25 March 2019
Date first made open access:28 April 2020

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